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INTRODUCTION 
 
onsidering the large aid effectiveness literature, contradicting findings of scholarly 
work (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004) and new rigorous 
evidence rather shows that the aggregated effect of development assistance is not 
significantly measurable (Dreher and Langlotz 2017). The picture looks more nuanced, 
however and unsurprisingly, if we disentangle development assistance into its different 
delivery modes (World Bank 2006), types (Dreher et al. 2008; Clemens et al. 2012) or specific 
deliverers such as individual bilateral donor countries (e.g., Berthélemy 2006; Minoiu and 
Reddy 2010 or the first Chapter). However, what exactly is it that makes development 
cooperation effective in contributing to improved living conditions in developing countries? 
The present dissertation contributes to the literature which is motivated by this question and 
seeks to produce scientific responses. In this vein, I address the role of personal characteristics 
and commitment of individuals in charge of development cooperation, namely development 
ministers and power structures in multilateral organizations dedicated to fostering 
development, namely the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
Subsequently, I look closer into the domains where success or failure of development 
cooperation is determined, i.e., at the level of project implementation. Jointly with my co-
authors, we examine our own development intervention, which we conducted as an impact 
evaluation in Indonesia, to identify determinants of successful intervention design, which may 
be useful to the research community and implementers of development interventions. Such 
impact evaluations of development projects generally have the sole purpose of increasing the 
effectiveness of development assistance through identifying what works, and what does not, 
and why. Their immanent success in actually fulfilling this goal and measurably contributing 
to increased development effectiveness was not quantitatively examined so far, however, and 
constitutes the final Chapter of this dissertation. 
Undoubtedly, development cooperation in practice is aware of its challenges and 
tackles them through initiatives like the Paris Declaration from 2005 or the Accra Agenda for 
Action from 2008 (OECD, 2008). Especially the Paris Declaration was a milestone in 
C 
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acknowledging the importance of ownership of recipients, harmonization among donor 
countries, alignment of recipient and donor systems, mutual accountability for development 
access and measurement of results as preconditions and pathways for effective development 
assistance. In light of descriptive statistics that indeed suggest an increasing aid quality after 
the Paris Declaration in 2005, me and my co-authors were interested to see whether this aid of 
higher quality was then capable of leading to improved living conditions measured through 
growth. This is indeed what our difference-in-differences analysis presented in Chapter 1 
(Minasyan, Nunnenkamp and Richert 2017) suggests. 
Naturally then appears the subsequent question. If we find that good quality assistance 
can affect growth, as opposed to aid of average quality – what determines the seemingly 
crucial provision of such good quality aid? Andreas Fuchs and I approached the determinants 
of bilateral aid volumes and their quality by examining the characteristics of the individuals, 
who decide over them – the development ministers. Evidence is presented in Chapter 2 (Fuchs 
and Richert 2018). Within a sample of more than 300 development ministers from 23 OECD 
member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), we find that ministers 
with more experience in office are better suited to fight for higher budgets, and that female 
ministers are associated with Official Development Assistance (ODA) of higher quality as well 
as the ones with specific prior professional experience in development cooperation. While it 
does not come at a surprise that adequately qualified individuals are better at doing their jobs 
(which is in line with the literature on other political positions), it is disappointing that only a 
mere 16 percent of the ministers in our sample possessed such a specific qualification when 
taking office. Potentially, our findings can contribute to overthink common tendencies to 
allocate the aid ministry more randomly than other issue areas due to the low domestic 
salience of aid policy. Why female ministers seem to give ODA of better quality is less obvious 
and we give some potential explanations in the chapter. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates 
that specific commitment of individuals can make a difference, which is also in line with 
anecdotal evidence (Day, 2016). Our identification strategy is rigorous, but cannot establish 
causality, however.  
While we have one person in charge for the respective bilateral development assistance 
of individual countries, multilateral aid agencies are governed by their member states through 
boards. One of the major multilateral aid agencies is the World Bank. Within the World Bank 
Axel Dreher and me focus on its private sector lending arm IFC, which is the largest global 
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development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing countries 
(International Finance Corporation 2016). The IFC’s day-to-day business is largely governed 
by its Board of Executive Directors, which consists of 25 mainly rotating member country 
representatives and the World Bank President. The Executive Directors have to approve every 
IFC project and therefore possess substantial leverage over the Corporation’s business. This 
institution attracts our attention, as the bulk of IFC’s lending benefits companies from 
industrialized countries, which receive loans from the IFC and use them mainly to operate 
projects in developing countries with middle income (Ellmers et al. 2010). Building an 
identification strategy which largely eliminates endogeneity concerns, we find that power 
structures actually significantly determine project destinations and volumes. If recipient and 
donor countries are jointly represented at the board of directors or at the politically influential 
position of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), they get more, which benefits donor 
countries’ operating companies as well as the countries receiving the projects. This practice 
comes with the concern that accordingly not the countries in most need and best project 
operators are supported by the IFC, but those of the most powerful members. This is 
particularly striking as Dreher et al. (2018) show that politically motivated aid tends to be less 
effective. What is more, the regulatory structure of the IFC makes the observed practice 
unlikely to change for good, as the ones who benefit from the system in operation are unlikely 
to alter it. 
Independent from which fortunate or unfortunate circumstances may have led to 
development projects, specifically and ultimately, the implementers of such projects have their 
individual capacities and opportunities to run interventions in an effective way. Many 
development projects aim at behavioral change. My co-authors Lennart Kaplan, Sebastian 
Vollmer and I conducted such an intervention and, at the same time, evaluated its 
effectiveness. In the framework of a randomized controlled trial (RCT), we evaluated in 
Indonesia, whether a checklist with the essential practices to be done during deliveries lead to 
safer deliveries.1 The precondition of this intervention to work is thus, health personnel 
sustainably changing their behavior towards using the checklist.  However, there is not much 
general guidance available in what actually drives these so-called take-up rates. We therefore 
                                                     
1 The idea is based on promising experience that had been made with checklists for surgeries 
implemented all over the world, in countries of any income group (Gawande, 2009). 
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examined the determinants of take-up rates with the example of our specific intervention to 
inform the general project implementation literature about incentivizing factors that can be 
included in the implementation design. Alongside group pressure, pressure from superiors 
and believe in the own capabilities to perform the task, especially the general attitude towards 
the behavior appeared to be crucial. This attitude determinant describes whether participants 
judged the checklist to be useful for their work. The attitude accordingly depends on 
motivating the respective behavior and is hence particularly well in control of project 
implementers. We elaborated further on this determinant within a field experiment and found 
that framing can influence the intention to use the checklist. When the role of international 
researchers for the project design was highlighted, health personnel were more likely to 
support the checklist, than when the local effort was accentuated.2 We randomized treatment 
groups, which reduces concerns about the internal validity of our experiment, however, we 
refrain from claiming external validity. In fact, we conclude that framing can be a cost-effective 
way of improving take-up rates in interventions, particularly about implementers’ 
characteristics. Which highlights will be effective, however, depends on the context.  
There is currently much debate on whether such impact evaluations – as we conducted 
one on Safe Childbirth – are actually a meaningful solution to improve overall development 
effectiveness or whether they rather divert too many resources from other important areas in 
development economics. However, evidence on the overall impact of impact evaluations is 
generally scarce, despite their long history of 40 years in practice, and mainly limited to 
qualitative research. My final dissertation chapter contributes first quantitative findings to the 
debate. In a cross-country setting, I find positive correlations between the number of impact 
evaluations conducted in health and health outcomes. However, endogeneity concerns are 
particularly difficult to disentangle in the cross-country setting. The subnational level offers 
improved conditions for directive linkages of impact evaluations in health leading to better 
health conditions via corresponding development projects. Also sub-nationally, my results 
robustly indicate that impact evaluations in maternal and newborn health are associated with 
reduced infant mortality through improved corresponding projects. Impact evaluations, 
                                                     
2 Local and international researchers were involved in the implementation design, we simply 
highlighted the one more than the other and vice versa.  
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accordingly, seem like a meaningful, statistically measurable option to improve development 
effectiveness.  
In a nutshell, my research shows that there is still room for improvement – to be filled 
with very tangible suggestions, and this dissertation hints at some factors which might lead to 
positive change. I hope the presented empirical evidence is informative to policy and can 
contribute to the ongoing debate on development effectiveness. 
Moreover, the dissertation contributes several databases to the research community. 
Specifically, I created three new databases jointly with my co-authors and research assistants 
and enhanced two further datasets. In the first Chapter, we disentangle the aggregated 
measure for quality-aid developed by Roodman into its components and make it available to 
the research community. The second Chapter builds a new and comprehensive dataset on all 
development ministers and government heads from 1967 to 2012 for 23 member countries of 
the OECD’s DAC and collects information on their personal characteristics with regard to 
gender, political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, and time 
in office. For the third Chapter, we collected data on the base countries of companies, which 
conduct IFC projects in recipient countries. While the recipients of all projects are available via 
the IFC website, the home countries of operating companies were less obvious. We collect 
information for 4557 projects over 23 years from 1994-2016. The dataset on Safe Childbirth 
Checklist use is also completely new as it was created through our intervention. Besides data 
on health personnel’s motivation or attitudes towards work, which is quite specific to our 
research question, the survey-based dataset entails information on hospital staffing, 
equipment, number of patients, mortality or morbidity rates. This information can be 
particularly useful to future research as administrative data for Aceh is generally scarce. The 
final Chapter made excessive use of a new database on all impact evaluations from the 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation’s repository and significantly enhanced it for the 
country Uganda. For all 100 impact evaluation studies in health conducted in Uganda between 
1995-2014 and included in the repository, I collected further information based on the original 
studies. I categorized the interventions into eight specific sub-categories and coded their 
outcomes, treatment duration and location. This dataset is available for future research. 
The dissertation employs different empirical methods depending on the research 
question. My work is mainly based on panel-data regression analysis across countries or 
within a quasi-panel with georeferenced data for the country Uganda, using ordinary least 
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squares (OLS) with different kinds of fixed effects. The application of an adequate set of fixed 
effects is neat as it can reduce the endogeneity concern of omitted-variable-bias substantially 
and leads to meaningful correlations. In combination with a source of exogenous variation as 
used in the third Chapter, this method can largely eliminate endogeneity concerns. For the 
fourth Chapter, we were (partly) able to apply the so-called “gold standard” of causal 
inference and used randomized data, which we collected within the RCT and evaluated simple 
differences between treatment and control group. A differences-in-differences approach was 
used for the first Chapter on the effects of quality-adjusted ODA. 
A compact overview of each chapter’s specifics is given in the following: 
 
CHAPTER 1 
It has been intensively and controversially discussed whether ‘good’ economic policies and 
governance in the recipient countries render foreign aid more effective in alleviating poverty 
and stimulating economic growth. By contrast, the question of whether aid recipient countries 
would benefit from stronger income effects if foreign donors provided higher quality aid has 
received scant attention so far. In Chapter 1, we make use of the index of donor performance 
from the Center for Global Development to compare the effects of quality-adjusted aid and 
unadjusted aid on changes in GDP per capita. Our difference-in-differences analysis reveals 
significant and quantitatively important treatment effects for quality-adjusted aid after the 
introduction of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, while we do not find 
significant treatment effects for unadjusted aid. This implies that only recipient countries with 
increased aid inflows of high quality benefit in terms of increasing GDP per capita. The quality 
of aid matters most when accounting for delayed effects. However, our results depend on the 
sample of recipient countries.  
CHAPTER 2 
Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international 
development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee since the organization started reporting detailed ODA data in 1967. Understanding 
their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions can influence aid effectiveness 
and thus economic development on the ground. Chapter 2 examines whether development 
ministers’ personal characteristics are associated with aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, 
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we create a novel database on development ministers’ gender, political ideology, prior 
professional experience in development cooperation, education, and time in office over the 
1967-2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal 
characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced 
ministers with respect to their time in the development office obtain larger aid budgets. 
Moreover, our results suggest that female ministers as well as officeholders with prior 
professional experience in development cooperation and a longer time in office provide 
higher-quality ODA. 
CHAPTER 3 
The bulk of IFC lending benefits companies from rich countries, and projects in countries with 
middle income. Large conglomerates such as Lidl or Mövenpick have been among its direct 
beneficiaries. This contrasts to some extent with the IFC’s official mandate, which is to finance 
poverty-reducing projects for which private capital is not available on reasonable terms. In 
Chapter 3, we investigate the drivers of this mismatch. According to our theory, the 
governments of industrialized countries where borrowing companies are based form 
coalitions with governments of middle-income countries where the projects are implemented. 
We therefore expect preferential treatment to be most pronounced when the representatives 
of both the recipient’s and the company’s countries are best able to collude in exerting their 
influence. We argue that this will be the case when both countries’ governments are 
represented among the IFC’s Board of Executive Directors, and when they have extraordinary 
clout with major IFC shareholders. Using data for more than 3,000 IFC projects over the 1995-
2015 period we show that the (joint) influence of these countries helps them to receive a 
disproportional share of IFC funding. 
CHAPTER 4 
The success of development interventions crucially depends on their uptake in the targeted 
population. We investigate incentives for uptake of those interventions, making use of a 
framework grounded in psychological theory, “The Theory of Planned Behavior”. The 
framework suggests three determinants for intervention uptake: personal attitudes, the social 
influence of important others and the perceived ease of intervention use. We use the setup of 
two randomized controlled trials in Indonesia and Pakistan to test the theory for development 
intervention purposes. Our findings show that the proposed determinants are indeed 
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associated with increased uptake. We investigate further on the determinant personal 
attitudes, which is most relevant to our intervention, by conducting a framed field experiment 
in Indonesia. The experiment shows that the study population in the Indonesian context 
exhibits higher levels of support for the project if the participation of international actors is 
highlighted. Consequently, our results encourage international research and development 
cooperation, first, to consider the determinants suggested by the “Theory of Planned 
Behavior” in the design of projects in order to increase intervention uptake. Second, depending 
on the country context, explicitly framing international participation in the conducted project 
might be a cost-effective way to increase supportive behavior towards the intervention. 
CHAPTER 5 
This chapter assesses the impact of impact evaluations based on impact evaluation studies in 
developmental health interventions, collected through the International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation’s repository. Considering the steady increase in impact evaluations and financial 
resources already spent, policy and research are demanding evidence on whether the growing 
effort indeed leads to learning, improved projects and finally, improved outcomes. I analyze 
this empirical question for the period 1995-2014 in a cross-country panel for general health 
outcomes and at a sub-national level for the country Uganda with regard to infant mortality 
rates per districts. Results are very robust and show a significant correlation between impact 
evaluations in health and improved outcomes on a cross-country level. Based on more precise 
data measurement and linkages, also sub-national findings indicate that impact evaluations in 
maternal and neonatal health conditional on increased corresponding ODA disbursements 
lead to reduced infant mortality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Does Aid Effectiveness Depend on the Quality of 
Donors?3 
Co-authored with Anna Minasyan and Peter Nunnenkamp 
 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
t has been intensively and controversially discussed whether ‘good’ economic policies and 
governance in the recipient countries render foreign aid more effective in alleviating poverty 
and stimulating economic growth. The role of the recipient countries’ policies and 
institutions has been stressed by the World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000). Skeptical 
assessments include Easterly et al. (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Considerably less 
attention has been paid to the question of how donor policies could enhance the effectiveness of 
aid, even though the recent literature offers several indications that the source of funding matters. 
Specifically, it appears that the effects of aid depend on political characteristics of the donors, the 
motives underlying their aid, and complementary (non-aid) policies.  
Concerning political characteristics, Bermeo (2011) finds that aid from democratic donors 
promotes democratization in the recipient countries, whereas aid from authoritarian donors is 
negatively associated with democratization. According to Dreher et al. (2015), political 
                                                     
3 Chapter available as published article: Minasyan, Anna, Peter Nunnenkamp and Katharina Richert (2017). 
Does Aid Effectiveness Depend on the Quality of Donors? World Development 100: 16-30. 
I 
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misalignment and greater ideological distance between donor and recipient governments reduces 
the growth effects of aid by adding to transaction costs and eroding trust.  
Focusing on trade-related motives of aid, Berthélemy (2006) differentiates between selfish 
and altruistic donors. Based on such classifications from the aid allocation literature, Minoiu and 
Reddy (2010) distinguish the growth effects of so-called developmental and non-developmental 
aid. These authors find that only developmental aid promotes economic growth in the recipient 
countries. In a similar vein, Kilby and Dreher (2010) find that the growth impact of aid that 
addresses recipient needs differs from the impact of aid that is motivated by donor interests. 
However, the donor classifications used by Minoiu and Reddy (2010) tend to be ad hoc and are 
typically time invariant. Strategic and geopolitical motives of donors are also likely to erode the 
effectiveness of aid. Headey (2008), Bearce and Tirone (2010), and Bermeo (2016) consider aid to 
be geopolitically motivated under Cold War conditions. Dreher et al. (2018) show that aid is less 
effective in promoting growth when recipient countries are strategically important as temporary 
members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Dreher et al. (2013) come to similar conclusions 
when investigating the effect of UNSC membership on the evaluation of World Bank projects. 
The effectiveness of aid may also depend on complementary donor policies. For instance, 
empirical evidence presented by Minasyan and Nunnenkamp (2016) suggests that higher 
remittances paid by donor countries, proxying for worker mobility and migration, strengthen the 
growth effects of aid. Instead of assessing conditional aid effects, Gary and Maurel (2015) 
construct a measure of donors’ policy consistency which includes aid as one of seven elements.4 
They find that more consistent donor policies are associated with higher growth in the recipient 
countries. 
In contrast to Gary and Maurel (2015), we focus on the quality of the donors’ aid policies in 
the following. Our analysis thus resembles the distinction between developmental and non-
developmental aid by Minoiu and Reddy (2010). However, we employ a time varying measure of 
the quality of donors to address the question of whether the income effects of aid depend on the 
                                                     
4 All elements (aid, trade, migration, investment, technology, security, and environment) are part of the 
Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index (for details see: 
http://www.cgdev.org/cdi-2015). 
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source of funding. Specifically, we make use of the periodical ranking of donors by Roodman 
(2012) which is available from the Center for Global Development on an annual basis since 1995.5 
Roodman’s ranking covers various aspects of aid-related policies, e.g., by discounting tied aid, 
adjusting for selective aid allocation, penalizing project proliferation, and rewarding tax policies 
to support private giving.  
Accounting for aid-related policies and adjusting nominal aid disbursements accordingly 
results in a measure of ‘effective’ donor support that may deviate substantially from the aid 
figures typically applied in previous studies on the aid-growth nexus. At the same time, the 
deviation between quality-adjusted aid and nominal aid varies considerably across donors and 
over time (for details see Section 1.2.). Consequently, the income effects in the recipient countries 
are likely to depend on the composition of donors contributing to overall aid inflows. Against this 
backdrop, we hypothesize that it is quality-adjusted aid, rather than nominal aid, from which 
recipient countries might benefit in terms of higher GDP per capita. Based on Roodman (2012) we 
calculate the effective amount of quality-adjusted aid that recipient countries receive from donors 
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
The Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness from 2005 marked a political turning point 
in the aid effectiveness debate focusing on improved donor policies. Our descriptive data indeed 
show an increase in quality-adjusted aid thereafter. Accordingly, we run a difference-in-
differences analysis using the year 2005 as dividing line between two 6-year periods before and 
after the PD. The approach reveals significant treatment effects for quality-adjusted aid, while we 
do not find significant treatment effects for unadjusted aid. Hence, we offer new empirical 
evidence for the notion that even though nominal amounts of aid might not affect growth, 
development cooperation can still have positive income effects if donors improve the quality of 
their aid.  
1.2. THE QUALITY OF AID – MEASUREMENT AND RELEVANCE 
Developmental aid can be defined as the part of aid that actually has the potential to foster 
economic growth in the recipient countries, in contrast to non-developmental aid. Previous 
                                                     
5 We are most grateful to David Roodman for sharing his data. 
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studies typically distinguish between the two types of aid by separating donors into distinct 
categories of ‘superior’ versus ‘inferior’, or ‘altruistic’ versus ‘selfish’ and comparing the effects of 
total aid from these groups (e.g., Berthélemy 2006 and Minoiu and Reddy 2010). With this 
strategy, studies might miss the fact that aid by a specific donor is not homogenous (Kilby and 
Dreher 2010). However, surprisingly few research tools are available to calculate the amount of 
effective development aid within a donor country’s total aid disbursements and even less so 
within a recipient country’s total aid receipts. A reliable measure of effective aid would empower 
the ongoing research on the link between aid and economic growth and help identify ways to 
increase the effectiveness of aid. 
The Center for Global Development (CGD) provides such a tool from the donor 
perspective for total aid disbursements: By assessing the quality of donors’ aid policies, the CGD 
derives the total amounts donors give in effective development aid. Specifically, the CGD applies 
donor-specific and time-varying discount factors to each donor’s nominal aid. For calculations of 
the discount factor, Roodman (2012) includes only the net amounts of aid after subtracting interest 
and principal payments, debt relief and rescheduled debt from gross disbursements. Roodman 
penalizes aid allocated to richer and to more corrupt countries. He further penalizes tied aid and 
project proliferation. More precisely, tied aid is expected to increase the administrative burden for 
recipient countries and to reduce the value for money, as donor-produced products have to be 
imported which are not necessarily the most competitive products. These direct and opportunity 
costs are estimated to reduce the value of disbursements by 13-23 percent. Similarly, a large 
number of small projects per donor, known as project proliferation, add to administrative costs 
and are therefore penalized. Finally, Roodman (2012) rewards fiscal incentives for charitable 
giving. Tax policies that encourage private donations reduce the discount factor as more funds 
for civil society organizations increase the amount of money that can be used for development 
purposes in recipient countries. 
Roodman’s account of aid-related policies affects effective donor support to varying 
degree. Comparing the 28 DAC donor countries in our sample, Sweden provides aid of highest 
quality, whereas the Slovak Republic represents the taillight. Net aid disbursements6 are on 
                                                     
6 In calculating the discount rate we follow Roodman (2012) and use his net aid measure. 
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average discounted by 44 percent for Sweden, compared to 77 percent for the Slovak Republic 
(Figure 1.1.). Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 1.2., the discount factor varies considerably 
over time for individual donors. 
Figure 1.1. Mean discount factors per donor country (1995-2011) 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Discount factor development for selected donors (1995-2011) 
 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
D
is
c
o
u
n
t 
fa
c
to
r 
(%
)
S
w
e
d
e
n
Ir
e
la
n
d
D
e
n
m
a
rk
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
F
in
la
n
d
N
o
rw
a
y
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
C
a
n
a
d
a
B
e
lg
iu
m
G
e
rm
a
n
y
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s
Ic
e
la
n
d
A
u
s
tr
ia
J
a
p
a
n
G
re
e
c
e
F
ra
n
c
e
S
p
a
in
It
a
ly
K
o
re
a
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
P
o
la
n
d
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
S
lo
v
a
k
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
Mean discount factor per donor country (1995-2011)
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
D
is
c
o
u
n
t 
fa
c
to
r 
(%
)
1995 2000 2005 2010
Japan USA
UK Germany
Norway France
Sweden
Discount factor development (1995-2011)
17 
 
Based on Roodman’s (2012) approach we calculate the amount of effective development 
aid that recipient countries finally receive. While the discount factor varies across donors and over 
time, it applies to all recipient countries.7 Our measure of quality-adjusted aid (QualAid) uses the 
donor-specific discount factors (d) at time t to adjust each donor j’s bilateral aid disbursements 
(Aid) to particular recipient countries i at time t. By aggregating all quality-adjusted aid 
disbursements from the 28 DAC-donors per recipient, we calculate the total amount of quality-
adjusted aid that each recipient receives per year (QualAidit):  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
28
𝑗=1
= ∑ (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗
28
𝑗=1
𝑑𝑗𝑡)     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑗𝑡 ≤ 1    (1) 
As a result, the variation of quality-adjusted aid across recipient countries stems from 
varying contributions of specific donors to the recipient’s overall aid inflows at different points in 
time.8 Figure 1.3. compares the sum of quality-adjusted aid and unadjusted aid for all recipient 
countries over our period of observation from 1995-2011. 
  
                                                     
7 Clearly, it would be preferable to calculate the discount factors bilaterally for each donor-recipient pair. 
To the best of our knowledge, the data situation does not allow for a comprehensive calculation of the 
quality of aid at the bilateral level. Moreover, for some quality aspects of Roodman’s measure, the 
principally superior bilateral approach appears to be infeasible for conceptual reasons. This applies 
especially to Roodman’s (2012) account of the tax policies of donor countries that reward charitable private 
giving in general, i.e., to all recipient countries alike. Note however, that we present complementary 
estimations at the bilateral level based on so-called country-programmable aid (CPA), which excludes debt 
relief and other items that cannot be used productively in recipient countries – similar to the first steps of 
Roodman’s calculation of donor discounts. See Table 1.3. in Section 1.4. for details. 
8 The limitation of this approach would be less serious if donors gave aid of similar quality to all recipient 
countries. We address this issue in detail in Appendix A1. Indeed, we find very few significant differences 
in the quality of aid from specific DAC donors between recipient countries in the treatment and control 
groups.  
18 
 
Figure 1.3. Quality-adjusted aid versus unadjusted aid, total US$ for all recipient countries per 
year (1995-2011) 
 
Interestingly, total quality-adjusted aid disbursements rise notably from 2007 onwards. A 
change in policies takes time until it can result in actual change on the ground. Considering the 
time usually required to disburse commitments due to administrative delay and existing 
contracts, the increase of quality-adjusted aid matches the onset of the Paris Declaration in 2005 
quite well.9 With regard to aid effectiveness, a clear change in donor policies was attempted to be 
induced by the PD. The signatories of the PD committed themselves to improve the quality and, 
thus, the effectiveness of aid (OECD 2008).10 What is more, additional initiatives in the same year 
such as the UN Millennium Project (UNDP 2005) and the Commission for Africa (2005) 
strengthened the case for intensified donor efforts and a concentration of aid on the particularly 
needy. Also, at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005, political leaders agreed to substantially 
increase aid by about US$ 50 billion per annum (by 2010) and to double aid to Africa 
(http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/g8overview.htm).  
                                                     
9 In Appendix B1., we present a placebo test by hypothetically pre-dating the Paris Declaration by five years 
to assess its relevance for explaining the nexus between quality-adjusted aid and changes in GDP per capita. 
10 For details of the Paris Declaration see: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (accessed: 
May 2016). 
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
B
ill
io
n
 U
S
$
 (
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
1
2
)
1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Quality-adj. aid (total) Unadj. aid (total)
19 
 
The commitments made by donors in 2005 have been met to varying degree, and the 
contribution of donors to the increase in quality-adjusted aid differs between the aid policy 
aspects considered by Roodman (2012) to calculate the above noted discount factors. Various 
donors contributed to the increase in quality-adjusted aid by raising the share of funds that 
actually reach the recipient countries and are available there for a productive use. In particular, 
most donors narrowed the gap between gross and net aid by lowering the repayment obligations 
of recipients.11 Furthermore, nominal aid items not involving actual financial transfers to recipient 
countries played a minor role after the PD. While debt relief and rescheduling accounted for more 
than one fifth of all donors’ aid commitments in 2005, this share dwindled to less than three 
percent in 2009-2011.12 
Moreover, most donors improved the quality of aid by increasingly untying aid. For the 
overall sample of donor countries, Roodman’s (2012) ‘penalty’ for tying aid declined from 7.1 
percent of total net aid in 1999-2004 to 3.8 percent in 2006-2011. Untying was most pronounced by 
this measure for Canada, Italy, Spain and the United States, whereas two major donors – Germany 
and Japan – counteracted this trend by higher penalties for tying aid after the PD. 
Fewer donors helped improve the quality of aid by less proliferation and greater 
selectivity. Proliferation, as reflected in Roodman’s (2012) project size weights, hardly changed 
when comparing the periods 1999-2004 and 2006-2011 for all donors taken together. On the one 
hand, ten donor countries improved the quality of aid by reducing proliferation – most notably 
France, Australia, Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, proliferation increased for some 
major donors such as Germany and Japan. Finally, the evidence from Roodman’s selectivity 
weights suggests that the quality of aid hardly improved through a more selective aid allocation. 
Some donors, notably the United States and Japan, became more selective compared to 2005. 
However, selectivity was exceptionally weak at the time of the PD. 
Considering the year 2005 and the conclusion of the PD as a quasi-experiment, we use the 
Roodman measure as proxy for improved quality of aid after 2005 and test whether the increase 
                                                     
11 Japan represents a major exception in this respect. Excluding Japan, the share of repayments in gross aid 
declined to less than eight percent in 2006-2011. 
12 For details see: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1 
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in quality-adjusted aid translated into more effectiveness on the ground, in terms of increased 
recipient countries’ GDP per capita (see next section for details). In the remainder of this section, 
we argue that policy changes induced by the PD should be captured by Roodman’s measure of 
quality-adjusted aid. Furthermore, we argue that this measure of quality-adjusted aid should be 
more capable of affecting economic growth than unadjusted aid. 
Roodman’s (2012) index was developed two years before the PD was signed and can 
apparently not have been intended to measure potential impacts thereof. All the same, the 
elements of Roodman’s index are closely related to relevant aspects of the donors’ aid policies that 
are also highlighted in the PD, which raised overall awareness of quality differences in aid by 
clarifying norms and focusing on the quality of aid partnerships (Wood et al. 2011).  Roodman’s 
points on the need to reduce tied aid and project proliferation are reflected in two out of the twelve 
PD indicators to measure progress (OECD 2008).13 Furthermore, Roodman’s selectivity weights 
for poorer and well-governed recipients as well as the reward for increased charitable giving are 
in line with the recommendation by Wood et al. (2011) to enforce the implementation of the PD 
by focusing on the poorest population, highlighting the impact of corruption, and encouraging 
stronger engagement with civil society organizations. Arguably, Roodman’s academic index 
construction influenced the political progress of concluding important parts of the PD. 
Consequently, we can reasonably expect that our measure of quality-adjusted aid is superior to 
unadjusted nominal aid in capturing economic growth effects if the PD had an impact on the 
effectiveness of aid. 
Concerning the aid-growth link, we advance two arguments why quality-adjusted aid 
should matter, rather than unadjusted aid. First, the quality-adjusted measure takes into account 
that only funds that actually reach the recipient countries can be used there productively. Most 
importantly, the quality-adjusted measure nets out principal and interest payments and excludes 
items such as debt relief and rescheduling that do not involve actual financial transfers to the 
                                                     
13 In the PD, the OECD echoes Roodman’s call for untying aid, in order to get better value for money (OECD 
2008: 5). Indicator 8 tracks the degree to which aid is untied, under the second PD principle “Alignment.” 
The need to reduce project proliferation for more aid quality is addressed by the OECD under the principle 
“Harmonisation.” Indicator 9 encourages program based approaches, instead of many small and distinct 
donor projects (OECD 2008: 6). Moreover, the call for less project proliferation and reduced donor 
fragmentation is taken up in several parts of the PD (see, e.g., paragraphs 6, 21, and 33). 
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recipient country. Moreover, it discounts tied aid appropriately and penalizes project 
proliferation, but also rewards tax policies that encourage charitable giving to arrive at financial 
transfers actually available for productive use. Second, the quality-adjusted aid measure accounts 
for development-oriented donor motives and allocation mechanisms. Roodman’s selectivity 
weights for poorer and better governed countries are particularly important in this respect. As 
argued by Kilby and Dreher (2010), more development-oriented donor motives can lead to more 
effective use of aid on the ground. Development-oriented donors are more likely to allocate aid to 
countries that credibly show efforts for effective use and to withhold tranches if recipients do not 
stick to the committed use of funds. Development-oriented donors are also more likely to adhere 
to mechanisms that increase aid effectiveness, for instance by applying the commitments made in 
the PD such as using the partners’ accounting mechanisms, embedding projects sustainably, and 
enforcing monitoring and control mechanisms (OECD 2008).  
1.3. APPROACH AND DATA 
We perform a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis to assess whether the income effects of aid 
depend on the quality of donors providing aid to recipient country i at time t.14 Our dependent 
variable is the difference in GDP per capita (GDPpc) between two points in time, as reported in 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.15 GDPpc is logged before differencing. 
The DD approach combines before-after and with-without comparisons of the difference in 
GDPpc. This combination helps mitigate the limitations of both types of comparison when used 
in isolation. The simple before-after approach would compare the difference in GDPpc in aid 
recipient countries prior and subsequent to a distinct change in donor behavior. Clearly, the 
implicit assumption that no other omitted variable might have affected our dependent variable 
over time is unlikely to hold. The simple with-without alternative of comparing the difference in 
GDPpc between countries benefitting from the change in donor behavior and those not benefitting 
                                                     
14 The description of the DD approach draws on Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2011). 
15 Alternatively, we consider the growth rate of GDP per capita as well as the level of GDP per capita as 
dependent variables. See Section 1.4. for details. 
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would ignore that our dependent variable might have developed differently in the treatment and 
control groups due to time-varying factors unrelated to aid.  
The DD estimator removes any fixed country effects and any fixed time trends. According 
to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009: 67), the DD approach “is often associated with so-called ‘natural 
experiments’, where policy changes can be used to effectively define control and treatment 
groups.”16 However, in this study, we do not have the ideal DD setting, as there is no group of 
developing countries that is exogenously excluded from receiving quality-adjusted aid. We will 
describe in detail below how this identification challenge is solved based on Abadie (2005). 
Moreover, concerns about causal inference are not completely resolved in the present context. 
While first-differencing removes omitted-variable bias from time-invariant factors, it does not 
address omitted-variable bias from time-variant characteristics of recipient countries (Clemens et 
al. 2012; Roodman 2015). For instance, donors may grant more quality-adjusted aid to new 
governments embarking on growth-promoting reform programs.17 This would violate our 
implicit assumption that quality-adjusted aid is distributed randomly across recipients, based on 
previously established bilateral aid relations with donors taking autonomous decisions on the 
quality of their aid.18 Consequently, higher growth could then be spuriously attributed to quality-
adjusted aid. In this study, we control for some of the apparent time-varying factors, such as trade 
and governance measures. However, factors that are not consistently observed and measured 
remain unaddressed. 
Our period of observation is 1999-2011. The limiting factor is the assessment of the donors’ 
quality which is not available for more recent years. We divide this period into two equally long 
sub-periods, i.e., 1999-2005 and 2005-2011 (‘before’ and ‘after’). As explained in more detail below, 
                                                     
16 The great appeal of DD analysis “comes from its simplicity as well as its potential to circumvent many of 
the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous 
individuals” (Bertrand et al. 2004: 249). 
17 Likewise, reverse causality may be an issue when donors grant more quality-adjusted aid to where they 
expect higher economic growth. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to unresolved 
endogeneity concerns. See also Appendix B1. where we present findings from a simple aid allocation model 
in order to address endogeneity concerns at least tentatively.  
18 In other words, we implicitly assume that a donor country’s decision to improve the quality of its aid does 
not affect this donor’s aid shares in given bilateral aid relationships. However, the donor’s decision to 
improve the quality of aid may coincide with a modified distribution of this donor’s aid, e.g., when donors 
with improved aid quality prefer better governed recipient countries. 
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we also account for delayed effects of the aid treatment by using more recent years for calculating 
the change in GDPpc. We calculate the difference in GDPpc between the first and the last year of 
each period and compare these differences. The outcome for the first period is thus GDPpc2005 – 
GDPpc1999 and for the second period GDPpc2011 – GDPpc2005. 
We then consider the difference in time of our outcome variable, i.e., before the treatment 
and after the treatment. Taking 2005 as the dividing line between ‘before’ and ‘after’ appears to 
be most plausible (as outlined in Section 1.2.), considering the PD and other initiatives being 
issued this year, which committed the donors to improve the quality and, thus, the effectiveness 
of aid. 
Finally, we consider two different country groups, of which one is receiving the treatment 
and the other one is not. We define our treatment and control groups based on our quality-
adjusted aid measure per recipient and follow the approach of Öhler and Nunnenkamp (2011). 
Our with-without dimension of the DD approach distinguishes between recipient countries with 
high increases in quality-adjusted aid after 2005 and recipient countries with low increases or 
declines in quality-adjusted aid (treatment group, T, versus control group, C). To identify both 
groups, we first calculate mean inflows of quality-adjusted aid per recipient country for the first 
period from 1999-2004 and for the second period from 2006-2011. We then compute the increase 
in mean quality-adjusted aid between the two periods by taking the difference (Differencei): 
Differencei = 
∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖
2011
𝑡=2006
6
−  
∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖
2004
𝑡=1999
6
        (2) 
 We use the median of this measure and select all countries with above-median increases 
in quality-adjusted aid into the treatment group, and countries with increases at the median or 
below into the control group. Countries in the treatment group, on average, experienced a 
considerable increase in quality-adjusted aid, whereas countries in the control group suffered a 
decline (see Table 1.10.). In per-capita terms, the increase in quality-adjusted aid amounted to 28 
US$ for the treatment group when comparing the second period with the first period, compared 
to a decline by about 9 US$ for the control group.19 Figure 1.4. shows the difference-values for all 
                                                     
19 Note that we exclude 2005 for the calculation of average annual aid flows since this year is the dividing 
line between the sub-periods before and after the change in donor behavior. 
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recipient countries and the selection into treatment and control group accordingly.20 Alternatively, 
we exclude countries around the median and compare the top and bottom tercile of our sample. 
In both variants of our approach we do not simply differentiate between countries with high and 
low quality-adjusted aid inflows, but between countries that benefited more (treatment) or less 
(control) from the policy change induced by the PD. 
Figure 1.4. Differences in mean quality-adjusted aid (total US$) between the 1st and the 2nd period 
per recipient country 
 
Note: The vertical red line illustrates the dividing line between treatment and control group. Countries on 
the left side are selected into the control group, countries to the right form the treatment group. 
Clearly, our treatment and control groups are not selected exogenously. This may violate 
the identifying assumption of the DD approach: the common trends assumption states that, in the 
absence of the (aid-related) treatment, the difference in the dependent variable between the two 
sub-periods would have been the same for the treatment and the control groups. The plausibility 
of this assumption in the present context is assessed tentatively in Appendix C.1. The trends 
shown there for the differences in GDP per capita are not perfectly parallel for the two groups of 
recipient countries, even though it is reassuring that the treatment and control groups seem to 
have parallel trends after 1995.21 Abadie (2005) argues that the plausibility of the common trends 
assumption of DD estimators is open to question if the treatment and control groups differ with 
                                                     
20 Paraguay is the country which sets the median at 11.6 million US$. All countries with higher differences 
are selected into the treatment group. The dividing line between treatment and control group is indicated 
by the red vertical. 
21 Subsequent to the PD in 2005, i.e., the year that divides our two sub-periods of observation, the treatment 
group shows larger differences in GDP per capita than the control group. 
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regard to factors that may be associated with the dynamics of the dependent variable. This risk 
often prevails when evaluating real-world policy interventions. However, Abadie (2005) offers a 
procedure to overcome this challenge. In addition to control variables that might affect the 
outcome differently for both groups, Abadie (2005) suggests including interaction terms between 
these controls and the dummy variable for the treatment period. This procedure accounts for time-
varying effects of factors influencing the outcome and, thereby, mitigates identification problems 
due to trend deviations between the treatment and control group. 
For further strengthening the validity of our results with respect to quality-adjusted aid, 
we perform the same procedure of identifying treatment and control groups for unadjusted aid 
flows and run the same DD regressions. This gives us the opportunity to compare whether 
potential effects can be attributed to differences in quality-adjusted aid but not to increases of 
unadjusted aid (similar to a placebo test). Unadjusted aid flows to country i at time t are (net) 
disbursements in constant prices of 2012,22 as available from the OECD-DAC aid database.23 The 
aid variables are defined in total US$ or, alternatively, per capita of the recipient countries’ 
population (see below for details). Formally, the DD estimator for our baseline specification is as 
follows:24 
))()((
))()((
1999200519992005
2005201120052011
CCTT
CCTT
GDPpcGDPpcGDPpcGDPpc
GDPpcGDPpcGDPpcGDPpcDD


    (3) 
The estimator corresponds to the coefficient of the interaction term between the dummy 
variable for the treatment group and the dummy variable for the second period in the basic 
regression specification without additional control variables. It should be noted that our DD 
approach does not take into account that the outcome variable for one group of recipient countries 
may be linked to the outcome for the other group. The differences in GDP per capita for the 
treatment and control groups are not necessarily independent from each other.25 In the case of 
                                                     
22 All monetary variables in our dataset are defined as constant 2012 US$. 
23 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1 (accessed: May 2016). 
24 While our aid measure is based on average annual flows during 6-year sub-periods, our dependent 
variable is the difference in the level of GDP per capita during the 6-year sub-periods 1999-2005 and 2005-
2011. 
25 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for having alerted us to this limitation. 
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quality-adjusted aid, we believe that the possible bias resulting from this limitation would work 
against us finding significantly different effects for the treatment group as compared to the control 
group.  In other words, we tend to err on the conservative side: reported differences, as reflected 
in the coefficient on the interaction between the dummy variables for the treatment group and the 
second period, tend to be underestimated.26 
In extended specifications, we add the (logged) level of GDPpc at the beginning of the first 
and second periods. In this way we take into account that changes in GDPpc may depend on initial 
levels. Furthermore, we control for the (logged) rate of inflation as an indicator of economic 
stability, the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP as an indicator of openness to trade, and 
control of corruption as an indicator of good governance – all at the beginning of the first and 
second periods.27 Another advantage of our DD approach may be noted in this context: we do not 
face the usual problem of including variables as controls which may actually represent channels 
through which aid could affect GDPpc. As we only include control variables for the first year of 
both periods, we do not run into the risk of closing channels during the period in question. 
Moreover, we account for disbursements of multilateral aid as a share of total aid, since our 
measure of quality-adjusted aid covers only bilateral DAC donors. Finally, we include interaction 
terms between the control variables and the dummy variable for the second period as outlined 
above. The fully specified regression equation reads as follows: 
ΔGDPpcit = α0 + βTreatmenti + ɣ2nd periodt + δ(Treatment*2nd period)it + λXit  
+ ρ(X*2nd period)it + εit          (4) 
ΔGDPpc is the difference in GDP per capita for recipient i between the first and the last 
year of each period 𝑡. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a recipient is in the treatment 
group, and 0 otherwise. 2nd period is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the treatment period (2005-
                                                     
26 In addition, we calculated the correlation of changes in GDP per capita between recipient countries in the 
treatment and control groups to test at least tentatively for the strength of interdependencies in the outcome 
variable. We considered differences in GDP per capita over six years, on a rolling annual basis, for this test. 
This exercise revealed that the correlation is relatively weak (0.3) during our period of observation (1999-
2011), compared to earlier and extended periods (0.61 for 1970-2011; 0.68 for 1980-2011; and 0.6 for 1990-
2011). Taken together, we consider it unlikely that our results suffer from serious bias of the DD estimator. 
27 We used the first non-missing value at the beginning of the first and second period, to be precise. The 
data on inflation and trade are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Control of corruption 
is from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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2011), and 0 otherwise. X denotes a set of control variables for the recipient country, including 
(first non-missing values of) the inflation rate, the share of trade in GDP, control of corruption and 
initial GDP per capita for each period and recipient country. 
The coefficient δ of the interaction between the dummy variables of the treatment group 
and the second period is of principal interest to assess our hypothesis that it is quality-adjusted 
aid, rather than unadjusted nominal aid, from which recipient countries benefit in terms of 
increases in GDPpc. The hypothesis implies that δ is significantly positive when the treatment is 
based on the difference of quality-adjusted aid, while δ would be statistically insignificant when 
the treatment is based on the difference of unadjusted aid as reported by the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee. In contrast, δ would be statistically insignificant 
independent of whether the treatment is based on the difference of quality-adjusted aid or 
unadjusted aid if it made no difference for recipients that aid is granted according to the criteria 
used in Roodman’s (2012) measure. Standard errors are clustered by recipient country. 
To summarize our approach, the PD serves to motivate our work of evaluating potential 
effects of donor quality on recipient countries’ GDPpc, and specifically the choice of 2005 as the 
dividing line between ‘before’ and ‘after’. The treatment group is defined as those countries 
receiving considerably higher quality-adjusted aid in 2006-2011, compared to 1999-2004 (i.e., we 
compare the average level of quality-adjusted aid in 2006-2011 with the average level in 1999-2004 
to define the increase in quality-adjusted aid). In other words, the treatment is the change in donor 
behavior after 2005, resulting in a marked increase of quality-adjusted aid (see Figure 1.3.); 
recipients in the treatment group benefited from this change, countries in the control group did 
not. 
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1.4. RESULTS 
Baseline results 
Table 1.1. presents our baseline results on the effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita 
for the full sample of recipient countries.28 We use the median of the difference in aid between the 
first and second periods to separate the treatment and control groups as outlined in Section 1.3. 
The difference in aid is based on inflows in total US$ in the upper panel of Table 1.1. and, 
alternatively, on inflows per capita in the lower panel of Table 1.1. We prefer the first measure 
since donors are expected to decide on absolute aid amounts when distributing their overall aid 
budget across recipient countries.29 Since small recipient countries typically receive higher aid 
inflows per capita (e.g., Neumayer 2003), they are more likely to fall into the treatment group 
when donors scale up aid and the treatment is defined in per-capita terms.  
We proceed in three steps to compare the treatment effects of quality-adjusted aid 
(columns 1-3) with the treatment effects of unadjusted aid (columns 4-6). In the first step, we 
perform the basic DD estimations without any additional control variables (columns 1 and 4). We 
then include the control variables introduced in Section 1.2. (columns 2 and 5). Finally, we also 
interact the control variables with the dummy variable for the second period (columns 3 and 6); 
this way we attempt to control for the effects of omitted time-varying and country-specific 
variables that may be correlated with increased quality aid (the treatment). For the sake of brevity, 
we do not show the coefficients on the control variables and their interactions with the dummy 
variable for the second period. While the signs of the control variables are generally as expected, 
they typically do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels.30 In other words, the 
                                                     
28 It should be noted that we excluded two outliers throughout our empirical analysis: Libya and Equatorial 
Guinea. While Libya’s GDP per capita suffered an exceptionally steep decline in 2011 (Libyan Civil War), 
the increase in Equatorial Guinea’s GDP per capita was exceptionally large in 2008, i.e., shortly after the 
discovery of large oil reserves.  
29 Our results stay robust if we control for the population of recipient countries. Results are available upon 
request.  
30 However, the share of multilateral aid proves to be statistically significant in the fully specified model in 
columns (3) and (6). Specifically, the change in GDP per capita was positively associated with multilateral 
aid, though only in the first period. 
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control variables do not have a strong impact on the dynamics of our dependent variable during 
the period of observation. 
Table 1.1. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: full sample, median of difference in aid 
to separate treatment and control groups 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Treatment based on change in aid inflows, total US$  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period -0.025 -0.013 0.024 -0.006 0.013 0.137  
(0.216) (0.576) (0.872) (0.760) (0.581) (0.347) 
Treatment -0.004 -0.009 -0.013 -0.008 -0.026 -0.028  
(0.881) (0.800) (0.724) (0.764) (0.437) (0.416) 
2nd period * 
treatment 
0.067** 0.055* 0.063** 0.029 0.014 0.013 
 
(0.017) (0.066) (0.047) (0.297) (0.653) (0.667) 
Constant 0.150*** 0.037 0.030 0.152*** 0.102 0.055  
(0.000) (0.790) (0.865) (0.000) (0.440) (0.734) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 288 238 238 288 238 238 
R2 0.018 0.037 0.055 0.003 0.030 0.049  
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, per capita US$  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period -0.019 -0.006 0.074 -0.012 0.006 0.126  
(0.321) (0.795) (0.605) (0.554) (0.796) (0.350) 
Treatment -0.029 -0.049 -0.050 -0.020 -0.029 -0.038  
(0.299) (0.143) (0.138) (0.485) (0.350) (0.247) 
2nd period * 
treatment 
0.055** 0.048 0.044 0.040 0.026 0.035 
 
(0.048) (0.107) (0.134) (0.154) (0.386) (0.237) 
Constant 0.162*** 0.129 0.105 0.158*** 0.087 0.043  
(0.000) (0.342) (0.513) (0.000) (0.479) (0.770) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 288 238 238 288 238 238 
R2 0.008 0.038 0.056 0.004 0.031 0.051 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. 
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The insignificant coefficients on the dummy variable for the second period indicate 
persistent dynamics of our dependent variable throughout the period of observation when 
considering the whole sample of recipient countries. Likewise, there is no evidence that the 
dynamics in GDP per capita differed between the treatment and control groups prior to the scaling 
up of aid, as reflected in the insignificant coefficients on the dummy variable for the treatment 
group. These results hold independently of whether we consider quality-adjusted aid in columns 
(1)-(3) or unadjusted aid in columns (4)-(6); they are also independent of whether we use our 
preferred measure of aid inflows in total US$ in the upper panel of Table 1.1. or the alternative 
measure of aid inflows per capita in the lower panel. 
However, the upper panel of Table 1.1. provides strong indications that the treatment 
effect of increased aid depends on whether aid is quality-adjusted or not. The interaction between 
the dummy variables for the second period and the treatment group proves to be significant at 
least at the ten percent level for quality-adjusted aid in columns (1)-(3). What is more, the average 
treatment effect is quantitatively important. According to the results in column (3), the average 
effect of 0.063 amounts to 37 percent of the mean change in GDP per capita for the treatment group 
(see Table 1.10.).31 In contrast, the interaction falls considerably short of reaching significance for 
unadjusted aid in columns (4)-(6). Furthermore, the p-values for the tests shown in Table D1.1. 
(see Appendix D1.) indicate statistically significant differences between the impact of quality-
adjusted and unadjusted aid on the change in GDP per capita when the treatment is based on the 
change in total aid inflows.32 Taken together, the quality of donors appears to matter for aid 
effectiveness. Only recipient countries with increased aid inflows of high quality, as revealed by 
Roodman’s (2012) measure, benefit in terms of increasing GDP per capita. 
The evidence on the treatment effect of quality-adjusted aid is weaker when considering 
aid inflows per capita in the lower panel of Table 1.1. The interaction between the dummy 
                                                     
31 However, as we show in the next sub-section, our results on the effects of quality-adjusted aid are not out 
of sync with previous studies finding positive growth effects of aid, including Hansen and Tarp (2001) and 
Clemens et al. (2012). 
32 As explained in more detail in Appendix D1., we test whether the coefficient on the interaction term 2nd 
period*treatment differs significantly between quality-adjusted aid and the corresponding estimation with 
unadjusted aid. 
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variables for the second period and the treatment group continues to be positive and significant 
(at the five percent level) in column (1). However, the interaction becomes insignificant when 
entering the control variables in columns (2) and (3). Moreover, the tests shown in Table D1.1. 
point to insignificant differences between the impact of quality-adjusted and unadjusted aid in 
per-capita terms.33 As noted above, small countries are more likely to fall into the treatment group 
when the treatment is defined in per-capita terms. This could affect our results if the dynamics in 
GDP per capita differ between small and large recipient countries. Indeed, closer inspection 
reveals that particularly small recipient countries (with a population of less than one million) are 
over-represented in the treatment group when defining the treatment in per-capita terms. At the 
same time, the difference in GDP per capita was clearly below average for the sub-group of 
particularly small recipient countries. This provides a first indication that our baseline findings 
are largely driven by specific groups of recipient countries.34 
 
Alternative dependent variables 
In Table 1.2., we modify the definition of our dependent GDP variable. We use compound 
growth rates of GDP per capita (in percent) during the first and second periods in the upper two 
panels of Table 1.2. In the lower two panels, we use period averages of the logged level of GDP 
per capita as the dependent variable. In all other respects, the specification of the estimation 
equation is the same as in Table 1.1.35  
 
                                                     
33 This does not necessarily imply, however, that the effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid strongly depends 
on whether it is measured in absolute or per-capita terms. In Table D1.2., we report another set of tests of 
differences in coefficients focusing on the statistical significance of the difference between estimates with 
total and per-capita aid. The p-values suggest that the coefficients on the interaction term 2nd period*treatment 
do not differ significantly between the two measures of quality-adjusted aid. The same applies to 
unadjusted aid. 
34 We return to this issue below when interpreting the results for restricted samples in Table 1.7. 
35 The exception is that we have to drop GDP per capita in the initial year of sub-periods as a control variable 
when considering the level of GDP per capita as the dependent variable. 
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Table 1.2. Effects of aid on alternative GDP variables: full sample, median of difference in aid to 
separate treatment and control groups 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: compound growth rate of GDP per capita (%) 
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, total US$ 
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 1.104** 0.916* 1.082** 0.452 0.196 0.227 
(0.020) (0.077) (0.046) (0.345) (0.709) (0.664) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 288 236 236 288 236 236 
R2 0.017 0.037 0.057 0.002 0.031 0.051 
               
Dependent variable: compound growth rate of GDP per capita (%) 
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, per capita US$ 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.901* 0.795 0.733 0.633 0.414 0.614 
(0.058) (0.122) (0.142) (0.185) (0.429) (0.233) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 288 236 236 288 236 236 
R2 0.007 0.038 0.057 0.004 0.032 0.053 
        
Dependent variable: log level of GDP per capita (period average) 
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, total US$ 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment -0.014 0.206** 0.231* -0.017 0.106 0.115 
(0.628) (0.034) (0.051) (0.550) (0.287) (0.332) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 284 236 236 284 236 236 
R2 0.268 0.518 0.524 0.191 0.474 0.479 
        
Dependent variable: log level of GDP per capita (period average) 
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, per capita US$ 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment -0.034 0.110 0.098 -0.027 -0.023 -0.008 
(0.231) (0.253) (0.308) (0.355) (0.819) (0.941) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 284 236 236 284 236 236 
R2 0.188 0.493 0.497 0.098 0.437 0.443 
       
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level.  
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The effects of aid on the growth rate of GDP per capita closely resemble the effects on the 
change in GDP per capita shown in Table 1.1. Again, the contrast between quality-adjusted aid 
and unadjusted aid is most pronounced when the treatment is based on aid inflows in total US$. 
Our previous findings are also corroborated by the tests for differences in coefficients in Table 
D1.1.36 The treatment effect of quality-adjusted aid amounts to about one percentage point of the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita. This effect is comparable to our baseline results, 
considering that the increase in GDP per capita by 5.7-6.9 percent in Table 1.1. spans over six years. 
The growth effect may appear to be surprisingly large compared to previous aid-growth studies, 
including Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Clemens et al. (2012). All the same, our result is not out of 
sync once it is taken into account that the aid variable is defined as a percentage of the recipients’ 
GDP in these studies. The above noted studies tend to find that an increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio 
by one percentage point is associated with an increase in growth by around 0.2 percentage 
points.37 OECD-DAC statistics on net aid receipts suggest that the growth effect of an increase in 
the aid-to-GDP ratio by one percentage point should be compared to the effect of an increase in 
per-capita aid by 7.8 US$.38 Recalling the difference of 37 US$ in per-capita aid between our 
treatment and control group, it appears plausible that the treatment effect of our DD analysis is 
about one percentage point of annual growth. 
The evidence on the treatment effect of quality-adjusted aid is somewhat weaker when 
considering the logged level of GDP per capita as the outcome variable. Specifically, quality- 
adjusted aid loses its significance in the lower panels of Table 1.2. in the specification without 
control variables (column 1).39 On the whole, however, the evidence in Table 1.2. suggests that our 
core finding, according to which recipient countries benefit only from increased aid inflows of 
high quality, is fairly robust to the exact definition of the GDP-related outcome variable. 
                                                     
36 For details, see the p-values shown in Table D1.1. for the regressions with the compound growth rate as 
dependent variable in Table 1.2. 
37 However, Dalgaard et al. (2004: F208) find that “outside the tropics a one percentage point increase in the 
aid/GDP ratio leads to an increase in the growth rate in the neighbourhood of one percentage point.” 
38 In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, net aid receipts amounted to 5.5 percent of GDP or about 43 US$ per 
capita at the beginning of the second (treatment) period in 2005. 
39 Note also that the corresponding tests in Table D1.1. point to statistically insignificant differences between 
the coefficients on the interaction terms in columns 1 and 4 of Table 1.2. 
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Bilateral country programmable aid 
As noted in Section 1.2., it is hardly possible to calculate the overall quality of aid at the 
bilateral level, i.e., for donor-recipient pairs. However, for the estimations reported in Table 1.3. 
we make use of the (limited) data on some specific aspects of the quality of aid at the bilateral 
level.40 Specifically, we use bilateral aid data from the OECD-DAC on so-called country 
programmable aid (CPA). CPA resembles the first steps of Roodman’s (2012) calculation of donor 
discounts insofar as CPA provides an estimate of the volume of aid resources actually transferred 
to recipient countries, e.g., by excluding debt relief and other items that cannot be used 
productively in aid recipient countries.41  
Table 1.3. Effects of country programmable aid (CPA) on the change in GDP per capita: full 
sample, median of difference in CPA to separate treatment and control groups  
Variables 
Treatment based on change in CPA 
inflows, total US$ 
Treatment based on change in CPA 
inflows, per capita US$ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd period 0.003 0.014 -0.048 0.001 0.011 -0.025 
 (0.849) (0.504) (0.759) (0.971) (0.575) (0.855) 
Treatment 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.027 0.028 0.026 
 (0.494) (0.665) (0.775) (0.296) (0.325) (0.389) 
2nd period * 0.016 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.016 0.022 
treatment (0.500) (0.675) (0.531) (0.369) (0.539) (0.449) 
Constant 0.119*** 0.078 0.123 0.114*** 0.082 0.116 
 (0.000) (0.498) (0.422) (0.000) (0.445) (0.396) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * 
controls 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 272 235 235 272 235 235 
R2 0.011 0.042 0.061 0.021 0.055 0.074 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level.  
 
                                                     
40 The period of observation is shorter in Table 1.3., compared to Table 1.1., due to restricted data availability 
on CPA. Consequently, the first period had to be reduced to 2000-2005 and the second period to 2005-2010. 
In other respects, we followed the same procedures to identify treatment and control groups. 
41 More precisely, CPA subtracts from gross aid disbursements unpredictable flows of development 
assistance like humanitarian aid or debt relief, aid that remains in the donor country like administrative 
costs, student costs or refugee spending and aid that is not negotiated between donor and recipient 
governments like food aid. However, unlike the Roodman measure, CPA does not net out loan repayments 
(for further details see http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/cpa.htm). 
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We employ bilateral CPA data to replicate the baseline estimations for quality-adjusted 
aid calculated according to Roodman’s concept. The results on the effect of CPA are in contrast to 
the baseline findings reported for quality-adjusted aid in columns (1)-(3) of Table 1.1. In particular, 
the interaction between the dummy variables for the treatment group and the second period 
proves to be statistically insignificant in Table 1.3. However, this does not necessarily invalidate 
our finding that quality-adjusted aid tends to be more effective. Rather, it appears that the CPA-
related adjustments to arrive at ‘true’ aid transfers cannot explain why we find quality-adjusted 
aid to be more effective.  
 
Decomposing Roodman’s measure of aid quality 
Recalling that Roodman’s concept of quality-adjusted aid is based on net aid plus several 
discounts, we tentatively assess in the following whether our baseline results on the effectiveness 
of quality-adjusted aid are driven by one particular element. To this end, we replicate the baseline 
estimations on quality-adjusted aid in Table 1.1. in several ways: (i) by considering Roodman’s 
measure of net aid (this measure excludes repayments as well as debt relief which is part of aid 
according to OECD-DAC guidelines), without any further discounts; (ii) by considering quality-
adjusted aid, but excluding the discount for tying aid; (iii) by considering quality-adjusted aid, 
but excluding the selectivity-related discount; and (iv) by considering quality-adjusted aid, but 
excluding the proliferation-related discount. The results of these estimations are summarized in 
Table 1.4.  
We find that it is already Roodman’s measure of net aid that renders aid effective. The 
interaction terms, 2nd period*treatment, prove to be significantly positive in columns 1-4 in the upper 
panel of Table 1.4. This is perhaps surprising, recalling the statistically insignificant results for 
CPA in Table 1.3. However, this difference can be attributed to Roodman’s measure of net aid, 
while CPA still includes repayments. It is also interesting to note that the exclusion of specific 
discounts related to aid tying, selectivity and proliferation hardly affects our baseline results on 
the effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid. In other words, there is no evidence in the lower panels 
of Table 1.4. that a particular discount factor is driving our baseline results. 
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Table 1.4. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: decomposition of Roodman’s quality 
measure  
Variables 
Treatment based on change in aid 
inflows, total US$ 
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, 
per capita US$ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2nd period * 
treatment 
      
Net aid, no further discounts 
 0.077*** 0.063** 0.070** 0.060** 0.045 0.041 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.020) (0.033) (0.124) (0.146) 
Quality-adjusted aid, excluding discount for tied aid 
 0.077*** 0.068** 0.079** 0.069** 0.064** 0.065** 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.036) (0.036) 
Quality-adjusted aid, excluding selectivity-related discount 
 0.076*** 0.063** 0.073** 0.055** 0.040 0.039 
 (0.006) (0.036) (0.015) (0.049) (0.162) (0.169) 
Quality-adjusted aid, excluding proliferation-related discount 
 0.080*** 0.066** 0.075** 0.055** 0.041 0.039 
 (0.004) (0.024) (0.011) (0.048) (0.153) (0.170) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * 
controls 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level.  
 
Excluding donor countries 
In the next step, we check whether our baseline finding of effective quality-adjusted aid, 
compared to ineffective unadjusted aid, is driven by the bilateral aid relations of one particular 
donor. This is done by excluding one donor at a time from the estimations on the effects of quality-
adjusted and unadjusted aid on the change in GDP per capita. That is, we replicate the calculation 
of quality-adjusted aid 28 times after excluding one particular donor from our sample of 28 
donors. In all other respects the estimations summarized in Table 1.5. resemble those reported in 
column (3) of the upper part of Table 1.1. For the sake of brevity we only show the interaction of 
the dummy variables for the treatment group and the second period when the treatment is based 
on absolute inflows of aid. The results are similar when the treatment is based on per-capita 
inflows of aid.42 
                                                     
42 The full set of estimation results is available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1.5. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: excluding one donor at a time 
Excluded donor: 
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
Sweden 0.080** (0.013) 0.026 (0.409) 
Ireland 0.064** (0.044) 0.015 (0.623) 
Denmark 0.068** (0.034) 0.027 (0.384) 
Luxembourg 0.064** (0.044) 0.017 (0.586) 
Netherlands 0.073** (0.020) 0.023 (0.458) 
Portugal 0.063** (0.048) 0.014 (0.642) 
United Kingdom 0.071** (0.022) 0.042 (0.163) 
Switzerland 0.079** (0.013) 0.019 (0.544) 
Finland 0.064** (0.045) 0.015 (0.628) 
Norway 0.065** (0.041) 0.030 (0.354) 
New Zealand 0.087*** (0.006) 0.015 (0.615) 
Australia 0.068** (0.032) 0.026 (0.406) 
Canada 0.067** (0.035) 0.024 (0.424) 
Belgium 0.068** (0.033) 0.022 (0.485) 
Germany 0.070** (0.030) 0.043 (0.174) 
United States 0.039 (0.211) 0.021 (0.488) 
Iceland 0.064** (0.044) 0.015 (0.625) 
Austria 0.063** (0.046) 0.021 (0.508) 
Japan 0.077** (0.018) 0.065** (0.042) 
Greece 0.074** (0.019) 0.015 (0.627) 
France 0.060* (0.079) 0.014 (0.664) 
Spain 0.063* (0.050) 0.026 (0.403) 
Italy 0.079** (0.013) 0.014 (0.658) 
Korea 0.060* (0.060) 0.013 (0.673) 
Czech Rep. 0.064** (0.044) 0.016 (0.616) 
Poland 0.064** (0.044) 0.023 (0.468) 
Slovenia 0.064** (0.044) 0.015 (0.625) 
Slovak Rep. 0.064** (0.044) 0.015 (0.625) 
The specification of estimations shown in this table corresponds to the full specification in column (3) of 
Table 1.1. Excluded donors are listed in the order of Figure 1.1. on average discount factors. For the sake of 
brevity we only show the interaction of the dummy variables for the treatment group and the 2nd period 
when the treatment is based on absolute inflows of aid. The results are similar when the treatment is based 
on per-capita inflows of aid. Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in 
brackets. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. 
 
As can be seen, the exclusion of individual donors typically affects our baseline results on 
the effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid only marginally. However, it appears that the United 
States is largely driving our results.43 The interaction between the dummy variables for the 
                                                     
43 It should also be noted that the exclusion of Japan results in a significantly positive interaction between 
the dummy variable for the second period and the treatment dummy based on unadjusted aid. The effect 
of quality-adjusted aid on the change in GDP per capita is just slightly higher in this case. 
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treatment group and the second period proves to be statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels when excluding the United States – not only for unadjusted aid, but also for quality-
adjusted aid.44 The important role of the United States is not particularly surprising: the United 
States is not only the largest donor by far in terms of absolute aid flows; the US also stands out in 
terms of a considerable decline in the discount factor after the Paris Declaration in 2005, as shown 
in Figure 1.2. 
 
Modified definition of treatment and control groups 
In Table 1.6., we modify the definition of treatment and control groups and then re-
estimate the same set of model specifications as in Table 1.1. Instead of using the median as the 
dividing line between treatment and control groups, we widen the gap between treatment and 
control groups by excluding countries with a change in aid inflows relatively close to the median 
and comparing the remaining top tercile of sample countries with the bottom tercile. The dummy 
variable for the treatment group proves to be significantly negative in several estimations in Table 
1.6., suggesting that the dynamics of GDP per capita were weaker for countries in the treatment 
than in the control group during the first period, i.e., before donors scaled up (quality-adjusted) 
aid. Most importantly, however, previous results on the interaction between the two dummy 
variables are hardly affected by this modification. As before, the treatment effect of unadjusted 
aid proves to be consistently insignificant in columns (4)-(6) of Table 1.6. The contrast to quality-
adjusted aid is again particularly pronounced in the upper panel of Table 1.6. when using aid 
inflows in total US$ to separate treatment and control groups.45 The results on the interaction 
terms for quality-adjusted aid in per-capita terms are slightly stronger in the lower panel of Table 
1.6., compared to the corresponding estimations in the lower panel of Table 1.1. 
 
  
                                                     
44 However, the interaction is just marginally insignificant for quality-adjusted aid in the basic specification 
without control variables (corresponding to column (1) in Table 1.1.; not shown in Table 1.5.). 
45 However, the p-value of the test reported in Table D1.1. does not point to a statistically significant 
difference between quality-adjusted and unadjusted aid for the fully specified model when comparing 
columns 3 and 6 in the upper panel of Table 1.6. 
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Table 1.6. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: full sample, top and bottom terciles as 
treatment and control groups 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Treatment based on change in aid inflows, total US$  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period -0.044* -0.025 0.062 0.006 0.014 0.240  
(0.067) (0.407) (0.777) (0.782) (0.575) (0.158) 
Treatment -0.060* -0.084* -0.095* -0.033 -0.040 -0.055  
(0.089) (0.073) (0.080) (0.360) (0.341) (0.240) 
2nd period * 
treatment 
0.095*** 0.076* 0.096** 0.038 0.039 0.064 
 
(0.006) (0.057) (0.040) (0.242) (0.278) (0.120) 
Constant 0.179*** 0.046 0.010 0.170*** 0.042 -0.056  
(0.000) (0.788) (0.966) (0.000) (0.795) (0.793) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 198 154 154 192 166 166 
R2 0.020 0.096 0.121 0.011 0.070 0.120  
Treatment based on change in aid inflows, per capita US$  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period -0.032 -0.009 0.295 0.010 0.010 0.139  
(0.151) (0.744) (0.120) (0.642) (0.694) (0.453) 
Treatment -0.069** -0.086** -0.077* -0.012 -0.032 -0.053  
(0.039) (0.049) (0.093) (0.746) (0.446) (0.241) 
2nd period * 
treatment 
0.095*** 0.075* 0.055 0.013 0.027 0.052 
 
(0.007) (0.057) (0.176) (0.707) (0.492) (0.212) 
Constant 0.170*** 0.185 0.073 0.156*** 0.107 0.069  
(0.000) (0.271) (0.738) (0.000) (0.530) (0.736) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 204 156 156 190 161 161 
R2 0.024 0.064 0.098 0.003 0.045 0.084 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. 
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Restricted samples 
The estimations reported in Table 1.7. are based on restricted samples to assess more 
systematically whether specific groups of recipient countries are driving our baseline results. For 
the sake of brevity, we use the preferred measure of aid inflows in total US$ in these estimations 
to separate the treatment and control groups.46 In the first panel at the top of Table 1.7., we exclude 
33 countries with a population of less than one million. The results of this exercise underscore the 
important role of small recipient countries for our baseline findings. The size of the coefficients on 
the interaction between the dummy variables for the second period and the treatment group still 
appear to be higher in columns (1)-(3) for quality-adjusted aid than in columns (4)-(6) for 
unadjusted aid. However, the treatment effects fail to reach statistical significance for quality-
adjusted aid, too. This suggests that mainly small recipient countries benefit from being treated 
with increases in quality-adjusted aid. In sharp contrast, the exclusion of the 30 largest recipient 
countries in the second panel of Table 1.7. hardly affects the baseline findings shown in Table 1.1.47 
Table 1.7. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: restricted samples  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Smallest countries (population < 1 million) excluded 
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.039 0.039 0.053 0.016 0.023 0.035 
(0.221) (0.213) (0.118) (0.624) (0.459) (0.279) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 221 192 192 221 192 192 
R2 0.017 0.092 0.125 0.003 0.078 0.112  
Largest countries (population > 23 million) excluded 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.094*** 0.073* 0.081** 0.047 0.019 0.023 
(0.004) (0.052) (0.035) (0.160) (0.620) (0.549) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
                                                     
46 The median to separate treatment and control groups is calculated based on the restricted sample, after 
the exclusion of countries. 
47 While Table 1.7. does not show the results when using the alternative measure of aid inflows in per-capita 
terms, we tested for significant differences between total and per-capita aid within the sub-samples of 
smaller and larger countries. Similar to the tests for differences in coefficients reported in Table D1.2. for 
the full sample, the corresponding tests for these sub-samples suggest that the coefficients on the interaction 
term 2nd period*treatment do not differ significantly. In particular, it appears that the effectiveness of quality-
adjusted aid in the sub-sample of smaller countries does not depend strongly on the measurement of aid 
(see Table D1.3. for details). 
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Observations 228 183 183 228 183 183 
R2 0.022 0.060 0.082 0.005 0.049 0.072  
Countries with particularly good governance excluded  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.060* 0.067** 0.075** 0.011 0.022 0.026 
 (0.053) (0.042) (0.040) (0.717) (0.520) (0.447) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 228 200 200 228 200 200 
R2 0.012 0.050 0.089 0.007 0.048 0.088  
Countries with particularly bad governance excluded  
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.068** 0.046 0.066* 0.030 -0.001 0.014 
 (0.027) (0.194) (0.085) (0.328) (0.976) (0.708) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 228 186 186 228 186 186 
R2 0.051 0.035 0.058 0.026 0.018 0.038  
Part II countries excluded; median to separate treatment and control groups 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.037 0.046 0.068** 0.015 0.030 0.045 
(0.195) (0.124) (0.043) (0.592) (0.315) (0.162) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 250 223 223 250 223 223 
R2 0.010 0.039 0.056 0.007 0.036 0.052  
Part II countries excluded; top and bottom terciles as treatment and control 
group 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.048 0.051 0.077* 0.029 0.056 0.069 
(0.180) (0.180) (0.070) (0.415) (0.160) (0.114) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 170 149 149 168 146 146 
R2 0.016 0.081 0.096 0.013 0.096 0.136 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. We do not show results for the dummy variables 
for the 2nd period and the treatment group and the constant term to avoid clutter. 
On the contrary, we do not find compelling evidence that our baseline results are driven 
by higher effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid in well governed recipient countries.48 In the third 
and fourth panel of Table 1.7., we exclude 30 recipient countries which performed either 
                                                     
48 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for having alerted us to this possibility. 
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particularly poorly or particularly well in terms of controlling for corruption.49 On the one hand, 
the interaction between the dummy variables for the second period and the treatment group is 
slightly stronger in column (1), without control variables included, for the reduced sample when 
excluding the 30 countries with particularly bad governance. On the other hand, the interaction is 
slightly weaker in columns (2) and (3) when excluding the 30 countries with particularly good 
governance. Importantly, the higher effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid, compared to 
unadjusted aid in columns (4)-(6), holds independently of whether recipient countries with 
particularly good or bad governance are excluded from the sample.  
In the fifth and sixth panel of Table 1.7., we exclude 19 so-called Part II countries from the 
sample.50 This group was introduced by the OECD’s DAC after the end of the Cold War in 1993; 
it consisted of relatively advanced developing countries and transition economies in Eastern 
Europe. When the DAC reverted to a single list of aid recipients in 2005, most Part II countries did 
no longer receive official development assistance and some of them had become new donors. 
Hence, former Part II countries typically fall into the control group in our estimations. At the same 
time, the average change in GDP per capita was relatively small for this group. 
When excluding Part II countries, the interaction terms between the dummy variables for 
the second period and the treatment with quality-adjusted aid lose their significance in columns 
(1) and (2). Importantly, however, the treatment effect for quality-adjusted aid proves to be 
significantly positive in column (3) where the specification includes both the control variables and 
their interaction with the dummy variable for the second period. 
To summarize, Table 1.7. reveals that our baseline results are sensitive to sample selection. 
This is not exceptional in the aid effectiveness literature. For instance, Easterly et al. (2004) 
challenged the major result of the seminal paper of Burnside and Dollar (2000) that aid has a 
positive impact on economic growth in recipient countries pursuing sound economic policies. 
Easterly et al. (2004) show that this result no longer holds when adding additional countries and 
                                                     
49 Results are similar when we use democracy instead of control for corruption. 
50 In this specification, we only keep countries in our sample that were on the official DAC list of ODA 
recipients in 2011. This list is revised every three years (for details see 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm). 
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observations to the dataset of Burnside and Dollar (2000). Clearly, sample selection also deserves 
closer attention in further research on the role of donor quality for the effectiveness of aid. 
 
Delayed effects 
In the final step of our analysis, we consider delayed effects of quality-adjusted aid and 
unadjusted aid on the change in GDP per capita in the recipient countries. Again, we only report 
the results based on the preferred measure of aid inflows in total US$. Table 1.8. shows the results 
with lags of one year, two years, and three years. Put differently, the change in GDP per capita 
during the second period no longer relates to 2005-2011 as in our baseline estimations; instead it 
relates to 2006-2012, 2007-2013, and 2008-2014, respectively. Estimations in the upper three panels 
of the table are based on the full sample, while estimations in the lower three panels are based on 
the reduced sample after excluding Part II countries. 
Table 1.8. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: delayed effects  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total sample, lagged by one year 
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.075** 0.051* 0.046 0.026  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.019) (0.092) (0.158) (0.410) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 286 238 238 286 238 238 
R2 0.039 0.047 0.066 0.009 0.027 0.053  
Total sample, lagged by two years 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.074** 0.056* 0.054 0.029  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.031) (0.084) (0.122) (0.383) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 286 238 238 286 238 238 
R2 0.049 0.056 0.078 0.020 0.037 0.066  
Total sample, lagged by three years 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.095*** 0.106*** 0.078** 0.057* 0.067* 0.039  
(0.005) (0.004) (0.030) (0.090) (0.072) (0.272) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 283 237 237 283 237 237 
R2 0.049 0.069 0.097 0.022 0.048 0.083  
Part II countries excluded; lagged by one year 
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  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.057* 0.070** 0.071** 0.026 0.048 0.047  
(0.069) (0.025) (0.031) (0.399) (0.136) (0.148) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 248 223 223 248 223 223 
R2 0.011 0.038 0.053 0.004 0.030 0.048  
Part II countries excluded; lagged by two years 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.058* 0.071** 0.067** 0.023 0.043 0.038  
(0.087) (0.037) (0.049) (0.500) (0.224) (0.266) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 248 223 223 248 223 223 
R2 0.010 0.040 0.059 0.002 0.031 0.054  
Part II countries excluded; lagged by three years 
  Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period * treatment 0.066* 0.079** 0.076** 0.034 0.055 0.050  
(0.063) (0.028) (0.036) (0.339) (0.141) (0.167) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 247 222 222 247 222 222 
R2 0.014 0.047 0.074 0.005 0.038 0.068 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. We do not show results for the dummy variables 
for the 2nd period and the treatment group and the constant term to avoid clutter. 
The treatment effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita generally become stronger, 
compared to the baseline results, when accounting for lags. Some interaction terms even turn out 
to be significant at the ten percent level when the treatment relates to unadjusted aid. However, 
this applies only to estimations for the full sample in columns (4) and (5). The treatment with 
unadjusted aid is no longer significant for the fully specified model in column (6), and after 
excluding Part II countries in the lower panels of Table 1.8. 
What is more, the results in Table 1.8. indicate consistently that the quality of donors 
matters for the effectiveness of aid. The size of the coefficients on the interaction terms as well as 
their significance typically increases compared to the corresponding baseline results. The average 
treatment effect reaches its maximum of 0.078 with three-years lags for the total country sample 
in column (3), compared to the corresponding treatment effect of 0.063 in Table 1.1. This 
underscores the quantitative importance of the treatment with quality-adjusted aid.
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Table 1.9. Definition of variables and data sources  
Variable Description Source 
2nd period Dummy for treatment period (2005-2011) Own definition 
Treatment Dummy for treatment group; see text for alternative definitions Own definition 
Unadjusted aid Bilateral net ODA disbursements in constant 2012 US$ OECD DAC Statistics 2014 
Quality-adjusted aid  Quality-adjusted aid in constant 2012 US$, as defined by Roodman 
(2012) 
Own calculation based on Roodman (2012) 
Change in (log) GDP per 
capita 
Six year difference in logged GDP per capita in period 1: 2005-1999 
and period 2: 2011-2005 
Own calculation based on World 
Development Indicators (2015) 
(log) GDP per capita Natural log of GDP per capita (constant 2012 US$), first non-missing 
value in each period 
World Development Indicators (2015) 
Corruption Control of corruption, first non-missing value in each period World Development Indicators (2015) 
(log) Inflation Natural log of inflation, first non-missing value in each period World Development Indicators (2015) 
Openness (exports + imports)/GDP, first non-missing value in each period World Development Indicators (2015) 
Multilateral aid Share of multilateral aid in total aid OECD DAC 
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Table 1.10. Descriptive statistics by treatment (T) and control (C) group (based on Table 1, columns 
(1)-(3), upper panel) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
2nd period T 144 1 1 0 1 
2nd period C 144 1 1 0 1 
Treatment T 144 1 0 1 1 
Treatment C 144 0 0 0 0 
Quality-adjusted aid (mean) T 144 218000000 246000000 0 1070000000 
Quality-adjusted aid (mean) C 144 72700000 130000000 0 730000000 
Quality-adjusted aid (difference) T 72 170000000 198000000 11700000 955000000 
Quality-adjusted aid (difference) C 72 -26000000 69000000 -434000000 11600000 
Change in (log) GDP per capita T 144 0.17 0.15 -0.44 0.55 
Change in (log) GDP per capita C 144 0.14 0.18 -0.60 0.69 
(log) GDP per capita T 142 7.27 1.04 5.43 9.43 
(log) GDP per capita C 142 8.63 1.23 6.11 11.43 
Corruption T 142 -0.54 0.58 -1.57 1.54 
Corruption C 143 -0.06 0.80 -1.52 2.29 
(log) Inflation T 140 2.04 1.07 -1.13 5.71 
(log) Inflation C 121 1.52 0.99 -1.70 5.52 
Openness T 140 74.06 37.44 20.98 270.36 
Openness C 137 101.35 58.36 30.12 422.33 
Multilateral aid T 143 33.83 18.48 0 100 
Multilateral aid C 123 32.39 24.33 0 100 
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1.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Compared to the intensive debate on the role of policies in the recipient countries for the 
effectiveness of foreign aid, it has received only scant attention whether aid could induce stronger 
income effects if donors provided their assistance in higher quality. As argued by Roodman 
(2012), donors could improve the quality of aid in various ways, inter alia, by untying aid, 
allocating aid selectively, avoiding project proliferation, and supporting private giving. We use 
Roodman’s ranking of donors along these dimensions to derive quality-adjusted aid inflows for 
a large sample of recipient countries during the period 1999-2011. We compare the effects of 
quality-adjusted aid and unadjusted aid as reported by the donors on changes in GDP per capita 
in the recipient countries by performing a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis. 
We find fairly strong indications that quality-adjusted aid is more effective than 
unadjusted aid in inducing income gains in the recipient countries. The DD analysis for the overall 
country sample reveals statistically significant and quantitatively important treatment effects for 
quality-adjusted aid, while we do not find significant treatment effects for unadjusted aid. Only 
recipient countries with increased aid inflows of higher quality benefit in terms of increasing GDP 
per capita. Allowing for a delayed impact on changes in GDP per capita, the treatment effects 
become stronger, compared to the baseline results, corroborating that the quality of aid inflows 
matters for aid effectiveness.  
However, our baseline results are sensitive to sample selection. In particular, it appears 
that mainly small recipient countries benefit from being treated with increases in quality-adjusted 
aid. Arguably, relatively altruistic donors providing higher quality aid focus on smaller and better 
governed recipient countries to achieve more impact. In contrast, relatively selfish donors 
providing lower quality aid may prefer larger and richer recipient countries to foster their own 
trade-related interest. Tentative findings based on simple aid allocation models (see Appendix B1. 
for details) do not provide compelling evidence to this effect. In particular, the small country bias 
of aid allocation by donors providing lower quality aid appears to be just slightly weaker than 
that of donors providing higher quality aid. Yet the role of donor characteristics clearly deserves 
more attention. Another possibility is that large recipient countries see no choice but to accept aid 
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from all available sources, independent of the donors’ quality ranking, in order to meet their 
perceived financing needs. Such an approach appears to be shortsighted, however, as long as 
various sources supply low quality aid. Then again, small countries might not have much 
bargaining power resulting in only limited choice. Theoretical arguments hence do not seem to 
offer fully conclusive explanations and future research may help clarify why it seems to be easier 
for small recipient countries to benefit from higher quality aid.  
Nevertheless, the necessity for the donors obviously is to improve the quality of their aid, 
rather than ‘only’ scaling up nominal aid budgets. The considerable discounts shown for various 
donors in Figure 1.1. and the limited progress, if any, made so far in reducing these discounts 
reveal the untapped potential for improving the effectiveness of aid in this way. At the same time, 
further research could pursue two avenues to provide a fuller account of aid-related donor 
policies. On the one hand, a refined analysis of specific elements of Roodman’s donor ranking 
may offer deeper insights even though we did not find that particular discounts (related to aid 
tying, donor selectivity and aid proliferation) are driving our results on the effectiveness of 
quality-adjusted aid. On the other hand, a broader view on donor policies, e.g., with regard to 
trade liberalization and market access, seems to be required to identify complementarities that 
may render aid more effective. 
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Appendix A1. Testing for differences in the quality of aid between the treatment and control 
group of recipient countries 
As noted in Section 1.2., the data situation as well as conceptual issues do not allow for a 
comprehensive calculation of the quality of aid at the bilateral level, i.e., for donor-recipient pairs. 
This is why we draw on Roodman’s (2012) aggregate measure of a donor’s aid quality. The 
limitation of this approach would be less serious if donors gave aid of the same quality to all 
recipient countries. In the present context, it appears to be of particular importance that the quality 
of aid from specific donors does not differ significantly between recipients in the treatment group 
and recipients in the control group. In this appendix, we evaluate the justification of using an 
aggregate, donor-based measure of aid quality in several steps. 
First of all, we perform group comparison t-tests for significant differences between the means of 
the donors’ quality-related aid shares for the treatment group versus the control group (in the first 
and second sub-periods). Table A1.1. presents the results of this exercise for the bilateral shares of 
tied aid as well as the bilateral shares of general budget support. The share of tied aid in net aid 
proxies the tying status in bilateral aid relations.51 We consider general budget support as a proxy 
of (the inverse of) aid proliferation, assuming that aid proliferation is less likely when donors 
grant mainly general budget support.52 As can be seen, significant differences in these dimensions 
of aid quality between the treatment and control group are rare exceptions. This provides a first 
indication that our approach of applying an aggregate measure of aid quality may not be unduly 
restrictive. 
Second, as for proliferation we also checked whether donor countries that tackled this issue by 
reducing the number of so-called non-significant aid relations did so in their bilateral relations 
with recipient countries in both the treatment and the control group. The OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) distinguishes significant and non-significant aid relations by two 
criteria: (i) whether a donor provides more than its global aid share to a particular recipient 
country and (ii) whether a donor is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90 percent 
                                                     
51 The calculation of this share is based on bilateral aid data drawn from AidData, 2.0 release. Note that this 
share is not directly comparable with the tying penalty as provided by Roodman (2012). 
52 The calculation of this share is based on DAC data on bilateral aid commitments in the Creditor Reporting 
System. 
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of total aid to a particular recipient country. Bilateral aid relations in which a donor fails to meet 
both criteria at the same time are classified to be non-significant. The DAC argues that the 
fragmentation of aid is closely related to the number of non-significant aid relations. 
The change in the number of non-significant aid relations is available from the DAC in a consistent 
way for country programmable aid during the period 2007-2014.53 We draw on this source to 
assess whether donors that improved the quality of their aid by reducing the number of non-
significant relations did so in both sub-groups of recipient countries. This indeed appears to be 
the case when considering the change in non-significant aid relations between 2007 and 2014 for 
all 28 donors in our sample taken together. The number of non-significant relations with recipients 
in the treatment group declined only modestly from 450 to 416 during this period (i.e., by about 8 
percent). Importantly, the decline in the number of non-significant relations (from 249 to 192) was 
no less pronounced for recipients in the control group.  
Figure A1.1. portrays the change in the number of non-significant relations for individual donor 
countries with recipients in the treatment group and those in the control group. The first thing to 
note is that few donors in our sample helped improve the quality of aid by reducing the number 
of non-significant aid relations considerably. Canada clearly stands out in this respect. 
Importantly, the strong decline in Canada’s non-significant relations was almost equally split 
between recipients in the treatment group and those in the control group. Likewise, Spain and 
Denmark which came closest to Canada in terms of reducing fragmentation did so in both groups 
of recipient countries. In striking contrast, fragmentation further increased for some donors such 
as Australia and the United Kingdom. Again, however, recipients were treated similarly by these 
donors; the number of non-significant aid relations increased in both groups. Considerable 
changes of fragmentation going in opposite directions for the two recipient groups are rare.54 
Third, we estimate donor-specific aid allocation models to assess the selectivity of their bilateral 
aid relations and, thus, the justification to apply the same discounts for granting aid to richer and 
                                                     
53 The data are available from: https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/fragmentation-orphans.htm 
(accessed: December 15, 2016). 
54 Where they occurred, as for the Netherlands and Sweden, it is interesting to note that fragmentation was 
reduced in the control group and not – as one could have expected – in the treatment group of recipient 
countries. 
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relatively corrupt countries in the treatment and control group. More precisely, we estimate a 
simple aid allocation model with (logged) GDP per capita, governance, population, and dummy 
variables for the second period as well as the treatment group of recipients on the right-hand side 
for (almost) all the donor countries in our sample.55 Importantly, we interact the standard 
determinants of aid allocation with the dummy variables to assess whether their impact differed 
between the treatment and control group of recipient countries. This does not appear to be the 
case, again with very few exceptions (Table A1.2.).56 Hence, it seems to be justified to apply the 
same penalty for granting aid to richer and relatively corrupt countries in both groups. 
Taken together, we find surprisingly strong evidence that donors give aid of similar quality to 
recipients in the treatment and control group. We conclude that the limitation of employing the 
aggregate measure of aid quality is less serious than one could have expected. 
Table A1.1. – t-tests (p-values) for significant differences between the means of donors’ aid shares: 
treatment versus control group of recipient countries in the first and second sub-periods 
 Share of tied aid Share of general budget support 
 1st sub-period 2nd sub-period 1st sub-period 2nd sub-period 
Australia 0.814 0.719 0.195 0.904 
Austria 0.364 0.005** 0.219 0.437 
Belgium 0.722 0.273 0.076 0.356 
Canada 0.639 0.072 0.195 0.081 
Czech Rep. 0.827 0.302 0.967 0.196 
Denmark 0.127 0.044* 0.144 0.306 
Finland 0.620 0.577 0.361 0.247 
France 0.830 0.172 0.156 0.059 
Germany 0.293 0.005** 0.564 0.309 
Greece 0.127 0.964 0.447 0.149 
Ireland - - 0.368 0.262 
Italy 0.118 0.993 0.535 0.297 
Japan 0.210 - 0.045* 0.663 
Korea, Rep. n.a. 0.479 n.a. - 
Luxembourg - 0.518 - 0.487 
Netherlands 0.672 0.853 0.185 0.303 
New Zealand 0.298 0.448 0.847 0.783 
Norway 0.188 0.428 0.812 0.110 
Portugal 0.520 0.099 0.290 0.740 
Spain 0.838 0.340 0.209 0.664 
Sweden 0.017* 0.446 0.142 0.070 
                                                     
55 The estimations could not be run for a few donors with insufficient data. 
56 We performed the same regression with control of corruption, instead of democracy, as an indicator of 
the quality of institutions (not shown). Results are affected only modestly by this modification. 
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United Kingdom - - 0.103 0.032* 
United States 0.597 0.362 0.489 0.630 
 Notes: Number of observations differs between listed donors and types of aid in sub-periods, depending 
on availability of bilateral aid data. Some (non-traditional) donor countries not listed due to missing 
bilateral aid data. *, ** significantly different means test in aid shares at the 5-percent and 1-percent level, 
respectively. “-” when aid shares are 0.000 for both the treatment and control group of recipient countries 
and p-values are not calculated by Stata. 
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Table A1.2. Aid allocation: regression results for DAC donor countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Spain Finland Germany France 
United 
Kingdo
m 
Greece 
Switzer-
land 
Ireland Italy Japan Korea 
Luxem-
bourg 
Nether-
lands 
Norway 
New 
Zealand 
Portugal Sweden USA 
Czech 
Rep. 
GDPpc (log) 0.027 -0.436* -0.823*** -0.522* -0.613 -0.827** -0.508* -0.361** -0.185 -0.476** -0.029 -1.024*** -0.621** -0.623** -0.683** -0.311 -0.264 -0.940** -0.406 -0.371 -0.408 -0.612 -0.995*** 0.134 
 (0.287) (0.183) (0.209) (0.227) (0.441) (0.249) (0.231) (0.137) (0.142) (0.172) (0.262) (0.234) (0.230) (0.216) (0.213) (0.171) (0.293) (0.299) (0.309) (0.224) (0.384) (0.314) (0.276) (0.275) 
Population (log) 0.676* 0.368 0.284* 0.663*** 0.386** 0.625** 0.676*** 1.027*** 0.567*** 0.510** 0.075 0.339* 0.316*** 0.372* 0.955*** 0.670*** 0.213 0.462** 0.482*** 0.327 -0.144 0.371** 0.695*** 0.202 
 (0.287) (0.213) (0.128) (0.118) (0.122) (0.197) (0.087) (0.095) (0.105) (0.169) (0.142) (0.156) (0.087) (0.162) (0.142) (0.125) (0.150) (0.169) (0.119) (0.188) (0.198) (0.119) (0.189) (0.163) 
Democracy (polity) 0.025 0.138 0.145 0.159** -0.033 0.168 0.078 0.140** 0.021 0.093 0.006 0.085 0.070 0.056 0.087 0.035 0.047 0.140 0.106 0.068 -0.139 0.219** 0.210** 0.058 
 (0.107) (0.077) (0.075) (0.061) (0.090) (0.098) (0.062) (0.048) (0.051) (0.059) (0.073) (0.071) (0.065) (0.076) (0.054) (0.055) (0.077) (0.089) (0.068) (0.073) (0.106) (0.079) (0.080) (0.049) 
Treated * GDPpc (log) -0.815 0.225 0.537 0.024 -0.096 1.174** -0.153 0.139 0.373 -0.460 0.138 0.350 -0.212 0.529 0.358 0.279 -0.067 0.085 -0.389 0.095 -0.105 0.192 0.298 0.088 
 (0.450) (0.277) (0.318) (0.273) (0.507) (0.352) (0.294) (0.190) (0.259) (0.301) (0.329) (0.305) (0.331) (0.314) (0.310) (0.235) (0.355) (0.380) (0.366) (0.311) (0.498) (0.380) (0.357) (0.368) 
Treated * Population 
(log) -0.448 0.163 0.173 0.188 -0.045 -0.098 -0.246 -0.239 0.009 0.447* -0.039 0.185 0.155 0.094 -0.189 -0.180 -0.240 0.000 0.127 -0.217 -0.284 0.156 0.010 -0.060 
 (0.385) (0.263) (0.185) (0.158) (0.213) (0.262) (0.162) (0.153) (0.165) (0.212) (0.205) (0.199) (0.170) (0.210) (0.183) (0.172) (0.218) (0.241) (0.180) (0.251) (0.329) (0.180) (0.229) (0.248) 
Treated * Democracy 
(polity) 0.060 -0.121 -0.171 -0.111 0.019 -0.077 0.016 -0.087 -0.148 0.067 -0.006 0.013 0.003 -0.151 0.115 -0.063 -0.021 0.018 -0.027 -0.038 0.319* -0.257* -0.071 -0.094 
 (0.184) (0.099) (0.118) (0.086) (0.118) (0.134) (0.087) (0.064) (0.093) (0.098) (0.091) (0.089) (0.108) (0.104) (0.097) (0.085) (0.108) (0.108) (0.096) (0.115) (0.145) (0.105) (0.111) (0.088) 
2nd Period * GDPpc 
(log) -0.362 0.615* 0.336 0.005 0.463 0.442 0.056 0.289 -0.033 0.426 0.314 0.253 0.024 0.070 0.123 0.126 -0.117 0.374 -0.121 -0.196 -0.070 0.017 0.490 0.388 
 (0.367) (0.311) (0.306) (0.311) (0.631) (0.469) (0.295) (0.255) (0.270) (0.241) (0.316) (0.337) (0.358) (0.346) (0.301) (0.329) (0.344) (0.427) (0.418) (0.574) (0.578) (0.449) (0.372) (0.581) 
2nd Period * Population 
(log) -0.049 0.244 0.240 -0.165 0.073 0.039 -0.140 0.113 0.076 0.098 0.372* 0.198 -0.191 -0.093 -0.143 0.133 0.225 -0.023 0.001 0.028 0.268 -0.012 0.156 0.174 
 (0.380) (0.314) (0.178) (0.152) (0.278) (0.266) (0.117) (0.144) (0.159) (0.217) (0.178) (0.205) (0.156) (0.235) (0.189) (0.181) (0.187) (0.247) (0.206) (0.264) (0.275) (0.168) (0.248) (0.240) 
2nd Period * Democracy 
(polity) -0.044 0.021 0.073 0.034 0.131 0.021 0.073 -0.022 0.020 -0.098 0.011 0.090 0.051 0.144 -0.025 0.038 0.101 -0.018 0.083 -0.024 0.235 -0.031 -0.094 -0.038 
 (0.150) (0.123) (0.107) (0.088) (0.133) (0.145) (0.081) (0.079) (0.077) (0.083) (0.102) (0.109) (0.091) (0.105) (0.078) (0.099) (0.107) (0.122) (0.107) (0.159) (0.148) (0.103) (0.109) (0.106) 
Treated * 2nd Period * 
GDPpc (log) 0.371 -0.552 -0.702 -0.221 -0.549 -0.916 0.006 -0.166 0.139 -0.274 0.008 -0.180 -0.154 -0.100 -0.465 -0.295 0.180 -0.508 0.320 0.324 0.536 -0.251 -0.272 -0.920 
 (0.560) (0.417) (0.455) (0.380) (0.714) (0.569) (0.380) (0.316) (0.401) (0.386) (0.408) (0.426) (0.472) (0.471) (0.404) (0.408) (0.454) (0.544) (0.518) (0.677) (0.736) (0.553) (0.468) (0.722) 
Treated * 2nd Period * 
Population (log) 0.094 -0.289 0.022 0.125 0.274 0.053 0.307 -0.033 -0.043 -0.071 -0.025 -0.234 0.277 -0.016 0.034 0.071 -0.132 -0.178 0.022 -0.117 -0.076 -0.112 -0.192 -0.430 
 (0.497) (0.376) (0.269) (0.220) (0.391) (0.344) (0.207) (0.226) (0.243) (0.267) (0.259) (0.269) (0.251) (0.305) (0.239) (0.260) (0.307) (0.350) (0.291) (0.379) (0.487) (0.259) (0.315) (0.384) 
Treated * 2nd Period * 
Democracy (polity) -0.052 -0.023 -0.106 -0.075 -0.047 -0.089 -0.162 -0.041 -0.034 -0.031 -0.023 -0.204 -0.087 -0.120 -0.077 -0.104 -0.145 -0.032 -0.102 -0.097 -0.352 0.048 0.007 0.058 
 (0.235) (0.149) (0.162) (0.120) (0.169) (0.186) (0.117) (0.098) (0.133) (0.128) (0.129) (0.132) (0.143) (0.140) (0.127) (0.141) (0.152) (0.158) (0.148) (0.220) (0.206) (0.150) (0.146) (0.174) 
Number of countries 110 109 113 116 95 117 112 120 120 114 113 106 105 116 120 117 100 113 112 87 81 108 120 63 
R2 0.22 0.24 0.40 0.58 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.68 0.35 0.54 0.13 0.39 0.39 0.23 0.55 0.43 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.17 0.12 0.31 0.50 0.10 
Observations 184 207 208 219 159 214 206 228 229 215 195 200 188 212 229 222 180 205 214 148 132 203 229 94 
Notes: Four donors of our overall sample are missing due to insufficient number of observations (Iceland, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic). Constant term as 
well as dummy variables for recipient countries in the treatment group, the second period, and the interaction between treatment group and second period are 
included in all regressions but not shown for the sake of brevity. ***, **, * if significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively. 
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Figure A1.1. Change in the number of insignificant aid relations, 2007-2014 
 
Source: OECD-DAC, https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/fragmentation-orphans.htm 
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Appendix B1. Donor-specific regressions on aid allocation and placebo test 
As discussed in Section 1.2., our DD estimator does not necessarily resolve endogeneity concerns. 
Therefore, this appendix presents donor-specific regressions on aid allocation and a placebo test 
by ‘pre-dating’ the Paris Declaration.  
The findings from a simple aid allocation model help evaluate the seriousness of some 
endogeneity concerns at least tentatively. The results reported in Table B1.1. are based on donor-
specific regressions, considering the recipient countries’ GDP per capita, governance in terms of 
control of corruption, and population as the widely used standard determinants of aid allocation 
across recipient countries. We also include dummy variables for the second period and the 
treatment group of recipients (not shown). DAC donors with sufficient data to assess the 
allocation of their aid are listed in ascending order of the discounts for quality-adjusted aid (as 
shown in Figure 1.1.). This ranking of donors helps us compare the coefficients on the standard 
determinants of aid allocation between donors that provide higher quality aid (upper half of the 
list) and those providing lower quality aid (bottom half). 
From this simple exercise we do not find evidence suggesting that richer recipient countries get 
more aid from donor countries granting higher quality aid. Rather, the poverty orientation of such 
donors, as reflected in the negative coefficients on GDP per capita in the corresponding aid 
allocation equations, appears to be somewhat stronger than the poverty orientation of donors 
granting lower quality aid. The coefficients on GDP per capita are -0.54 and -0.23, on average, for 
the upper and lower half of donors in the table, respectively. Neither do we find evidence that 
weaker governance in the recipient countries leads to inflows of lower quality aid. It rather 
appears that donors typically pay little attention to governance, in terms of controlling for 
corruption, when deciding on the allocation of their aid. Most of the coefficients on governance 
prove to be statistically insignificant, independently of whether the specific donor country grants 
higher or lower quality aid. Hence, it seems unlikely that our findings reported in the main body 
of the chapter are seriously distorted by these dimensions of potential endogeneity. 
Table B1.2. reports the results of a placebo test to assess whether the Paris Declaration in 2005 was 
really relevant for higher effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid. For this placebo test, we assume 
that the Paris Declaration would have been agreed five years earlier in 2000. Since the data for 
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quality-adjusted aid is available only from 1995, we split the placebo period 1995-2005 into two 5-
year sub-periods: 1995-1999 and 2001-2005. In other respects, the placebo test follows the 
procedures underlying the baseline estimations reported in the upper part of Table 1.1. 
According to the results in Table B1.2., both types of aid have been effective in increasing GDP 
per capita for the treatment group in 2001-2005. This surprising finding may be attributed to the 
increase in aid after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It appears that this event affected the aid-growth 
nexus for both types of aid. In the present context, however, it is more important that the placebo 
test does not point to higher effectiveness of quality-adjusted aid, compared to unadjusted aid, 
after the placebo treatment in 2000. This contrast to our baseline findings suggests that the Paris 
Declaration in 2005 was a relevant event indeed to explain the significantly higher effects of 
quality-adjusted aid on the change of GDP per capita for the treatment group in the aftermath of 
the Paris Declaration. 
Table B1.1. – Aid allocation by specific DAC donors: significant coefficients on GDP per capita, 
control of corruption and population 
 GDP per capita Control of corruption Population 
Sweden -0.529***  0.433*** 
Ireland -0.825*** 0.488* 0.363*** 
Denmark -0.701***  0.502*** 
Luxembourg -0.442*** 0.549* 0.218** 
Netherlands -0.868***  0.404*** 
Portugal -0.393*   
United Kingdom -0.574***  0.692*** 
Switzerland -0.722***  0.485*** 
Finland -0.540***  0.548*** 
Norway -0.563***  0.587*** 
New Zealand    
Australia -0.372*   
Canada -0.565*** 0.309* 0.611*** 
Belgium -0.595***  0.475*** 
Germany -0.224**  1.044*** 
United States -0.455*** -0.533* 0.609*** 
Austria -0.240*  0.498*** 
Japan -0.663*** 0.568** 0.606*** 
Greece 0.312**  0.272*** 
France   0.749*** 
Spain   0.630*** 
Italy -0.319*  0.331*** 
Korea  -0.367* 0.517*** 
Czech Rep.    
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Notes: DAC donors listed in ascending order by discounts for quality-adjusted aid (see Figure 1.1.). DAC 
donors with insufficient number of observations not listed (Iceland, Poland, Slovak Rep. and Slovenia). 
Statistically insignificant coefficients are not shown; ***, **, * significant at the one, five and ten percent, 
respectively. All regressions include dummy variables for the treatment group of recipients and the second 
period (not shown). 
 
Table B1.2. Effects of aid on the change in GDP per capita: placebo test for the full sample, median 
of difference in aid inflows (total US$) to separate treatment and control groups 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
 
 
Quality-adjusted aid Unadjusted aid 
2nd period 0.025 0.020 -0.270** 0.010 0.011 -0.301***  
(0.187) (0.352) (0.025) (0.637) (0.614) (0.008) 
Treatment 0.012 -0.005 -0.011 0.014 0.023 0.019  
(0.675) (0.840) (0.962) (0.640) (0.340) (0.423) 
2nd period * treatment 0.053 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.083** 0.095*** 0.101***  
(0.135) (0.002) (0.004) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.098*** 0.103 0.218** 0.097*** 0.074 0.203*  
(0.000) (0.292) (0.038) (0.000) (0.457) (0.057) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
2nd period * controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 290 233 233 290 233 233 
R2 0.043 0.115 0.147 0.065 0.152 0.184 
Standard errors are clustered at the recipient country level. Robust p-values in brackets. * (**, ***) indicates 
statistical significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. 
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Appendix C1. Trends of the change in GDP per capita for the treatment and control group 
The DD approach assumes that, in the absence of the (aid-related) treatment, the difference in the 
dependent variable between the two sub-periods would have been the same for the treatment and 
the control groups. In this appendix, we tentatively assess the plausibility of this assumption. 
Specifically, we portray in Figure C1.1. how the differences in GDP per capita for the treatment 
and control groups of recipient countries evolved since 1960. Differences in GDP per capita are 
calculated over six years, on a moving annual basis. Each dot in Figure C1.1. shows the average 
change in GDP per capita for countries in the treatment group or countries in the control group, 
respectively, over the period from t to t+5; e.g., the two dots for 2005 relate to the difference of 
GDP per capita in 2011 minus GDP per capita in 2005.  
As can be seen, the trends are not perfectly parallel for the two groups of recipient countries. 
However, both groups seem to have parallel trends after 1995. See Section 1.3. for a discussion of 
methodological implications. 
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Figure C1.1. Trends of the differences in GDP per capita since 1960 
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Appendix D1. Tests for statistically significant differences between the coefficients of the 
interaction terms, 2nd period*treatment 
We report two types of tests in Table D1.1. and Tables D1.2. and D1.3. The p-values of these tests 
are briefly interpreted in the main body of the chapter. 
Table D1.1. shows tests for statistically significant differences between the impact of quality-
adjusted aid and unadjusted aid on the change in GDP per capita in Tables 1.1. and 1.6., or the 
alternative definitions of the dependent variable in Table 1.2. More precisely, we test whether the 
interaction term 2nd period*treatment differs significantly between quality-adjusted aid and the 
corresponding estimation with unadjusted aid. In the front column of Table D1.1., we specify the 
interaction terms compared by noting the relevant table, the panel (in Tables 1.1. and 1.6.) or the 
definition of the dependent variable (in Table 1.2.), and the columns where the two interaction 
terms are based on the same specification of the estimation equation. For instance, the p-value of 
0.061 in the first line of Table D1.1. compares the coefficients on the interactions terms shown in 
columns 1 and 4 of the upper panel of Table 1.1. (0.067 and 0.029, respectively). 
Tables D1.2. and D1.3. show tests for significant differences between the impact of aid measured 
in total US$ with that of aid measured in per-capita terms. The tests reported in Table D1.2. are 
based on the interaction terms, 2nd period*treatment, for the two aid measures shown in Table 1.1. 
for the full sample of recipient countries; i.e., we compare the interaction terms for either quality-
adjusted aid or unadjusted aid in the upper panel of Table 1.1. (where the treatment is based on 
the change in aid inflows in total US$) with the corresponding interaction terms in the lower panel 
of Table 1.1. (where the treatment is based on the change in aid inflows in per-capita terms). For 
instance, the p-value of 0.573 compares the coefficients on the interaction terms shown in column 
1 of the upper and the lower panel of Table 1.1. (0.067 and 0.055, respectively). The tests reported 
in Table D1.3. compare the interaction terms (for either quality-adjusted aid or unadjusted aid) 
between the two measures of aid after excluding the smallest recipient countries or, alternatively, 
the largest recipient countries. The interaction terms are shown in Table 1.7. when the treatment 
is based on the change in aid inflows in total US$, while the corresponding interaction terms with 
the treatment based on the change in aid inflows in per-capita terms are available on request. For 
instance, the p-value of 0.902 reported in the first line of Table D1.3. compares the coefficients on 
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the interaction term shown in column 1 of the top panel of Table 1.7. (0.039) and the corresponding 
interaction term for quality-adjusted aid in per-capita terms (not shown in Table 1.7.). 
Table D1.1. Tests for statistically significant differences between the coefficients of the interaction 
terms, 2nd period*treatment, for quality-adjusted aid and unadjusted aid 
Coefficients p-value 
Table 1.1., upper panel, column 1 & 4 0.061 
Table 1.1., upper panel, column 2 & 5 0.079 
Table 1.1., upper panel, column 3 & 6 0.060 
Table 1.1., lower panel, column 1 & 4 0.459 
Table 1.1., lower panel, column 2 & 5 0.381 
Table 1.1., lower panel, column 3 & 6 0.785 
Table 1.6., upper panel, column 1 & 4 0.010 
Table 1.6., upper panel, column 2 & 5 0.067 
Table 1.6., upper panel, column 3 & 6 0.210 
Table 1.6., lower panel, column 1 & 4 0.005 
Table 1.6., lower panel, column 2 & 5 0.097 
Table 1.6., lower panel, column 3 & 6 0.963 
Table 1.2., compound growth, total aid, column 1 & 4 0.059 
Table 1.2., compound growth, total aid, column 2 & 5 0.063 
Table 1.2., compound growth, total aid, column 3 & 6 0.039 
Table 1.2., compound growth, per capita aid, column 1 & 4 0.450 
Table 1.2., compound growth, per capita aid, column 2 & 5 0.366 
Table 1.2., compound growth, per capita aid, column 3 & 6 0.739 
Table 1.2., log GDP, total aid, column 1 & 4 0.871 
Table 1.2., log GDP, total aid, column 2 & 5 0.102 
Table 1.2., log GDP, total aid, column 3 & 6 0.070 
Table 1.2., log GDP, per capita aid, column 1 & 4 0.666 
Table 1.2., log GDP, per capita aid, column 2 & 5 0.059 
Table 1.2., log GDP, per capita aid, column 3 & 6 0.169 
 
Table D1.2. Tests for statistically significant differences between the coefficients of the interaction 
terms, 2nd period*treatment, for the aid measure in total US$ and in per-capita terms, full sample in 
Table 1.1. 
 p-value 
Table 1.1., Column 1, U&L (quality aid total & quality aid per capita) 0.573 
Table 1.1., Column 2, U&L (quality aid total & quality aid per capita) 0.769 
Table 1.1., Column 3, U&L (quality aid total & quality aid per capita) 0.486 
Table 1.1., Column 4, U&L (unadj. aid total and unadjusted aid per capita) 0.509 
Table 1.1., Column 5, U&L (unadj. aid total and unadjusted aid per capita) 0.432 
Table 1.1., Column 6, U&L (unadj. aid total and unadjusted aid per capita) 0.204 
 Note: U&L denotes upper and lower panel. 
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Table D1.3. Tests for statistically significant differences between the coefficients of the interaction 
terms, 2nd period*treatment, for the aid measure in total US$ and in per-capita terms, excluding 
smallest or largest countries in Table 1.7. 
 p-value 
Quality aid (smallest countries excluded) 
Total vs per capita, column 1 
 
0.902 
Total vs per capita, column 2 0.513 
Total vs per capita, column 3 
Unadjusted aid (smallest countries excluded) 
0.759 
Total vs per capita, column 4 0.312 
Total vs per capita, column 5 0.334 
Total vs per capita, column 6 
Quality aid (largest countries excluded) 
0.216 
Total vs per capita, column 1 0.580 
Total vs per capita, column 2 0.590 
Total vs per capita, column 3 
Unadjusted aid (largest countries excluded) 
0.274 
Total vs per capita, column 4 0.509 
Total vs per capita, column 5 0.344 
Total vs per capita, column 6 0.266 
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CHAPTER 2 
Development Minister Characteristics and Aid 
Giving57 
Co-authored with Andreas Fuchs 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
uring the run up to Germany’s 2009 General Elections, the Free Democratic Party 
campaigned for the abolishment of the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. When Chancellor Angela Merkel formed a 
coalition with the Free Democrats later that year, it was a frontrunner of the Free Democratic 
Party who took office in the ministry: Dirk Niebel, then the party’s General Secretary. Rather 
than sticking to the announcement to dissolve the ministry, the new minister asked for an 
increase in the ministry’s budget.58 Niebel did not have any professional experience in 
development cooperation when he took office, leading the German news magazine Stern to 
conclude: “Nobody can really say what actually qualifies Dirk Niebel as development aid 
minister.“59 
                                                     
57 Chapter 2 is available as published article: Fuchs, Andreas and Katharina Richert (2018). Development 
Minister Characteristics and Aid Giving. European Journal of Political Economy 53: 186-204. 
58 DIE WELT, “Neuer Minister: Niebel verlangt mehr Geld für Entwicklungshilfe,” WELT.de, 23 
November 2009, available at http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article5297548/Niebel-verlangt-
mehr-Geld-fuer-Entwicklungshilfe.html (accessed 26 November 2014). 
59 Christ, Sebastian and Hans-Peter Schütz, “Entwicklungshilfeministerium: Dirk Niebel, 
Minister auf Bewährung,” stern.de, 29 October 2009 (own translation), available at 
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/entwicklungshilfeministerium-dirk-niebel-
minister-auf-bewaehrung-1517745.html (accessed 26 November 2014). 
D 
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 Does it matter who is in charge of development cooperation? Over 300 ministers 
responsible for development aid have entered (and left) office in 23 member countries of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since this institution started reporting 
detailed aid flows in 1967.60 30 percent of the ministers are explicitly “Ministers for 
Development Cooperation” (or have similar titles), while in most cases development aid has 
been the responsibility of the foreign minister. 18 percent of the ministers have been women 
and a mere 16 percent possessed any professional experience in development cooperation 
when they took office. While it is highly disputed whether (and how) aggregate aid affects the 
economic growth of developing countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004), 
there is evidence that certain types of aid have positive effects on development outcomes 
(Dreher et al. 2008; Clemens et al. 2012; Bjørnskov 2013; but see also Roodman 2015).61 
Moreover, scholarship has shed light on some unwelcome side effects that aid might have on 
conflict, governance, and sustainable development in general (e.g., Bjørnskov 2010; Nunn and 
Qian 2014). Understanding the role played by development ministers in foreign aid is crucial 
since their decisions might influence both the quantity and the quality of aid and thus impact 
aid effectiveness and aggravate or mitigate the potential side effects of aid. 
 In order to study whether the personal characteristics of development ministers matter 
for donors’ aid giving, we build a novel database covering all ministers of OECD-DAC 
countries responsible for development cooperation since 1967. The study covers all country-
years for which detailed aid flows have been reported to the OECD-DAC (as of July 28, 2014). 
Using panel econometric models, we then estimate the link between development ministers’ 
personal characteristics and (1) aid quantity, i.e., the size of aid budgets in terms of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA),62 as well as (2) aid quality, i.e., the share of aid budgets that 
                                                     
60 As of the end of 2012, 23 countries (and the European Commission) were members of the OECD-DAC: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We only cover aid provided by DAC donors 
in order to analyze a comparatively homogenous set of donor countries, which have agreed to follow 
the same guidelines on the management of development aid. This is not to say that DAC donors would 
not show considerable variation with respect to their aid motives (see, for example, Doucouliagos and 
Manning 2009). 
61 See Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2010, 2011) for meta studies of the aid effectiveness literature. 
62 ODA is defined by the OECD (2008) as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of 
ODA Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development 
institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the 
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is expected to be particularly conducive to achieving developmental goals as operationalized 
by the foreign-assistance component of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) 
(Roodman 2012).63 Specifically, we test whether these two variables are associated with 
ministers’ gender, ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, 
university education, and years in office. 
 Our chapter combines two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the empirical 
aid literature (e.g., Dudley 1979; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006) and to 
the scholarly work on aid budgets in particular (e.g., Bertoli et al. 2008; Tingley 2010; Dreher 
and Fuchs 2011; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Fuchs et al. 2014). Second, the chapter adds to the 
burgeoning literature on the effects of political leaders’ personal characteristics on economic 
outcomes. Previous research has focused on the role of gender (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004; Koch and Fulton 2011), political ideology (e.g., Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015), 
educational and professional background (e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Spilimbergo 
2009), regional and ethnic origin (e.g., Hodler and Raschky 2014; De Luca et al. 2015), 
socioeconomic status (Hayo and Neumeier 2012, 2014, 2016), and time in office (e.g., Jochimsen 
and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014). Contributions cover the role played by country 
leaders (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009; Besley et al. 2011), foreign ministers and defense ministers 
(Koch and Fulton 2011), finance ministers (e.g., Moser 2007; Chatagny 2015), central bankers 
(e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015), heads of subnational 
regions (Hayo and Neumeier 2012, 2014), and mayors (e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko 2014; Freier 
and Thomasius 2016), among others.64 
The development minister offers a particularly interesting case to reinvestigate the role 
of leadership since this position receives relatively little (domestic) attention compared to 
other cabinet members, such as the head of government or the minister of finance, despite its 
global importance. Development ministers have a low profile at home, usually being either 
                                                     
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional 
in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per 
cent).” 
63 As there is a lack of consensus as to what constitutes high-quality aid, we will also show results where 
we remove controversial subcomponents of this aggregate indicator. 
64 A related literature analyzes how leadership changes (rather than personal characteristics) affect 
economic outcomes (McGillivray and Smith 2004; Jones and Olken 2005; Moser and Dreher 2010; Dreher 
and Jensen 2013). 
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annexed to their respective foreign ministry or having a low rank in cabinet.65 Given the low 
issue salience of aid policies (e.g., Lundsgaarde 2013; Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015), it 
appears likely that foreign ministers assuming the function of a development minister are 
selected based on their stance on foreign policy issues rather than on their development 
profile. All of this is beneficial for our research design as the selection of the officeholder 
should thus be more independent from policy positions in the issue area he or she oversees 
than in the case for ministers in other issue areas. Nevertheless, decisions made by 
development ministers are of high importance. In sharp contrast to the disinterest in 
development issues in many governments, parliaments and the public, aid decisions taken at 
donor ministries can have huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries alone provide more 
than US$ 100 billion annually to the developing world. 
 The previous literature barely touches on the role of the decision-makers responsible 
for the provision of development assistance. The existing papers that cover the role of 
development ministers only analyze the impact of the ministers’ gender. Dreher et al. (2015a) 
find that female development ministers are more responsive to gender issues when allocating 
aid than their male counterparts. Kleemann et al. (2016) discover only minor gender 
differences in the allocation of aid for education. A systematic analysis of development 
minister characteristics is still lacking. Additionally, since the above two papers do not control 
for female heads of government, their empirical strategies come with the drawback of not 
capturing the pure effect of the minister’s gender. Appointing a female development minister 
could just be a proxy for women having control over government in general.66 In order to 
approach the identification of a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of 
the development minister, we control for the personal characteristics of the respective head of 
government and donor-country-fixed effects, or, alternatively, government-head-fixed effects. 
The inclusion of government-head-fixed effects also helps mitigate concerns that the observed 
effects might be driven by the strategic appointment of ministers by heads of governments as 
these regressions only exploit variation within governments over time. However, we cannot 
                                                     
65 For example, the development ministers are not full-ranked ministers in France (ministre délégué). The 
German development minister has full cabinet rank but is the lowest ranked line minister according to 
German protocol. 
66 Lu and Breuning (2014) control for the gender composition of governments in their analysis of the 
role of gender for aid generosity. However, they do not include donor-country-fixed effects, meaning 
that the observed effects may be driven by unobserved country characteristics. 
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control for changes in the focus of a given head of government while in office. Since we lack 
adequate external instrumental variables for the appointment of development ministers, we 
do not claim that the observed coefficients represent causal effects. 
Our chapter provides the first test for the role of the personal characteristics, beyond 
gender, of development ministers for a large sample of donor countries.67 Additionally, we 
also offer the first quantitative analysis of the ministers’ role for the “development-
friendliness” of donors’ aid giving (“aid quality”) and introduce a rigorous empirical strategy 
that can be applied in the context of research on the role of government members more 
generally. The results show that some personal characteristics of development ministers 
matter. Most notably, more experienced ministers with respect to their time as development 
minister obtain larger aid budgets: One additional year in the development office increases 
total ODA commitments by 0.7 percent. Additionally, we find that the share of quality ODA 
increases by 1.1 percentage points if development ministers possess prior professional 
experience in the field of development cooperation and by 0.2 percentage points for each 
additional year in office. Moreover, aid quality is on average one percentage point higher if 
development ministers are female. 
 We proceed as follows. Section 2.2. discusses potential linkages between the personal 
characteristics of development ministers and the quantity and quality of ODA. Section 2.3. 
presents our novel dataset covering the characteristics of the 320 ministers that have been 
responsible for the OECD's development aid since 1967. Section 2.4. introduces the empirical 
approach and presents our results. The final section concludes and discusses avenues for 
future research. 
2.2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Development ministers negotiate at the cabinet table about the size of their budget and then 
assume the leadership role to distribute the aid money across recipient countries, sectors, and 
types of aid. Theory suggests that minister characteristics are particularly salient in the case of 
decision-making by development ministers compared to other government members. In 
contrast to government expenditures in most other political spheres (e.g., spending by the 
                                                     
67 Dreher et al. (2015b) analyze the role of the political color of both the Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the Foreign Federal Office on German aid allocation. 
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ministry of transport), taxpayers cannot directly observe how their government allocates the 
country’s aid budget in recipient countries (e.g., Martens et al. 2002).68 This absence of the usual 
control mechanism between taxpayers and politicians creates a principal-agent problem and 
development ministers should thus have sufficient discretion to influence aid giving to further 
their own interests. These can be either altruist motives to promote development in recipient 
countries, or self-interests such as their intention to get promoted within the ministerial 
hierarchy or to obtain side-payments from lobby groups. Early work indeed suggests that the 
development minister has “considerable latitude within the bounds of general policy 
directives” (Breuning 1999: 732). 
Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to believe that development ministers do not 
have the power to significantly influence aid giving. Most fundamentally, the minister’s power 
is limited due to shared competencies within the government and parliamentary oversight 
(Dreher et al. 2015b). Other forces that reduce the minister’s room to maneuver include a 
powerful aid bureaucracy – whether in the form of the ministry itself or an aid agency – that 
follows its own agenda (Easterly 2002a; Copelovitch 2010), special interest groups that may 
dominate aid decisions (Anwar and Michaelowa 2006; Hicks et al. 2010), and traditions and 
other patterns of persistence in aid relations, including the emergence of “lead donors” 
(Steinwand 2015). If development ministers possess sufficient power to overcome the 
constraining influences of other actors, their personal characteristics will affect the quantity 
and quality of aid. In what follows, we discuss how the gender, political ideology, and 
experience of a development minister could affect aid giving. 
 
Gender 
Women and men show significant differences in their preferences.69 For example, Togeby 
(1994) identifies a gender gap in foreign policy attitudes: women are on average more 
supportive of development aid (and less supportive of military interventions). However, it is 
                                                     
68 Although some large (e.g., infrastructure) projects receive some media coverage in donor countries, 
taxpayers typically do not directly observe the benefits of aid. Indirect effects on the domestic sphere, 
such as reduced refugee flows or a possible reduction in transnational terrorist attacks, are difficult to 
quantify. 
69 Croson and Gneezy (2009) review experimental evidence on gender-specific differences in risk 
preferences, social preferences, and competitive preferences. Econometric studies show, for example, 
that, as women obtain the right to vote, government size and social spending increase (Lott and Kenny 
1999; Aidt and Dallal 2008). 
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unclear whether such gender differences in individuals’ preferences also translate into 
politicians’ actual decision-making. Strategic considerations, including party pressure or log-
rolling, may prevent these differences from affecting policies (Funk and Gathmann 2015). 
Scholarly evidence is mixed on whether the described overall larger support of women for 
development aid is reflected in legislators’ decisions on aid policies. Empirical studies do not 
show a consistent positive relationship between the strength of female representation in 
parliament and the size of aid budgets (Breuning 2001; Lundsgaarde et al. 2007; Olsen-Telles 
2013; Fuchs et al. 2014; Lu and Breuning 2014; Hicks et al. 2016). 
Predictions are also not straightforward with respect to total ODA budgets when it 
comes to the role of female development ministers rather than parliamentarians. 
Independently of gender-specific differences in the ministers’ stance towards foreign aid, 
ministers have a vested interest in maximizing their respective budget as a greater budget 
increases their chances of success as a minister (and should thus affect their chance of being 
promoted and re-elected). Based on this, one would expect to observe no significant difference 
in the size of aid budgets between female-led and male-led aid ministries. However, empirical 
evidence points at systematic gender differences in negotiation outcomes, such as in salary 
negotiations, in which women are worse off than men (e.g., Gerhart and Rynes 1991). 
Explanations include, among others, women’s lower willingness to self-promote, and 
negotiation partners, both male and female, who make lower offers to women since they 
assume that female negotiators will give in more easily than their male counterparts (Solnick 
2001). Applying these findings to political negotiations, it could be argued that male ministers 
more successfully negotiate for larger aid budgets than female ministers. 
Turning to the specific use of the aid money, which should affect the quality of aid, 
Hicks et al. (2016) find strong evidence of gender differences arising from larger female 
representation in parliaments: the level of the flows going to education, health and social 
capital projects as well as to least-developed countries appear to increase with stronger 
representation of women in national parliaments. One could thus expect that donor countries 
with female development ministers also provide more aid to social sectors and poor countries, 
which is – as some argue (e.g., Mosley 1985) – of higher ODA quality. This would be consistent 
with evidence of gender differences in foreign policy attitudes discussed above (e.g., Togeby 
1994). 
71 
 
However, there are reasons to believe that such “female behavior” does not hold at the 
level of political leaders. Analyzing the role of gender in foreign policy, Koch and Fulton (2011) 
show that female representation in parliaments causes a decrease in defense spending and 
conflict behavior but they find the opposite effect for female defense ministers and 
government heads. In the words of Koch and Fulton (2011), “[w]hen it comes to masculinized 
leadership positions, like executive ofﬁce, this challenge to gain credibility may lead women 
to present themselves as more masculine, in an attempt to combat the stereotype.” Given that 
women face more barriers to access leadership positions, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 
394), referring to Eagly et al. (1995), note that “[i]f a woman must be ‘twice as good as a man’ 
in order to be appointed to a leadership position […] then women may be more effective 
leaders and superior performers compared to their male colleagues.” Similarly, empirical 
evidence on monetary policy suggests that women take more “hawkish” decisions than their 
male counterparts (Farvaque et al. 2009). Translating this to the case of development ministers, 
one might expect “tougher” behavior from female development ministers in negotiations over 
budgets and in their usage of budgets in the sense that they pursue a more self-interested 
development policy at the detriment of aid quality. 
 
Political ideology 
Scholarship has scrutinized the effects of government ideology on aid giving. First, it is argued 
that, in analogy to domestic social welfare transfers, left-wing governments provide more aid 
than right-wing governments since the former are supposedly more “altruistic” and “pro-
poor” (Thérien and Noël 2000; Round and Odedokun 2004). Moreover, the left’s stronger 
tendency to interfere in market mechanisms is put forward as an explanation (Tingley 2010). 
Second, right-wing governments are said to provide larger aid budgets as they see aid as a 
tool to promote commercial and geostrategic interests (Round and Odedokun 2004; Bertoli et 
al. 2008). Finally, it might again just be that ministers aim to maximize their budgets 
independent of their respective political ideology as argued above. While Thérien and Noël 
(2000) and Tingley (2000) provide evidence for the first argument, Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
find political ideology to be insignificant, and, according to Bertoli et al. (2008) and Dreher et 
al. (2015b), right-wing governments provide more aid. 
Based on the same lines of argumentation, there are also reasons to believe that 
development ministers’ political orientation affects the quality of aid. Brech and Potrafke 
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(2014) find that left-wing governments experience stronger increases in bilateral grant aid and 
grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. This might suggest that left-
wing governments provide in general higher aid quality compared to right-wing governments 
as such an allocation pattern leads to lower future financial obligations for recipient countries 
and is more need-oriented. This is in line with the argument that right-wing decision-makers 
are guided to a greater extent by domestic political and commercial interests than their left-
wing counterparts who are expected to believe more in the merits of redistribution from the 
rich to the poor. However, empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. While Fleck and Kilby 
(2006) find that development concerns in the United States matter more under a Democratic 
president and Congress compared to when the president and/or Congress are Republican, 
Dreher et al. (2015b) reject claims that Germany’s aid allocation under conservative 
governments is guided to a larger extent by commercial and politico-strategic interests than 
under left-wing administrations. 
 
Experience 
Prior research shows that the professional background of political decision-makers affects 
their decisions while in office. For example, former central bank staff prefer lower inflation 
rates than former politicians after being appointed to central bank councils (Göhlmann and 
Vaubel 2007; Farvaque et al. 2009) and former entrepreneurs are more likely to implement 
market-liberalizing reforms when they lead a government (Dreher et al. 2009). Based on these 
results, one could also argue that relevant experience in development cooperation, including 
work experience in aid agencies, development NGOs and developing-country embassies, 
influences the work of the development minister. There are at least two reasons why such 
technical experience could be positively related to aid quality. First, ministers who worked in 
development cooperation prior to assuming office should have had the chance to observe the 
differential effects of aid interventions and determinants of success on the ground. Such field 
experience could have stimulated a learning process on how to provide effective development 
aid.70 Second, ministers who have been engaged in the field of development cooperation before 
assuming office are more likely to be intrinsically motivated to foster development than those 
                                                     
70 Jacqmin and Lefebvre (2016) make a similar argument in favor of learning by doing for education 
ministers. 
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who have not. Intrinsically motivated ministers are expected to shift the balance away from 
donor self-interests towards need orientation. While this explains differences in the quality of 
aid, it is unlikely that prior experience in development cooperation influences the quantity of 
aid, as greater development affinity does not necessarily translate into better negotiation skills 
at the cabinet table. 
Turning to education, the empirical evidence that educational backgrounds matter for 
political decision-making is much weaker than for specific prior occupations (Göhlmann and 
Vaubel 2007; Dreher et al. 2009; Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014). Still, there 
are reasons to believe that a training in economics can make a difference when there is strong 
need for economic expertise such as in the context of economic development. In this regard, 
Hallerberg and Wehner (2012) find that countries with a high frequency of financial crises, 
such as Greece and Portugal, are more likely to appoint economists as economic policymakers 
than other OECD countries. Dreher et al. (2009: 170) identify a potential advantage of trained 
economists “in implementing reforms as they are more likely to distinguish good from bad 
advice and might be more able to resist the pressure of lobbying groups preferring the status 
quo.” Similarly, economics-trained development ministers might be in a better position to 
implement effective development policies as they better understand the market mechanisms 
and market failures at play in developing countries and are thus better able to identify 
successful development measures. If this is true, we should observe higher aid quality when 
the development minister has obtained a degree of higher education in economics. At the same 
time, however, economists are found to be more selfish (e.g., Frey and Meier 2003) and might 
thus exhibit a stronger focus on personal or donor-country self-interests to the detriment of 
aid quality. To the extent to which economists are better bargainers, aid budgets of economics-
trained development ministers should be larger. In line with this, Jochimsen and Thomasius 
(2014: 394) evoke the possibility that “trained economists […] are more successful in 
convincing their cabinet colleagues of sound budgets with low deficits.” 
 Beyond ministers’ technical experience acquired prior to taking office, their experience 
on the job could also affect aid giving. Usually, the political power of ministers increases with 
their time in office as they accumulate experience. Referring to finance ministers, Feld and 
Schaltegger (2010: 509) argue that a “minister who succeeds in remaining a long time in ofﬁce 
usually enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and 
the interest groups.” Moessinger (2014: 185) suggests that “an experienced finance minister 
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[…] know[s] more about the schemes of his cabinet colleagues in attracting additional funds 
for their respective ministries.” Along similar lines, more experienced development ministers 
should better know how to successfully secure funds for their own ministry as they can more 
forcefully oppose the finance minister and more successfully compete against other cabinet 
colleagues. Moreover, more experienced development ministers should have acquired more 
knowledge over time on the types of aid that work. Assuming that development ministers 
want to increase the impact of development aid (out of humanitarian motives or career 
concerns), we expect that development ministers learn over time how to provide more 
effective aid and shift resources accordingly. On the contrary, the longer a minister is in office 
the higher the chances that he or she gets “captured” by the aid industry, which could reduce 
the quality of aid. For example, ministers captured by a vivid NGO community are more likely 
to hand out many small projects to satisfy their various needs, which amplifies the problem of 
project proliferation. 
2.3. DEVELOPMENT MINISTER DATABASE 
We define “development minister” as the donor country’s government member that holds the 
main responsibility for development cooperation.71 We first identify the names and governing 
periods of all development ministers for the years in which the respective OECD-DAC donor 
reports detailed aid flows to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (i.e., since 1967 at the 
earliest).72 We collect the required data through internet research from publicly available 
sources, including government websites, the personal websites of the ministers, Political Data 
Yearbook interactive,73 and Wikipedia, among others. Where necessary, we contacted the 
ministries or other government institutions via e-mail to gather additional information. 
Following the described procedure, we obtain a dataset with 957 observations containing 320 
ministers for 23 OECD-DAC countries between 1967 and 2012, i.e., for a maximum of 46 years 
per country. 
                                                     
71 The respective cabinet member is either a minister, minister of state, or secretary of state. In what 
follows, we use the term “development minister” for the sake of brevity. 
72 We attribute years during which two or more development ministers are in office to the minister who 
is longest in power during that year. In six cases, however, two ministers were equally long in office (6 
months). We then keep the minister being in office for the last six months in our dataset. 
73 See http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/ (last accessed 11 December 2014). 
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 To be able to study the relationship between the personal characteristics of 
development ministers and donors’ aid giving, we collect information on five personal 
characteristics of development ministers – mirroring the hypotheses introduced in the 
previous section. First, we collect information on the ministers’ genders. The binary variable 
for a minister’s gender is coded as one for women. Across all OECD-DAC donors under 
analysis, a female minister is in charge of development cooperation in one fifth of all country-
years. For comparison, only 5 percent of all heads of governments are women in our dataset. 
Sweden shows the largest proportion of female-led development cooperation with women 
being in power over 27 of 46 years, closely followed by Canada with 26 years. In Australia, 
Italy, and South Korea, the position of the development minister has never been assigned to a 
woman (as of 2012).74 Analyzing the gender distribution over time, Figure 2.1.a shows a sharp 
increase in the number of female development ministers starting with the turn of the century. 
While only 14 percent of ministers are female by 1990, the share of women increases to 43 
percent in 2000. In the peak years of 2001, 2005 and 2006, the gender distribution is almost 
balanced with a total of 11 female ministers in 23 countries. 
Second, we gather data on ministers’ political ideologies measured on a five-tier left-
right scale. Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) use the social democratic party as an “anchor party,” 
following the idea that its national branches are broadly comparable on the international 
level.75 They assign a value of 0 to social democratic parties and classify the remaining political 
parties accordingly. Following their approach, we code the political ideology of development 
ministers with regards to the economic policy position of the political party they are affiliated 
with. Specifically, a value of -1 is assigned to “unreformed socialist and communist,” -0.5 to 
“modern socialist,” 0 to “social democratic,” 0.5 to “conservative,” and 1 to “liberalist 
economic policy.”76 We find that the position of the development minister is – with 48 percent 
                                                     
74 Julie Bishop assumed office in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 and thus 
became Australia’s first female development minister. 
75 As a test of robustness, we also compare our results below with a right-left coding scheme based on 
parties’ election manifestos. 
76 We are grateful to Christian Bjørnskov for having generously provided us with their raw database 
that enabled us to translate their categorization of the ideologies of political parties to the case of 
development ministers. In countries without a social democratic party, such as France for instance, we 
follow Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) and code ministers’ parties relative to a fictional central party to 
keep the classification pattern consistent. In cases where ministers are not party members, we code their 
economic-policy orientation based on other relevant information provided in their CVs (such as 
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of all country-years covered – almost as equally often assigned to left-wing politicians 
(including social democrats) than to right-wing politicians (52 percent; see Figure 2.1.b for 
details). No unreformed socialist or communist has been appointed over the time period under 
study. 
Figure 2.1. Personal characteristics of development ministers (1967-2012) 
 
                                                     
memberships in relevant associations). In the absence of such information, we code them in line with 
the respective head of government that selected the respective minister. 
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Third, we collect information on whether the development ministers possess 
development-specific work experience when they take office. Specifically, we code a binary 
variable that takes a value of one if the minister has gained professional experience in the field 
of development cooperation.77 As can be seen in Figure 2.1.c, a large majority of development 
ministers lack relevant work experience in the development context upon assuming office. 
Only 16 percent possess any prior work experience in development cooperation before coming 
into power. 
Fourth, the database includes information on whether the ministers have obtained a 
degree of higher education in economics or business.78 23 percent of all ministers have received 
such training (see again Figure 2.1.c). 
Fifth, in addition to ministers’ experience prior to taking office, we also examine their 
political experience gained on the job. Specifically, we calculate the number of years a 
development minister holds office in a given year, irrespective of whether the period in office 
was interrupted by another minister’s term or not. Almost 15 percent of the ministers hold 
office for only one year, which demonstrates a relatively large fluctuation in the position. The 
average tenure of a development minister is 3 years. There is much more fluctuation in the 
office of the development ministers (320 ministers overall) compared to heads of governments 
(207). Luxembourg’s Jacques Poos is the minister that gained the most experience in office (15 
years). Figure 2.1.d plots the average tenure of ministers in power over time. 
To sum up, the typical minister is male, stays in power for three years and cannot be 
clearly attributed to one of the two political camps of left or right. He has neither received 
economics training nor gained prior professional experience in development cooperation. 
Appendix A2.1. lists all development ministers covered by our database. 
 
                                                     
77 We code professional experience in development cooperation as one if ministers have worked for 
international development organizations (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme), national 
development agencies (e.g., the Agence Française de Développement), or non-governmental organizations 
addressing development concerns (e.g., Médecins sans Frontières). Additionally, we code this variable as 
one if the development minister led the development ministry in a prior term. 
78 We analyze business degrees jointly with economics as these study programs typically convey a 
comprehensive understanding of economic principles. Our definition covers degrees in the related 
fields of commerce, finance, political economy, and alumni of “Philosophy, Politics and Economics,” an 
interdisciplinary study program with a strong economics component. Later we will also analyze five 
other educational backgrounds. 
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2.4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Empirical Approach 
In order to analyze the role of development ministers in shaping the size and “development-
friendliness” of a donor’s development cooperation, we estimate the association of the 
development ministers’ personal characteristics with (1) the size of aid budgets (TotalODA), 
and (2) the quality of aid (QualityODA). To account for TotalODA, we use a donor country’s 
total amount of ODA in logarithms and measured in constant 2012 US$ (OECD 2014).79 We 
analyze both ODA commitments and disbursements as both measures come with their 
respective advantages and disadvantages. Commitments allow us to capture the impact that 
the development minister exerts directly on development policy. Disbursements in a 
particular year on the contrary may already have been committed under a minister’s 
predecessor and thus falsely be attributed to the successor. The use of disbursements, 
however, comes with the advantage that one accounts for the development minister’s 
influence on the current spending process. Moreover, Roodman (2012) points to the potential 
risk of overestimating aid when using aid commitments if ministers knowingly or 
unknowingly over-promise aid. Thus, only disbursements mirror the actual effort of donor 
countries. As can be seen from Figure 2.2., annual ODA disbursements are systematically 
smaller than commitments. 
Figure 2.2. ODA quantity (1967-2012) and ODA quality (1995-2011) 
  
                                                     
79 Note that we add a value of US$ 1 to all ODA values before taking logarithms so as not to lose zero 
values in our sample. 
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The measurement of QualityODA is not straightforward. Although several 
comprehensive indices propose various ways to measure the quality of ODA (Easterly 2002b; 
Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Knack et al. 2011), the quality-adjusted aid 
measure developed by Roodman (2012) is the only one that goes back as far as 1995.80 
Roodman discounts gross ODA disbursements for several factors that are judged as reducing 
the effectiveness of aid. He first subtracts debt forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt from 
OECD-defined ODA to obtain his measure of “gross aid.” He then adjusts the amount of 
“gross aid” by the extent to which a donor’s aid is tied, by principal and interest payments, 
and by administrative costs. Finally, Roodman also rewards policies that are expected to 
increase a donor’s development impact. Specifically, he implements a selectivity weight for 
ODA given to poorer and to well-governed countries. The resulting measure of “quality-
adjusted aid” is the amount of ODA that is estimated to be effective. As our measure of aid 
quality, we divide Roodman’s quality-adjusted bilateral aid disbursements by his total 
bilateral gross aid disbursements. The resulting average values of QualityODA range between 
18 percent for Japan and 56 percent for Sweden (see also Figure 2.2.).81 Figure 2.3. shows for 
four important donors how both TotalODA and QualityODA evolve over the terms of 
development ministers.82 
 
 
 
                                                     
80 We are grateful to David Roodman for having generously provided us with access to an extended 
version of his dataset. 
81 In our dataset, Portugal constitutes an outlier as its aid quality is highly volatile and it is the only 
donor that shows a negative quality-adjusted ODA value in a year (1997). This occurs as the country 
disproportionally supports richer recipients in that year. Hence, we set Portugal’s value of QualityODA 
to zero in 1997. Note that our results below are robust to the exclusion of Portugal from our regressions. 
82 In Appendix A1.3., we show for each individual donor how aid quantity and quality developed since 
1967. 
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Figure 2.3. ODA quantity (1967-2012) and ODA quality (1995-2011) of four important donor countries by development minister 
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Of course, this indicator is only one of many ways to measure ODA quality. However, 
it is important to note that there is a large overlap of Roodman’s measure with alternative 
indicators of aid quality (Easterly 2002b; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; 
Knack et al. 2011). They are similar to Roodman (2012) as they all contain measures for 
selectivity towards poorer and better-governed countries and account for the degree to which 
a country’s aid is untied. While most components are not subject to a larger debate, the benefits 
of aid selectivity are controversial. Most importantly, although several scholars argue that aid 
is more effective in better-governed countries (e.g., Svensson 1999; Burnside and Dollar 2000), 
there is no robust evidence that aid promotes growth if given to countries with good policies 
or institutions (Easterly et al. 2004; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2010). This is why we also show 
results below where we remove selectivity weights for good governance (and income). 
Moreover, we show results when removing the penalties for tied aid and project proliferation. 
We regress our two dependent variables on the same set of independent variables, 
testing for a potential role of the ministers’ gender, their political ideology, and their 
experience as captured by their prior professional experience in development cooperation, 
education in economics or business, and time in office.83 Our regression equations read as 
follows: 
(1) log(TotalODAit) = β1 log(TotalODAit-1) + β2 Genderit-1 + β3 Ideologyit-1 + Σl β4l Experienceilt-1 +  
Σm β5m Controlsimt-1 + ηi + μt + uit 
(2) QualityODAit = γ1 QualityODAit-1 + γ2 Genderit + γ3 Ideologyit + Σl γ4l Experienceilt +                 
Σm γ5m Controlsimt + ηi + μt + vit 
The index i refers to the respective donor country, t stands for the respective year, l allows for 
the three different measures of experience, and m identifies the 15 variables that form our set 
of control variables described below. 
 While we lag all independent variables in the TotalODA regression by one year, the 
variables enter simultaneously in the QualityODA regression. This is because budget 
negotiations in national parliaments typically take place in the previous year. Once the budget 
is determined, ministers’ decisions can influence the allocation of aid across recipients, sectors 
                                                     
83 Although there are no clear expectations on how minister age could affect aid quantity and quality, 
we also explored a potential role of age. Since age never turned out to have a significant impact on either 
dependent variable, we excluded age from our specifications. 
82 
 
and types of aid throughout the year, all of which can affect ODA quality. To test the 
robustness of our results, we also show regression results below based on alternative timing 
decisions. 
 In order to approach the identification of a genuine effect stemming from the personal 
characteristics of the development minister, we additionally control for the corresponding 
personal characteristics of the respective head of government.84 The inclusion of these control 
variables prevents us from falsely attributing the influence of heads of government to 
development ministers. Such a correlation is most obvious for political ideology as the 
selection of the development minister by the head of government will be a function of their 
respective political orientations.85 Female heads of government might also be more likely to 
appoint female ministers and a similar argument can easily be made for heads of government 
with professional experience in development cooperation or training in economics due to 
networks or affinity towards candidates with similar characteristics. Moreover, government-
head and minister characteristics might also be interlinked in more complex ways. For 
example, to the extent to which left-wing heads of government are more likely to appoint 
female ministers (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), a significant effect of the 
minister’s gender might be driven by the political orientation of the head of government 
instead. Applying the same logic to the legislative, we additionally include the share of women 
in parliament (data from Brady et al. 2014 and World Bank 2014) and the mean ideological 
orientation of parliament members (data from Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2011) as control 
variables. 
As we argue above, the low salience of aid policy provides reasons to believe that the 
selection of development ministers is more random than in other issue areas. Still, a strategic 
selection of development ministers is of concern.86 For example, a head of government who 
believes that aid is important may on the one hand appoint a more experienced development 
                                                     
84 We build on the dataset in Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011), which in turn is based on Woldendorp et 
al. (2000), to create a dataset on the characteristics of donor countries’ heads of government. 
85 This also applies to coalition governments since parties with a similar political orientation are more 
likely to build a coalition. The correlation between the ideology of ministers and heads of government 
in our sample is 0.656. 
86 To give an example, Day (2016: 21) notes that UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “personal championing 
of developing issues afforded Clare Short, the Development Secretary, political cover to reform British 
aid policy. Short also enjoyed the active support of Chancellor Gordon Brown, who also desired to see 
the UK aid budget increase.” 
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minister and on the other hand push for higher ODA budgets. If we then observe a positive 
correlation between the minister’s experience and the size of ODA budgets, we may falsely 
attribute this to the minister’s performance. To mitigate this concern, we also estimate 
regressions that include government-head-fixed effects instead of donor-country-fixed effects. 
Although this does not fully eliminate our concerns if heads of government change their 
preferences during their time in office, results based on this more conservative specification 
raise our confidence that the observed effects are indeed driven by differences in development 
minister characteristics rather than the strategic appointment of ministers by heads of 
governments as we only exploit variation within governments over time. 
In the selection of the remaining control variables, we follow Fuchs et al. (2014) and 
Brech and Potrafke (2014). First, we include the lagged dependent variable to account for aid 
inertia. Bertoli et al. (2008: 24) argue that this is an important variable in aid budget regressions 
“since the persistence in budgetary allocations determines a significant path-dependence in 
the evolution of aid effort.” Second, we control for (logged) per-capita GDP, trade openness, 
government expenditure as a share of GDP (data from World Bank 2014) and the debt-over-
GDP ratio (Abbas et al. 2010) to capture the donor country’s (international) economic and fiscal 
situation. Third, we include a donor country’s level of political globalization (Dreher 2006; 
Dreher et al. 2008) to account for the transmission of ideas through networks of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (Lundsgaarde et al. 2007). Fourth, we 
add a binary variable for the existence of an aid agency in the donor country (Fuchs et al. 2014). 
As Bertoli et al. (2008: 15) argues, “an independent aid agency may be able to preserve an 
appropriate aid level and allocation regardless of the political orientation and aid preferences 
of the newly elected government.” Finally, we control for the logged size of the population 
living in the donor’s former colonies (Mayer and Zignago 2006; World Bank 2014) to account 
for the donor country’s historical past. Table 2.1. provides descriptive statistics and Appendix 
A2.2. gives an overview of all variables used, their definitions and sources. 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable name 
Obser-
vations 
Mean Sd Min Max 
(log) ODA commitments 919 21.50 1.40 17.12 24.37 
(log) ODA disbursements 957 21.30 1.51 16.46 24.21 
Quality ODA 389 41.74 11.31 0.00 69.24 
Quality ODA (no selectivity reward) 389 66.51 13.92 0.00 86.23 
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Quality ODA (no proliferation penalty) 389 53.68 14.17 10.21 78.16 
Quality ODA (no tied aid penalty) 389 43.95 10.64 0.00 75.14 
(log) GDP per capita 931 10.41 0.39 9.11 11.53 
Openness 940 69.14 45.22 9.68 352.90 
Gov. expenditure 940 18.71 3.69 8.09 28.06 
Debt 957 52.15 32.90 0.00 238.03 
Political globalization 883 85.85 11.64 45.34 98.43 
Aid agency 957 0.42 0.49 0 1 
(log) Colonial history 957 10.33 8.70 0.00 21.56 
Female minister 957 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Female gov. head 957 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Female parliament 949 16.66 11.91 0.00 47.30 
Right-wing minister 957 0.31 0.40 -0.50 1.00 
Right-wing gov. head 957 0.31 0.35 -0.50 1.00 
Right-wing parliament 934 0.27 0.17 -0.43 0.78 
Ideological difference 957 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Ideological difference (more right-wing) 957 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Ideological difference (more left-wing) 957 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Right-wing minister (election manifesto) 953 -3.56 19.61 -58 48.46 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 957 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head 957 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Economics & business minister 957 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Economics & business gov. head 934 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Economics minister 957 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Economics gov. head 934 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Business administration, commerce, or finance 
minister 
957 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Business administration, commerce, or finance 
gov. head 
934 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Law minister 957 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Law gov. head 957 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Medicine, public health, or pharmacy minister 957 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Medicine, public health, or pharmacy gov. head 957 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Nat. sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agr. 
science minister 
957 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Nat. sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agr. 
science gov. head 
957 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Political science or other social sciences minister 957 0.27 0.44 0 1 
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Political science or other social sciences gov. head 957 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Teaching, social work, or pedagogics minister 957 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Teaching, social work, or pedagogics gov. head 957 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Tenure minister 957 2.99 2.35 1 15 
Tenure gov. head 957 4.34 3.12 1 18 
General ministerial experience minister 952 19.27 32.88 0 219 
Tenure minister + General ministerial experience 
minister 
952 55.06 43.97 12 252 
Head of government in the future 957 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
Moreover, we construct a binary variable that takes a value of one if the political 
orientation of the development minister and the head of government is different. This is to 
account for government fractionalization: a larger number of parties involved in decision-
making results in more compromises and more concessions being granted to each party 
(Dreher and Langlotz 2015). One could thus expect that the quantity of ODA increases if the 
development minister and the head of government have different political ideological 
orientations.87 
 We estimate our baseline models with ordinary least squares (OLS) using donor-
country- and year-fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the government-head level. Such a fixed-effects estimation that includes a lagged 
dependent variable may lead to inconsistent estimators and induce the so-called Nickell bias 
through the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term (Nickell 1981). 
However, with an average number of time periods per donor of over 35 years, the problem 
should be negligible in our TotalODA regressions and OLS appropriate. Since the time period 
covered in our QualityODA regressions is much shorter with a maximum of 17 years, we also 
show results from two further specifications: first, we exclude the lagged dependent variable; 
second, we exclude country-fixed effects (and keep the lagged dependent variable). As noted 
by Angrist and Pischke (2008), the first approach may overestimate the true effect, while the 
latter may lead to an underestimation. The true effect will thus lie in between this upper and 
lower bound. 
                                                     
87 Beyond this set of personal characteristics, we further constructed a binary variable that takes a value 
of one if the development minister is head of a separate ministry for development cooperation. Since 
this variable never showed up significantly in our regressions, we decided to drop it from the analysis 
below. Results are available upon request. 
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The Quantity of ODA 
Table 2.2. presents the results for aid budgets. We start by analyzing the results of a 
specification that excludes government-head characteristics (columns 1 and 2) and then add 
the personal characteristics of the heads of government as well as variables capturing the 
gender and ideological composition of national parliaments to approach the identification of 
a genuine effect stemming from the characteristics of development ministers (columns 3 and 
4). We examine both total ODA commitments (columns 1 and 3) and total ODA disbursements 
(columns 2 and 4). Our model has large explanatory power as evidenced by the R-squared of 
more than 80 percent. It is also reassuring that the results for the control variables are largely 
in line with expectations: we find evidence for persistent ODA budgets and for donors 
providing more ODA as they grow richer, as shown by the positive and highly significant 
coefficients on lagged DV and (log) GDP per capita. Openness and government expenditure enter 
with the expected positive sign but do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels 
in each specification. A higher debt-over-GDP ratio is associated with lower total ODA levels, 
at the one-percent level of significance. Political globalization shows the expected significant 
positive relationship with the quantity of aid, at least at the ten-percent level. The existence of 
an aid agency in the donor country is positively linked with total ODA disbursements (but not 
with commitments), at the one-percent level of significance. In line with Bertoli et al. (2008), 
ODA budgets appear to work as substitutes for a colonial legacy, at least at the ten-percent 
level of significance. 
Table 2.2. Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets (1971-2012) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
Lagged DV 0.4750*** 0.6984*** 0.4774*** 0.6566*** 0.0979 0.2927*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.100] [0.000] 
(log) GDP per capita 1.3020*** 0.8093*** 1.3170*** 0.9722*** 2.2188*** 1.9817*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness 0.0012 0.0008 0.0016 0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0016* 
  [0.237] [0.112] [0.108] [0.003] [0.525] [0.070] 
Gov. expenditure 0.0176** 0.0100 0.0159* 0.0102 0.0362** 0.0391*** 
  [0.036] [0.145] [0.055] [0.117] [0.023] [0.004] 
Debt -0.0014*** -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0010 -0.0004 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.272] [0.456] 
Political globalization 0.0050** 0.0024* 0.0060** 0.0043** 0.0053 0.0059* 
  [0.021] [0.086] [0.024] [0.029] [0.236] [0.063] 
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Aid agency 0.0300 0.0765*** 0.0162 0.0827*** 0.0210 0.2088** 
  [0.371] [0.004] [0.614] [0.003] [0.827] [0.012] 
(log) Colonial history -0.2252*** -0.1266** -0.1414* -0.1114* -0.4366 -0.5402*** 
  [0.004] [0.029] [0.054] [0.061] [0.234] [0.003] 
Female minister -0.0355 -0.0215 -0.0289 -0.0274 -0.0381 -0.0434 
  [0.107] [0.266] [0.186] [0.189] [0.227] [0.150] 
Female gov. head   0.0088 0.0226   
    [0.791] [0.370]   
Female parliament   0.0064*** 0.0039**   
   [0.002] [0.022]   
Right-wing minister 0.0075 -0.0063 0.0008 -0.0356* 0.0175 0.0113 
  [0.713] [0.661] [0.979] [0.088] [0.739] [0.722] 
Right-wing gov. head   -0.0062 0.0112   
    [0.883] [0.678]   
Right-wing parliament   -0.0134 0.2299**   
   [0.880] [0.014]   
Ideological difference   0.0693*** 0.0371**   
   [0.001] [0.015]   
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0160 0.0265 0.0017 0.0243 -0.0496 -0.0034 
  [0.505] [0.143] [0.944] [0.164] [0.172] [0.910] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head   -0.0012 0.0043   
   [0.968] [0.841]   
Economics & business 
minister 0.0085 0.0157 -0.0050 0.0081 -0.0156 -0.0019 
  [0.625] [0.205] [0.753] [0.508] [0.621] [0.931] 
Economics & business gov. 
head   0.0377* 0.0390***   
    [0.066] [0.005]   
Tenure minister 0.0074** 0.0047* 0.0068* 0.0054** 0.0088 0.0070** 
  [0.044] [0.069] [0.059] [0.047] [0.134] [0.046] 
Tenure gov. head   -0.0023 -0.0034*   
    [0.342] [0.078]   
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 836 866 808 838 836 866 
R-squared (within) 0.813 0.917 0.818 0.916 0.459 0.647 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 182 187 180 185 182 187 
Average number of years 36.4 37.7 35.1 36.4 4.6 4.6 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. 
Turning to the interpretation of the results for our variables of interest, we do not find 
a significant relationship between the gender of development ministers (and heads of 
government) and TotalODA. However, the coefficient on female parliament, i.e., the share of 
women in national parliaments, is positive and statistically significant at least at the five-
percent level – in line with the findings in Hicks et al. (2016). A one-percent increase in the 
share of female deputies in parliament raises ODA commitments by 0.6 percent and ODA 
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disbursements by 0.4 percent on average (columns 3 and 4). This finding shows that female 
representation matters, but at the legislative not executive level (see also Lu and Breuning 2014). 
We also do not find a significant link between ODA volumes and development 
ministers’ political orientation on a left-right scale of economic policy orientation.88 This is in 
line with our expectations: ministers fight for an increase in their budgets independently of 
where they stand ideologically. This also holds when we replace our ideology measure with a 
right-left scale based on parties’ statements in election programs.89 Also, the political ideology 
of the heads of government does not appear to be associated with aid budgets – an 
unsurprising result given prior empirical research summarized in Fuchs et al. (2014). Again, 
we find differences between the executive and parliament. More economically liberal 
parliaments are associated with larger total ODA disbursements at the five-percent level of 
significance.90 Moving one ideological unit to the right – such as from social democratic to 
economically liberalist – increases disbursements by 23 percent. When we split the sample into 
the Cold War and post-Cold War period (see Appendix B2.1., columns 3-4, for details), we find 
that the effect stems from the Cold War era. This finding casts doubts on widespread 
expectations that more right-wing parliaments provide less aid and thus corroborates similar 
results in Dreher et al. (2015b). This could also hint at right-wing politicians using aid during 
the Cold War more intensively as a geostrategic instrument than left-wing politicians. 
The binary variable ideological difference, indicating that the head of government and 
development minister have different political orientations, turns out to be positive and 
statistically significant at least at the five-percent level. Divided governments show an increase 
of total ODA commitments by 7 percent and of total ODA disbursements by 4 percent. We 
check whether this is indeed driven by diverging interests rather than by development 
ministers being more left-wing and thus potentially more aid-supporting than their heads of 
government. In order to do so, we construct two new binary variables for ideological 
                                                     
88 Our findings are similar when we replace the five-tier-scaled variable with a simple binary variable 
for right-wing ministers (conservative or economically liberal parties). Results are available upon 
request. 
89 Specifically, we use the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2016) and match the right-left position 
of each party to our development minister database. The correlation with our baseline measure of 
minister ideology over our sample period is 52.2 percent. See Appendix B2.2. for detailed regression 
results. 
90 This finding is not robust for commitments but holds when we exclude the lagged dependent variable 
(Appendix B2.1., columns 1 and 2). 
89 
 
differences. The first takes a value of one if the development minister is more left-wing than 
the head of government. The second takes a value of one if the development minister is more 
right-wing than the head of government. When we replace the baseline measure of ideological 
differences with these two new variables, both variables are jointly significant at the one-
percent level (ODA commitments) and at the ten-percent level (ODA disbursements), 
respectively. However, their coefficients are not significantly different from one another at 
conventional levels of significance (p-values of 0.660 and 0.646; see Appendix B2.3. for details). 
This supports the view that diverging interests within the government causes each partner to 
grant the other partner more concessions (e.g., Dreher and Langlotz 2015). 
With respect to our experience variables, we find that ODA budgets increase with the 
tenure of the development minister, at conventional levels of significance (columns 1-4). More 
precisely, each additional year of experience as development minister increases ODA 
commitments by 0.7 percent and disbursements by 0.5 percent on average (columns 3 and 4).91 
Taking this at face value, Luxembourg’s Jacques Poos in his 15th year would have been able to 
secure an aid budget that is roughly 10 percent larger than that of a newcomer. As 
hypothesized, political experience as development minister appears to provide ministers with 
an advantage in their fight for higher budgets. There is also some evidence that a longer tenure 
of heads of government has the opposite, negative effect on aid budgets, as evidenced by the 
negative significant coefficient on tenure gov. head in column 4 (at the ten-percent level). More 
experience in office seems to enable heads of government to better defend against demands 
for budget increases. An additional year of experience as head of government is associated 
with a reduction of ODA disbursements by 0.3 percent.92 In contrast to on-the-job experience, 
development ministers’ prior professional experience in development cooperation (prof. dev. 
coop. minister) and training in economics or business (economics & business minister) do not seem 
                                                     
91 When we omit the lagged dependent variable, the effect increases to 1.0 and 1.2 percent, respectively 
(Appendix B2.1., columns 1-2). The finding appears to be driven by the post-Cold War period 
(Appendix B2.1., columns 3-6). Given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the values above 
correspond only to the short-run effect of tenure. Taking account of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, we obtain long-run effects of 1.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively. 
92 Non-linearities in the accumulation of political experience do not appear to play a significant role. 
Our results also show that it is the experience on the development office rather than general ministerial 
experience that matters for ODA budgets. Finally, as a proxy of unobserved ability, we also code a 
binary variable that takes a value of one if the development minister will become head of government 
in the future. However, ministers who make it to the head of government do not appear to attract more 
aid money. See columns 1 and 2 of Appendix B2.4. for detailed results. 
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to be associated with ODA budgets as none of the corresponding coefficients reaches statistical 
significance at conventional levels.93 On the contrary, we find evidence for larger aid budgets 
when the government is led by a trained economist. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.2. present regressions with government-head-fixed effects 
rather than government-head characteristics and donor-country-fixed effects. In this very 
strict specification, we only identify the possible effects of development minister 
characteristics on aid budgets through variation of development ministers within the tenure of 
each particular head of government. Focusing on the variables of interest for the sake of 
brevity, the results confirm our main findings from above. Development ministers’ experience 
in office appears to be the only relevant minister characteristic that plays a role for aid budgets. 
Tenure minister remains positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level for ODA 
disbursements, while all other development minister characteristics do not reach statistical 
significance in this conservative specification. Even when we add minister-fixed effects to our 
baseline model, i.e., identify the effect of tenure on ODA budgets only through variation 
within ministers over their time in office, we still find support for this hypothesis (see panel E 
of Appendix B2.4.).94 
 To sum up, the development ministers’ personal characteristics do not seem to matter 
much with regards to the quantity of ODA. Only one finding appears to be largely robust: a 
longer time in the development office strengthens the ministers’ ability to negotiate higher 
ODA budgets. This also holds when we use contemporaneous rather than lagged explanatory 
variables (Appendix B2.6.) or replace our dependent variable by ODA disbursements as a 
share of government expenditures (Appendix B2.7.).95 The appointment of more experienced 
                                                     
93 We also analyzed economics and business separately as well as five other educational backgrounds 
of development ministers, i.e., university degrees in (1) law, (2) medicine, pharmacy, or public health, 
or, (3) sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agricultural science, (4) political science or other social 
sciences, and (5) teaching, social work, or pedagogics. None of them appears to play a robust role for 
ODA budgets. Appendix A2.4. provides descriptive statistics on the frequency of these degrees and 
columns 1 and 2 of Appendix B2.5. present detailed regression results. 
94 Given that this is a very demanding test, it is not surprising that the corresponding coefficients have 
p-values of 0.062 and 0.102 and are only weakly significant or even marginally insignificant. 
95 Since the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can do harm to the estimates of other explanatory 
varables (e.g., Achen 2010), it is important to highlight that our qualitative results are largely unaffected 
when we remove the lagged dependent variable (Appendix B2.1.). One may also argue that political 
globalization and the existence of an aid agency constitute “bad controls” in the terminology of Angrist 
and Pischke (2008). Development ministers’ characteristics may affect the decisions to enter 
international organizations and sign treaties, i.e., they could affect a country’s degree of political 
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ministers can thus help countries to achieve the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI as 
development aid. Political experience seems to pay off. 
 
The Quality of ODA 
Table 2.3. shows our results for ODA quality. We begin our analysis with specifications that 
exclude the lagged dependent variable (columns 1 and 2). While the regression in column 1 
additionally excludes government-head and legislative controls, these variables are included 
in column 2. Starting with the interpretation of the results for the control variables, the 
coefficient on (log) GDP per capita is positive and reaches statistical significance at the five-
percent level. High-quality ODA thus seems to be a luxury good: as countries become richer, 
incentives to provide self-interested aid shrink. In line with this explanation, a larger debt-to-
GDP ratio is associated with significantly lower ODA quality (at the one-percent level). 
Government expenditure on the other hand is positively associated with higher ODA quality, 
suggesting that governments with higher expenditures have more experience with 
redistribution. Openness does not have a significant relationship with ODA quality. ODA 
quality decreases with the degree of political globalization and the existence of an aid agency, 
both at the ten-percent level of significance. While the effect of political globalization is 
surprising as one would expect more globalized countries to embrace a greater role in 
international development, aid agencies have higher administration costs which might harm 
the share of quality ODA. Finally, the positive and highly significant coefficient on (log) colonial 
history suggests that stronger ties with developing countries could give former colonial powers 
insights into where aid will be most effective and how to channel their aid more efficiently. 
Table 2.3. Development minister characteristics and ODA quality (1995-2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Quality ODA Quality ODA Quality ODA 
Quality 
ODA 
Quality 
ODA 
Lagged DV   0.2449** 0.7029*** 0.0293 
    [0.038] [0.000] [0.735] 
(log) GDP per capita 15.2759** 16.9968** 11.1843** -0.2558 26.9395** 
  [0.026] [0.014] [0.026] [0.826] [0.030] 
Openness 0.0348 0.0354 0.0164 0.0203* 0.0264 
  [0.242] [0.213] [0.524] [0.076] [0.357] 
Gov. expenditure 1.1572*** 0.9757** 0.5387 0.2746 1.4362 
                                                     
globalization. In addition, the institutional design of aid agencies may depend on the respective 
development minister in charge. When we remove these potential “bad controls” in addition, our results 
remain similar (Appendix B2.8.). 
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  [0.003] [0.024] [0.256] [0.161] [0.156] 
Debt -0.1178*** -0.1009*** -0.0634*** -0.0560** -0.0480 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.032] [0.133] 
Political globalization -0.2675* -0.2317* -0.1476 0.1131 -0.0967 
  [0.055] [0.077] [0.199] [0.149] [0.417] 
Aid agency -1.7096* -1.8045* -1.6019** -1.3811* -2.4474 
  [0.070] [0.073] [0.040] [0.069] [0.233] 
(log) Colonial history 16.9263*** 16.7040*** 17.3956*** -0.0761 20.4548** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.134] [0.039] 
Female minister 0.8782 1.0448* 1.2345** 0.9802* 0.7638 
  [0.118] [0.099] [0.010] [0.064] [0.185] 
Female gov. head  -2.4266** -3.1056** -0.8441  
   [0.046] [0.024] [0.354]  
Female parliament  0.1193 -0.0432 -0.0161 0.0726 
  [0.231] [0.605] [0.728] [0.609] 
Right-wing minister 0.4247 -0.6945 -0.6600 -0.7011 -0.8947 
  [0.624] [0.529] [0.421] [0.504] [0.623] 
Right-wing gov. head  2.1887 2.0506* 0.7247  
   [0.122] [0.054] [0.551]  
Right-wing parliament  -5.1830 -4.3708 4.6252 5.8445 
  [0.134] [0.161] [0.192] [0.358] 
Ideological difference  0.1781 -0.1828 -0.0312 -1.2962 
  [0.801] [0.752] [0.963] [0.263] 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 1.2172** 1.1406* 1.1491** -0.5053 1.3063* 
  [0.047] [0.088] [0.044] [0.493] [0.097] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head  -2.5437 -2.0237 -0.4762  
  [0.120] [0.113] [0.560]  
Economics & business minister -0.7844 -0.9859 -0.5221 0.1794 0.6708 
  [0.161] [0.137] [0.304] [0.774] [0.213] 
Economics & business gov. head  -0.1709 -0.4718 0.0914  
   [0.828] [0.472] [0.874]  
Tenure minister 0.1207 0.1693* 0.1703** 0.1135 0.1658 
  [0.241] [0.089] [0.040] [0.136] [0.268] 
Tenure gov. head  0.0945 0.0758 -0.0039  
  [0.345] [0.331] [0.963]  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 389 387 365 365 365 
R-squared (within) 0.231 0.263 0.288 0.807 0.159 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 88 88 82 82 82 
Average number of years 16.9 16.8 15.9 15.9 4.5 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. 
 Turning to our variables of interest, we find a positive association between female 
minister and the quality of ODA, which is statistically significant at the ten-percent level in 
column 2. Interpreting the size of the effect, we find that ODA quality increases by one 
percentage point when a woman directs development policy. Even though this effect is not of 
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a large magnitude and only corresponds to US$ 28 million of additional quality ODA annually 
when holding gross aid constant, the result supports the idea that women and men differ in 
their preferences. Strikingly, however, the coefficient on female gov. head has the opposite sign 
and is statistically significant at the five-percent level. Specifically, we find that ODA quality 
decreases by 2.4 percentage points when a woman leads government.96 Women in the highest 
political position might feel the urge to overcome the gender stereotype as discussed by Koch 
and Fulton (2011). Consequently, female heads of government might support more self-
interested aid giving than their male counterparts.97 The insignificant coefficient on female 
parliament suggests that no comparable gender difference exists at the legislative level. We 
conclude that gender differences in aid quality cannot be generalized and depend on the 
specific position under analysis. 
With respect to political ideology, we find no robust significant relationship between 
our variables and the quality of ODA. This non-finding applies to development ministers, 
heads of government, the ideological differences of the former and latter, and also to the 
ideology of parliamentarians. We also obtain a non-finding when we replace our baseline 
measure of minister ideology with one based on parties’ statements in election programs 
(column 3 of Appendix B2.2.). We conclude that the quality of ODA is independent of the 
political ideology of the relevant decision-makers. 
 Continuing with development ministers’ experience, we find that ministers’ 
professional experience in development cooperation as well as their experience in office matter 
for the quality of ODA. According to column 2, ministers with specific development 
experience succeed in increasing aid quality by 1.1 percentage points. Assuming gross aid to 
be constant, the average donor provides US$ 30 million of additional quality ODA annually if 
a development minister with such a background comes to power. Accordingly, we find some 
support for our hypothesis that ministers with development experience deliver higher quality 
                                                     
96 Only 11 of 210 heads of government in our sample are female, accounting for 6.3 percent of the 
minister-years. Hence, we cannot rule out that this finding is driven by individual personalities and that 
we thus only capture something like a Thatcher or Merkel effect. Regression results from specifications 
that individually drop one of the ten countries that ever had a female government head from the 
estimation sample suggest that the effect is largely driven by Australia and New Zealand. 
97 The comparison of regressions that exclude (column 1) and include (column 2) government-head and 
legislative controls supports our decision to include these variables. In column 1, female minister 
supposedly absorbs part of the negative effect of female gov. head, leaving female minister with an 
insignificant and less positive coefficient than in column 2. 
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ODA – either because they have acquired knowledge of how aid can be more effective or 
because they have a higher intrinsic motivation to give quality ODA.98 Also, development 
ministers shift more resources to “development-friendlier” activities as they gain experience 
on the job. One additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA given on average by 
0.2 percentage points, amounting to US$ 4.7 million for the average donor (column 2). Among 
the three variables capturing the ministers’ experience, economics minister is the only one not 
to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Economists thus neither appear to be 
more selfish in the sense that they provide lower quality aid, nor more able to raise aid 
quality.99 Also, the corresponding government-head experience variables do not reach 
statistical significance in our regressions.100 
 The lagged DV reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level when we include 
it in column 3. The quality of aid thus appears to be path dependent although the relationship 
is weaker than for aid quantity. The results for most control variables are similar compared to 
the specifications excluding the lagged DV in columns 1 and 2. Only gov. expenditure and political 
globalization lose statistical significance at conventional levels. Most notably, our findings for 
the minister characteristics are robust and the statistical significance of female minister, prof. dev. 
coop. minister and tenure minister actually increase from the ten-percent to the five-percent 
level.101 
 Since the average number of years per panel is 16 when using donor-country-fixed 
effects with lagged DV (column 3), our estimates may suffer from the Nickell bias. As 
discussed above, Angrist and Pischke (2008) recommend regressions that only include either 
                                                     
98 We cannot control for experience in domestic regional development, which could affect ODA quality 
in a similar way. However, this should – if at all – downward bias our findings for experience in 
international development and thus work in our favor. 
99 Analyzing the six other educational backgrounds of development ministers described in footnote X 
above, we do not find most of them to affect ODA quality. Only ministers with degrees in medicine, 
public health, or pharmacy appear to provide lower-quality aid than ministers with other degrees or no 
degree. See again Appendix B2.5. 
100 When we remove political globalization and aid agency, two potentially “bad controls” as discussed 
above, results are similar (columns 7-3 of Appendix B2.8.). 
101 This is the only specification in which right-wing gov. head becomes statistically significant. 
Governments led by right-wing politicians seem to provide an aid quality that is 2 percentage points 
higher according to column 3. This finding is the opposite of our expectation that right-wing politicians 
might link more domestic economic benefits to aid, leading to lower ODA quality. However, we do not 
put much emphasis on this finding as the coefficient is only significant at the ten-percent level and does 
not hold in any other specification. 
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the lagged dependent variable (column 4) or country-fixed effects (column 2) to bracket the 
true effect between an upper and lower bound. We find a significantly positive coefficient on 
female minister in all specifications, but our findings for prof. dev. coop. minister and tenure 
minister are not robust to the exclusion of country-fixed effects. 
 As we discussed above, Roodman’s decision to reward recipient countries with good 
institutions is particularly debatable. Removing the aid selectivity adjustment, i.e., excluding 
the punishment for aid flows to richer and poorly governed countries, our finding that a 
development background is associated with higher ODA quality becomes stronger (see 
column 2 of Table 2.4.). However, we do not find anymore that ODA quality is higher if a 
female minister is in office and that ODA quality improves with a longer time in office. Both 
earlier findings thus appear to be driven by these ministers’ focus on aid selectivity. Ministers 
with development experience seem to be most suited to reduce problems associated with 
project proliferation as the respective coefficient becomes smaller and insignificant once we 
remove the penalty for proliferation (column 3 of Table 2.4.). 
Table 2.4. Development minister characteristics and ODA quality (1995-2011, alternative 
adjustments) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Quality ODA Quality ODA Quality ODA Quality ODA 
  
No selectivity 
reward 
No 
proliferation 
penalty 
No tied aid 
penalty 
Lagged DV 0.2449** 0.2933** 0.3152*** 0.1857* 
  [0.038] [0.029] [0.003] [0.072] 
(log) GDP per capita 11.1843** 7.8445 11.5880* 7.0939 
  [0.026] [0.323] [0.060] [0.161] 
Openness 0.0164 -0.0288 0.0364 0.0136 
  [0.524] [0.420] [0.215] [0.628] 
Gov. expenditure 0.5387 0.2850 0.7181 0.4291 
  [0.256] [0.619] [0.135] [0.374] 
Debt -0.0634*** -0.0829** -0.0504** -0.0607*** 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.026] [0.005] 
Political globalization -0.1476 -0.0863 -0.0830 -0.1198 
  [0.199] [0.544] [0.490] [0.328] 
Aid agency -1.6019** -1.6809 -2.4307*** -1.1258 
  [0.040] [0.210] [0.003] [0.184] 
(log) Colonial history 17.3956*** 14.5201** 21.8077*** 15.9239*** 
  [0.001] [0.010] [0.001] [0.004] 
Female minister 1.2345** 0.7243 1.6455*** 0.8830* 
  [0.010] [0.293] [0.001] [0.056] 
Female gov. head -3.1056** -1.9396** -2.1522 -2.7389** 
  [0.024] [0.042] [0.167] [0.037] 
Female parliament -0.0432 0.0322 0.0043 -0.0636 
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 [0.605] [0.792] [0.965] [0.430] 
Right-wing minister -0.6600 1.5051 -1.2285 -0.7472 
  [0.421] [0.157] [0.159] [0.343] 
Right-wing gov. head 2.0506* 1.1456 2.5154** 2.1377** 
  [0.054] [0.387] [0.026] [0.040] 
Right-wing parliament -4.3708 -11.4162* -3.6732 -6.1191* 
 [0.161] [0.059] [0.262] [0.052] 
Ideological difference -0.1828 1.0236 -0.6830 -0.2660 
 [0.752] [0.139] [0.295] [0.640] 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 1.1491** 2.1488*** 0.5334 1.3129** 
  [0.044] [0.009] [0.383] [0.031] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head -2.0237 -2.1776 -3.6360*** -0.9674 
 [0.113] [0.124] [0.004] [0.394] 
Economics & business minister -0.5221 -0.9598 -0.8006 -0.0185 
  [0.304] [0.186] [0.164] [0.971] 
Economics & business gov. head -0.4718 0.0266 -0.5163 -0.4827 
  [0.472] [0.978] [0.370] [0.521] 
Tenure minister 0.1703** 0.1260 0.2321** 0.0977 
  [0.040] [0.216] [0.030] [0.205] 
Tenure gov. head 0.0758 0.0612 0.0697 0.1110 
 [0.331] [0.603] [0.414] [0.179] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gov. head FE No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 365 365 365 365 
R-squared (within) 0.288 0.344 0.361 0.252 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 82 82 82 82 
Average number of years 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. 
Summing up, we find evidence that the ministers’ gender and experience matter for 
ODA quality. This also holds when we use lagged rather than contemporaneous explanatory 
variables (Appendix Table B2.9.). As hypothesized, development ministers’ experience, in the 
form of prior professional experience in development cooperation and within their office, 
increases the quality of ODA. Although female ministers appear to provide higher-quality 
ODA, the opposite is true for aid given during the terms of female heads of government. This 
finding thus cautions against generalizations about gender differences in aid giving and 
highlights that such differences depend on the specific position in the political hierarchy being 
considered. We find no evidence that ministers’ ideology or an education in economics or 
business are linked with ODA quality. However, our findings are contingent on the chosen 
definition of ODA quality and some results lack robustness to specifications that exclude 
country-fixed effects. 
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2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Development ministers play an important role in determining aid outcomes but the 
importance of their role in this office often goes unnoticed by their home country. According 
to a poll conducted in September 2014 by Forsa, only 2 percent of Germans know that Gerd 
Müller is their development minister.102 Almost two years after the French development 
minister Pascal Canfin took office in May 2012 (and shortly before he was removed again), a 
French news magazine still listed him among the “unknown ministers.”103 In sharp contrast to 
the disinterest in development issues in many governments, parliaments and the public, aid 
decisions taken at donor ministries can have huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries 
alone provide more than US$ 100 billion annually to the developing world. Building on the 
burgeoning literature on political leadership, this chapter is an attempt to assess the link 
between the personal characteristics of the government member responsible for development 
cooperation (“development minister” in short) and the quantity and quality of ODA. 
To examine this research question, we introduce a novel database covering all 
development ministers of OECD-DAC countries since the OECD started reporting detailed 
ODA flows in 1967. The outcome is a dataset covering 320 ministers, active in 23 countries 
over 46 years. Using panel econometric models, we then estimate the link between 
development ministers’ personal characteristics and (1) the size of aid budgets, and (2) aid 
quality as operationalized by the foreign-aid component of the Commitment to Development 
Index (CDI). Specifically, we test the role of the minister’s gender, political ideology, prior 
professional experience in development cooperation, university education, and time in office. 
In order to approach the identification of a genuine effect stemming from the personal 
characteristics of the development minister, we control for the corresponding personal 
characteristics of the respective head of government as well as donor-country- and time-fixed 
effects. In order to mitigate selection effects, we also run regressions with government-head-
fixed effects and thus identify effects only through variation within governments over time. 
                                                     
102 See poll “stern-RTL Wahltrend” available at http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-rtl-
wahltrend-das-milieu-der-afd-waehler-ist-rechtspopulistisch-bis-rechtsradikal-2137035.html (accessed 
27 November 2014). 
103 “Ces ministres dont on ne connait toujours pas le nom,” Valeursactuelles.com, 3 March 2014, available 
at http://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/ces-ministres-dont-on-ne-connait-toujours-pas-le-nom-
43891 (last accessed 8 December 2014). 
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 Our results show that experience matters. In line with our expectations, we find that 
the minister’s political experience, as measured by their time in the development office, is 
positively associated with the quantity of aid: one additional year in office increases total ODA 
volume by 0.7 percent (controlling for the total ODA volume of the previous year). If one wants 
to raise the likelihood that a country’s aid level achieves the UN target to provide 0.7 percent 
of GNI as development aid, one should hire an experienced development minister. If one 
believes that aid is detrimental to development outcomes, one should favor a rookie instead. 
With respect to the quality of aid, one additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA 
by 0.2 percentage points. Ministers with prior work experience in the field of development 
cooperation provide on average 1.1 percentage points larger share of quality ODA than 
ministers that lack such experience. Moreover, female ministers appear to be more successful 
in providing quality ODA than their male counterparts: the share of quality ODA increases by 
1 percentage point when women lead the ministry responsible for development cooperation. 
However, we cannot fully rule out reverse causation and our findings for aid quality lack 
robustness to specifications that exclude country-fixed effects. 
Taken together, our results show that some of the development ministers’ personal 
characteristics are associated with aid giving but they do not matter much overall. This finding 
stands in contrast to the significant impact that scholars have found for the characteristics of 
heads of government, central bank governors, and finance ministers. Why are development 
ministers different? There are several potential explanations for this. First, an extensive strand 
of literature has shown that development aid is allocated due to national geostrategic and 
commercial interests (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Younas 2008). The defense of national 
interests ties too closely into the agenda of heads of government and parliamentarians and this 
might limit the room for development ministers to maneuver. This explanation would be in 
line with our finding that the gender and ideological composition of parliaments and some of 
the government-head characteristics are statistically significant in our regressions. Second, our 
analysis shows that it is not the ideology of ministers or heads of governments that directly 
matters for the quantity of ODA, but rather diverging ideologies that play a role. This finding 
hints at the important role of the negotiation process within governments that deserves closer 
investigation. 
We leave several questions for future research. Since the importance of non-DAC 
donors in international development cooperation is rapidly growing (e.g., Dreher et al. 2013), 
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future research should analyze the role of development minister characteristics in these 
donors’ aid policies. Given that most of the big emerging donors are non-democratic and have 
weaker institutions than their DAC counterparts, the role of minister characteristics in these 
countries might be larger as a result of the fewer checks and balances that they have in place. 
Moreover, it would be necessary to test our explanations as to why ministers’ characteristics 
do not show the expected effects by including variables capturing, for instance, donors’ 
geostrategic or commercial interests. This undertaking would require a dyadic study design, 
including donor and recipient countries. It also appears fruitful to investigate the role of 
department heads within ministries. They are less likely to fluctuate and it would be 
interesting to learn more about the power struggles and negotiations within ministries. 
Finally, future research could delve deeper into the role of ministers’ professional 
backgrounds and test whether ministerial experience in regional development is associated 
with ODA quality or whether their prior professions affect the sectoral allocation of ODA. 
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Appendix A2.1. List of development ministers (23 DAC countries, 1967-2012) 
Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Australia 1967 Paul Hasluck male 0.5 1 0 4 
Australia 1969 Gordon Freeth male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1970 William McMahon male 0.5 0 1 1 
Australia 1971 Leslie Bury male 0.5 1 1 1 
Australia 1972 Nigel Bowen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1973 Gough Whitlam male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 1974 Donald Robert Willsee male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 1976 Andrew Peacock male 0.5 1 0 1 
Australia 1981 Anthony Austin Street male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1983 Bill Hayden male 0 0 1 1 
Australia 1989 Gareth Evans male 0 0 1 1 
Australia 1996 Alexander Downer male 0.5 0 1 1 
Australia 2008 Stephen Smith male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 2011 Kevin Rudd male 0 1 0 1 
Australia 2012 Bob Carr male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1967 Lujo Toncic-Sorinj male 0.5 0 0 2 
Austria 1968 Kurt Josef Waldheim male 0.5 1 0 1 
Austria 1970 Rudolf Kirchschläger male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1974 Erich Bielka-Karltreu male 0 1 0 1 
Austria 1977 Willibald Pahr male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1983 Erwin Lanc male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1985 Leopold Gratz male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1986 Peter Jankowitsch male 0 1 0 1 
Austria 1987 Alois Mock male 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 1995 Wolfgang Schüssel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 2000 Benita-Maria Ferrero-Waldner female 0.5 1 0 1 
Austria 2005 Ursula Plassnik female 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 2009 Michael Spindelegger male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1967 Pierre Harmel male 0.5 0 0 2 
Belgium 1969 Raymond Scheyven male 0.5 1 0 1 
Belgium 1972 Lucien Harmegnies male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1973 Guy Cudell male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1974 Renaat van Elslande male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1977 Lucien Outers male 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1979 Mark Eyskens male 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 1981 Daniel Coens male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1982 Jacqueline Mayence-Goossens female 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1983 Francois-Xavier de Donnea male 1 0 1 1 
Belgium 1986 André Kempinaire male 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1988 André Geens male 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 1992 Erik Derycke male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1995 Reginald Moreels male 0 1 0 1 
Belgium 2000 Eddy Boutmans male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2004 Marc Verwilghen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2005 Armand de Decker male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2008 Charles Michel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2011 Olivier Chastel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2012 Paul Magnette male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1967 Paul Joseph James Martin male 0 0 0 5 
Canada 1968 Mitchell Sharp male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1975 Allan MacEachen male 0 0 1 1 
Canada 1977 Donald Jamieson male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1979 Flora MacDonald female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 1980 Mark MacGuigan male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1983 Allan MacEachen male 0 0 1 3 
Canada 1985 Monique Vézina female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 1986 Monique Landry female 0.5 0 0 1 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Canada 1993 Monique Vézina female 0.5 0 0 2 
Canada 1994 André Ouellet male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1996 Pierre Pettigrew male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1997 Diane Marleau female 0 0 1 1 
Canada 2000 Maria Minna female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2002 Susan Whelan female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2004 Aileen Carroll female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2006 Josée Verner female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 2008 Beverley Oda female 0.5 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1967 Willy Spühler male 0 0 1 2 
Switzerland 1970 Pierre Graber male 0 0 1 1 
Switzerland 1978 Pierre Aubert male 0 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1988 René Felber male 0 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1993 Flavio Cotti male 0.5 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1999 Joseph Deiss male 0.5 0 1 1 
Switzerland 2003 Micheline Calmy-Rey female 0 0 1 1 
Switzerland 2012 Didier Burkhalter male 1 0 1 1 
Germany 1967 Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1969 Erhard Eppler male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1975 Egon Bahr male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1977 Marie Schlei female 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1978 Rainer Offergeld male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1983 Jürgen Warnke male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1987 Hans Klein male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1989 Jürgen Warnke male 0.5 0 0 5 
Germany 1991 Carl-Dieter Spranger male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1999 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul female 0 0 0 1 
Germany 2010 Dirk Niebel male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1967 Jens Otto Krag male 0 0 1 6 
Denmark 1968 Poul Hartling male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1972 Knud Børge Andersen male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1974 Ove Guldberg male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1975 Knud Børge Andersen male 0 0 0 3 
Denmark 1979 Henning Christophersen male 1 0 1 1 
Denmark 1980 Kjeld Olesen male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1983 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen male 1 0 1 1 
Denmark 1993 Helle Degn female 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1995 Poul Nielson male 0 1 0 1 
Denmark 2000 Jan Trøjborg male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 2001 Anita Bay Bundegaard female 0.5 0 0 1 
Denmark 2002 Per Stig Møller male 0.5 0 0 1 
Denmark 2005 Ulla Pedersen Tørnæs female 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 2010 Søren Pind male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 2012 Christian Friis Bach male 0.5 1 1 1 
Spain 1980 Marcelino Oreja Aguirre male 0.5 0 0 5 
Spain 1981 José Pedro Pérez-Llorca male 0.5 0 0 1 
Spain 1983 Fernando Morán male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1986 Francisco Fernández Ordóñez male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1992 Javier Solana male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1996 Abel Matutes male 0.5 0 1 1 
Spain 2000 Josep Piqué male 0.5 0 1 1 
Spain 2003 Ana Palacio female 0.5 0 0 1 
Spain 2004 Miguel Ángel Moratinos male 0 1 0 1 
Spain 2011 Trinidad Jiménez female 0 0 0 1 
Spain 2012 José Garcia-Margallo y Marfil male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1967 Ahti Kalle Samuli Karjalainen male 0.5 0 0 4 
Finland 1970 Väinö Olavi Leskinen male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1972 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1973 Ahti Kalle Samuli Karjalainen male 0.5 0 0 7 
Finland 1975 Olavi Johannes Mattila male 0.5 1 1 1 
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Country  Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Finland 1976 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 2 
Finland 1977 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1982 Pär Olav Mikael Stenbäck male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1983 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 6 
Finland 1987 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 3 
Finland 1989 Pertti Kullervo Paasio male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1991 Toimi Olavi Kankaanniemi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1994 Pekka Olavi Haavisto male -0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1999 Satu Maijastiina Hassi female -0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 2002 Suvi-Anne Siimes female -0.5 0 1 1 
Finland 2003 Paula Ilona Lehtomäki female 0.5 0 1 1 
Finland 2007 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 10 
Finland 2011 Heidi Hautala female -0.5 1 0 1 
France 1967 Yvon Bourges male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1973 Pierre Billecocq male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1974 Pierre Abelin male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1976 Jean de Lipkowski male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1977 Robert Galley male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1981 Jean-Pierre Cot male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 1983 Christian Nucci male -0.5 1 0 1 
France 1986 Michel Aurillac male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1988 Jacques Pelletier male 0 0 0 1 
France 1991 Edwige Avice female -0.5 0 1 1 
France 1992 Marcel Debarge male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 1993 Michel Roussin male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1995 Jacques Godfrain male 0.5 0 1 1 
France 1997 Charles Josselin male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 2002 Pierre-André Wiltzer male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2004 Xavier Darcos male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2005 Brigitte Giradin female 0.5 1 0 1 
France 2007 Jean-Marie Bockel male 0 0 0 1 
France 2008 Alain Joyandet male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2011 Henri de Raincourt male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2012 Pascal Canfin male -0.5 0 0 1 
UK 1967 Arthur Bottomley male 0 0 0 1 
UK 1968 Reginald Prentice male 0 0 1 1 
UK 1970 Richard Wood male 1 0 1 1 
UK 1974 Judith Hart female 0 1 1 1 
UK 1975 Reginald Prentice male 0 1 1 3 
UK 1977 Judith Hart female 0 1 1 2 
UK 1979 Harry Neil Marten male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1983 Timothy Raison male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1987 Christopher Patten male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1990 Lynda Chalker female 1 0 0 1 
UK 1997 Clare Short female 0 1 0 1 
UK 2003 Valerie Ann Amos female 0 1 0 1 
UK 2004 Hilary Benn male 0 1 0 1 
UK 2007 Douglas Alexander male 0 0 0 1 
UK 2010 Andrew Mitchell male 1 1 0 1 
Greece 1996 Theodoros Pangalos male 0 0 1 1 
Greece 1999 Georgios A. Papandreou male 0 0 0 1 
Greece 2004 Petros Molyviatis male 0.5 1 0 1 
Greece 2006 Dora Bakoyannis female 0.5 0 0 1 
Greece 2010 Georgios A. Papandreou male 0 0 0 6 
Greece 2011 Stavros Lambrinidis male 0 0 1 1 
Greece 2012 Dimitris Avramopoulos male 0.5 1 0 1 
Ireland 1974 Garret FitzGerald male 0.5 0 1 2 
Ireland 1978 Michael O'Kennedy male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1980 Brian Lenihan male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1982 Gerry Collins male 0 0 0 1 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Ireland 1983 Peter Barry male 0.5 0 0 1 
Ireland 1987 Brian Lenihan male 0 0 0 3 
Ireland 1990 Gerry Collins male 0 0 0 2 
Ireland 1992 David Andrews male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1993 Tom Kitt male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1995 Joan Burton female -0.5 0 1 1 
Ireland 1997 Liz O'Donnell female 1 0 0 1 
Ireland 2002 Tom Kitt male 0 0 0 3 
Ireland 2005 Conor Lenihan male 0 0 1 1 
Ireland 2007 Michael Kitt male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 2008 Peter Power male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 2011 Jan O'Sullivan female -0.5 0 0 1 
Ireland 2012 Joe Costello male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1967 Giulio Andreotti male 0.5 0 0 2 
Italy 1969 Mario Tanassi male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1970 Silvio Gava male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1972 Mauro Ferri male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1974 Ciriaco De Mita male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1975 Carlo Donat-Cattin male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1979 Franco Nicolazzi male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1980 Antonio Bisaglia male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1981 Giovanni Marcora male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1983 Filippo Maria Pandolfi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1984 Renato Altissimo male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1987 Adolfo Battaglia male 0 0 0 1 
Italy 1991 Guido Bodrato male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1992 Giuseppe Guarino male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1993 Paolo Savona male 0 0 1 1 
Italy 1994 Vito Gnutti male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1995 Alberto Clo male 0 0 0 1 
Italy 1996 Pierluigi Bersani male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2000 Enrico Letta male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2001 Antonio Marzano male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2005 Claudio Scajola male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2006 Pierluigi Bersani male 0 0 0 5 
Italy 2008 Claudio Scajola male 0.5 0 0 2 
Italy 2010 Silvio Berlusconi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2011 Paolo Romani male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2012 Corrado Passera male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1967 Takeo Miki male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1969 Kiichi Aichi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1971 Takeo Fukuda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1973 Masayoshi Ohira male 0.5 0 1 3 
Japan 1975 Kiichi Miyazawa male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1977 Iichiro Hatoyama male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1978 Sunao Sonoda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1980 Saburo Okita male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1981 Sunao Sonoda male 0.5 0 0 3 
Japan 1982 Yoshio Sakurauchi male 0.5 1 1 1 
Japan 1983 Shintaro Abe male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1987 Tadashi Kuranari male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1988 Sosuke Uno male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1990 Taro Nakayama male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1991 Michio Watanabe male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1993 Tsutomu Hata male 0 0 1 1 
Japan 1994 Yohei Kono male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1996 Yukihiko Ikeda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1998 Keizo Obushi male 0.5 1 0 1 
Japan 1999 Masahiko Komura male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 2000 Yohei Kono male 0.5 0 1 3 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Japan 2001 Makiko Tanaka female 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2002 Yoriko Kawaguchi female 0.5 1 1 1 
Japan 2005 Nobutaka Machimura male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2006 Taro Aso male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2008 Masahiko Komura male 0.5 0 0 2 
Japan 2009 Hirofumi Nakasone male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2010 Katsuya Okada male 0 0 0 1 
Japan 2011 Takeaki Matsumoto male 0 0 0 1 
Japan 2012 Koichiro Genba male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 1987 Choe Gwang-su male 0.5 0 0 2 
South Korea 1989 Choe Ho-jung male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1991 Lee Sang-ok male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1993 Han Seung-ju male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1995 Gong Ro-myeong male 0.5 1 1 1 
South Korea 1997 Yu Jong-ha male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1998 Park Jeong-su male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 1999 Hong Sun-yeong male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2000 Lee Jeong-bin male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2001 Han Seung-su male 0.5 0 1 1 
South Korea 2002 Choe Seong-hong male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2003 Yoon Young Kwan male 0.5 0 1 1 
South Korea 2004 Ban Ki-moon male 0.5 1 0 1 
South Korea 2007 Song Min-sun male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 2008 Yu Myung-hwan male 0.5 1 0 1 
South Korea 2011 Kim Sung-hwan male 0.5 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1980 Gaston Thorn male 1 0 0 12 
Luxembourg 1981 Colette Flesch female 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1985 Jacques Poos male 0 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 2000 Charles Goerens male 1 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 2004 Jean-Louis Schiltz male 0.5 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 2010 Marie-Josée Jacobs female 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1967 Berend Jan Udink male 0.5 0 1 1 
Netherlands 1972 Kees Bortien male 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1973 Jan Pronk male 0 0 1 1 
Netherlands 1978 Jan de Koning male 0.5 1 0 1 
Netherlands 1982 Kees van Dijk male 0.5 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1983 Eegje Schoo female 1 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1987 Pieter Bukman male 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1990 Jan Pronk male 0 0 1 6 
Netherlands 1999 Eva Herfkens female 0 1 0 1 
Netherlands 2003 Agnes van Ardenne female 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 2007 Albert Gerard Koenders male 0 1 1 1 
Netherlands 2010 Maxime Verhagen male 0.5 1 0 1 
Netherlands 2011 Ben Knapen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1967 John Lyng male 0.5 0 0 2 
Norway 1970 Svenn Stray male 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1971 Andreas Zeier Cappelen male 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1973 Dagfinn Varvik male 1 0 1 1 
Norway 1974 Knut Frydenlund male 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1981 Svenn Stray male 0.5 0 0 2 
Norway 1983 Reidun Brusletten female 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1986 Vesla Vetlesen male 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1988 Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl female 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1990 Tom Vraalsen male 1 1 1 1 
Norway 1991 Grete Faremo female 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1993 Kari Nordheim-Larsen female 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1998 Hilde Frafjord Johnson female 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 2000 Anne Kristin Sydnes female 0 0 0 1 
Norway 2002 Hilde Frafjord Johnson female 0.5 1 0 3 
Norway 2006 Erik Solheim male -0.5 1 0 1 
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dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Norway 2012 Heikki Holmås male -0.5 0 1 1 
New Zealand 1967 Keith Holyoake male 1 0 0 8 
New Zealand 1973 Norman Kirk male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1975 Bill Rowling male 0 0 1 1 
New Zealand 1976 Brian Talboys male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1982 Warren Cooper male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1985 David Lange male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1988 Russell Marshall male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1990 Mike Moore male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1991 Donald Charles McKinnon male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2000 Phil Goff male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2006 Winston Peters male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2009 Murray McCully male 1 0 0 1 
Portugal 1980 Diogo Freitas do Amaral male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1981 André Gonçalves Pereira male 0.5 1 0 1 
Portugal 1982 Vasco Futscher Pereira male 0.5 1 0 1 
Portugal 1983 Jaime Gama male 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 1986 Pedro Pires de Miranda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1988 Joao de Deus Pinheiro male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1993 José Manuel Barroso male 0.5 0 1 1 
Portugal 1996 Jaime Gama male 0 0 0 4 
Portugal 2002 António Martins da Cruz male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 2004 Teresa Gouveia female 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 2005 Diogo Freitas do Amaral male 0.5 1 0 2 
Portugal 2006 Luís Amado male 0 0 1 1 
Portugal 2011 Paulo Portas male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1967 Alva Myrdal female 0 1 0 1 
Sweden 1974 Gertrud Sigurdsen female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1977 Ola Ullsten male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1983 Lennart Bodström male 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1986 Lena Hjelm-Wallén female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1992 Alf Svensson male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1995 Pierre Schori male 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2000 Maj-Inger Klingvall female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2002 Jan Olov Karlsson male 0 0 1 1 
Sweden 2004 Carin Jämtin female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2007 Gunilla Carlsson female 1 0 1 1 
USA 1967 David Dean Rusk male 0 0 0 7 
USA 1969 William Pierce Rogers male 1 0 0 1 
USA 1974 Henry Kissinger male 1 1 0 1 
USA 1977 Cyrus Vance male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1980 Edmund Muskie male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1981 Alexander Haig male 1 0 1 1 
USA 1983 George Pratt Shultz male 1 0 1 1 
USA 1989 James Baker male 1 0 0 1 
USA 1993 Warren Christopher male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1997 Madeleine Albright female 0 1 0 1 
USA 2001 Colin Powell male 1 0 1 1 
USA 2005 Condoleezza Rice female 1 0 0 1 
USA 2009 Hillary Rodham Clinton female 0 0 0 1 
. 
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Appendix A2.2. List of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
(log) Total ODA com. (log) Total ODA commitments (in constant 2012 US$) OECD (2014) 
(log) Total ODA disb. (log) Total ODA disbursements (in constant 2012 US$) OECD (2014) 
Quality ODA Roodman’s (2012) bilateral quality-adjusted gross aid disbursement  (% of bilateral gross aid) Own construction with data from Roodman (2012) 
Quality ODA (no selectivity 
reward) 
Roodman’s (2012) bilateral quality-adjusted gross aid disbursement excluding the discount for 
selectivity with regards to richer and poorly governed countries (% of bilateral gross aid) 
Own construction with data from Roodman (2012) 
Quality ODA (no proliferation 
penalty) 
Roodman’s (2012) bilateral quality-adjusted gross aid disbursement excluding the discount for project 
proliferation (% of bilateral gross aid) 
Own construction with data from Roodman (2012) 
Quality ODA (no tied aid penalty) Roodman’s (2012) bilateral quality-adjusted gross aid disbursement excluding the discount for tied aid 
(% of bilateral gross aid) 
Own construction with data from Roodman (2012 
Gender 
Female minister 1 if development minister is female Own construction 
Female gov. head 1 if head of government is female Own construction 
Female parliament Seats held by women in national parliaments (% of total seats) WDI (World Bank 2014) and Brady et al. (2014) 
Political ideology 
Right-wing minister Political ideology of development minister (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), social 
democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) 
Own construction following Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) 
Right-wing gov. head Political ideology of head of government (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), social 
democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) 
Own construction following Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) 
Right-wing parliament Average political ideology of all parliament members (liberalist economic policy (1), conservative (0.5), 
social democratic party (0), modern socialist (-0.5), unreformed socialist and communist (-1)) 
Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) 
Ideological difference 1 if political ideology of development minister and head of government is different Own construction based on Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) 
Ideological difference (more right-
wing) 
1 if development minister is more right-wing than the head of government Own construction based on Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) 
Ideological difference (more left-
wing) 
1 if development minister is more left-wing than the head of government Own construction based on Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) 
Right-wing minister (election 
manifesto) 
Right-left position of development minister’s party (or of his head of government if he or she is not 
affiliated with a party) 
Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2016) 
Experience 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 1 if development minister has a professional background in development cooperation Own construction 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head 1 if head of government has a professional background in development cooperation Own construction 
Economics & business minister 1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in economics or business administration, 
commerce or finance 
Own construction 
Economics & business gov. head 1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in economics or business administration, 
commerce or finance 
Own construction 
Economics minister 1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in economics Own construction 
Economics gov. head 1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in economics Own construction 
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Business administration, 
commerce, or finance minister 
1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in business administration, commerce or 
finance 
Own construction 
Business administration, 
commerce, or finance minister 
1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in business administration, commerce or 
finance 
Own construction 
Law minister 1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in law Own construction 
Law gov. head 1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in law Own construction 
Medicine, public health, or 
pharmacy minister 
1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in medicine, public health, or pharmacy Own construction 
Medicine, public health, or 
pharmacy gov. head 
1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in medicine, public health, or pharmacy Own construction 
Nat. sciences, mathematics, 
engineering, or agr. science 
minister 
1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in natural sciences, mathematics, 
engineering, or agricultural science 
Own construction 
Nat. sciences, mathematics, 
engineering, or agr. science gov. 
head 
1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in natural sciences, mathematics, engineering, 
or agricultural science 
Own construction 
Political science or other social 
sciences minister 
1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in political science or other social sciences Own construction 
Political science or other social 
sciences gov. head 
1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in political science or other social sciences Own construction 
Teaching, social work, or 
pedagogics minister 
1 if development minister has a degree of higher education in teaching, social work, or pedagogics Own construction 
Teaching, social work, or 
pedagogics gov. head 
1 if head of government has a degree of higher education in teaching, social work, or pedagogics Own construction 
Tenure minister Number of years the development minister is in office Own construction 
Tenure gov. head Number of years the head of government is in office  Own construction 
General ministerial experience 
minister 
Number of months the development minister has worked in a ministerial position other than the 
development minister before assuming office 
Own construction 
Tenure minister + General 
ministerial experience minister 
Total number of months the development minister has worked as development minister or any other 
minister prior to assuming the development office 
Own construction 
Head of government in the future 1 if development minister will become head of government in the future Own construction 
Control variables 
(log) GDP per capita Log of gross domestic product divided by population (constant 2005 US$) WDI (World Bank 2014) 
Openness Trade (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank 2014) 
Gov. expenditures General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank 2014) 
Debt Government debt (% of GDP) Abbas et al. (2010) 
Political globalization KOF Index on Political Globalization (components: embassies (25%), membership in international 
organizations (28%), participation in UN Security Council missions (22%), international treaties (25%)) 
Dreher (2006), updated in Dreher, Gaston and Martens 
(2008)  
Aid agency 1 if existence of national aid agencies operating independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fuchs et al. (2014), own update 
(log) Colonial history (log) Population of former colonies on DAC list of ODA recipients (0 if no colonial history) Own calculations based on CEPII data (Mayer and 
Zignago 2006) and WDI (World Bank 2014) 
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Appendix A2.3. Quantity and quality of ODA by donor country (1967-2012) 
 
4
4
4
6
4
8
5
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
2
4
6
8
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
AUS
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
AUT
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
.5
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
3
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
BEL
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
CAN
4
6
4
8
5
0
5
2
5
4
5
6
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
1
2
3
4
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
CHE
2
6
2
8
3
0
3
2
3
4
3
6
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
DEU
4
6
4
8
5
0
5
2
5
4
5
6
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
.5
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
3
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
DNK
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
2
4
6
8
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
ESP
4
6
4
8
5
0
5
2
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
FIN
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
8
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
FRA
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
GBR
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
GRC
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.5
1
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
IRL
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
ITA
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
JPN
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
KOR
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
LUX
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
5
1
0
1
5
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
NLD
4
4
4
6
4
8
5
0
5
2
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
2
4
6
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
NOR
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.2
.4
.6
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
NZL
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
.5
1
1
.5
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
PRT
5
2
5
4
5
6
5
8
6
0
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
0
2
4
6
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
SWE
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
O
D
A
 Q
u
a
li
ty
 (
%
)
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
T
o
ta
l 
O
D
A
 (
in
 b
il
li
o
n
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
U
S
$
)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total ODA (commitments)
ODA Quality
USA
110 
 
Appendix A2.4. Development ministers’ educational background (1971-2012) 
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Medicine, public health, or pharmacy
Nat. sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agr. science
Business administration, commerce, or finance
Teaching, social work, or pedagogics
Political science or other social sciences
Economics
Law
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Appendix B2.1. Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets (alternative 
specification) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) Total 
ODA 
disb. 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 <=1990 <=1990 >=1991 >=1991 
Lagged DV 
  0.4898**
* 
0.4885**
* 
0.3603*** 0.5393*** 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(log) GDP per capita 
2.6073*** 2.9678*** 1.4275**
* 
1.8873**
* 
1.9005*** 1.3337*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness 0.0035** 0.0056*** -0.0054* -0.0018 0.0023* 0.0015 
  [0.029] [0.000] [0.079] [0.385] [0.072] [0.127] 
Gov. expenditure 
0.0467*** 0.0759*** 0.0099 0.0322**
* 
0.0155 0.0034 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.389] [0.001] [0.210] [0.755] 
Debt -0.0022*** -0.0029*** -0.0013* -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.057] [0.361] [0.833] [0.340] 
Political globalization 0.0095*** 0.0127*** 0.0054 0.0052 -0.0008 0.0004 
  [0.005] [0.002] [0.455] [0.192] [0.764] [0.859] 
Aid agency 0.0181 0.1108** -0.1378 0.0971 0.0150 0.0862** 
  [0.706] [0.030] [0.320] [0.548] [0.739] [0.017] 
(log) Colonial history -0.3592*** -0.4424*** 0.4274** 0.0927 0.2853 0.0701 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.043] [0.541] [0.131] [0.597] 
Female minister -0.0513* -0.0608* -0.0160 -0.0320 -0.0499* -0.0387 
  [0.086] [0.055] [0.761] [0.404] [0.054] [0.164] 
Female gov. head 
0.0408 0.0440 -
0.2970**
* 
-
0.1788**
* 
0.0548 0.0668*** 
  [0.497] [0.483] [0.000] [0.001] [0.142] [0.004] 
Female parliament 
0.0116*** 0.0146*** 0.0178**
* 
0.0147**
* 
0.0004 -0.0002 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.890] [0.934] 
Right-wing minister 
0.0044 -0.0531 -0.0213 -
0.0890** 
-0.0214 -0.0388 
  [0.934] [0.257] [0.755] [0.043] [0.528] [0.126] 
Right-wing gov. head -0.0170 -0.0013 -0.0403 -0.0073 0.0324 0.0417 
  [0.813] [0.984] [0.652] [0.905] [0.460] [0.232] 
Right-wing parliament 
0.0326 0.6919*** 0.3957** 0.8388**
* 
-0.0358 0.0713 
 [0.813] [0.002] [0.012] [0.000] [0.736] [0.411] 
Ideological difference 
0.1063*** 0.0771** 0.1314**
* 
0.1342**
* 
0.0157 -0.0175 
 [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.000] [0.469] [0.330] 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0082 0.0079 0.0388 0.0239 -0.0048 0.0329 
  [0.810] [0.846] [0.311] [0.394] [0.883] [0.185] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head 0.0153 0.0210 0.0219 0.0207 0.0195 -0.0221 
 [0.756] [0.592] [0.725] [0.624] [0.649] [0.467] 
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Economics & business minister -0.0223 0.0007 -0.0489 0.0044 0.0169 0.0112 
  [0.334] [0.977] [0.110] [0.839] [0.433] [0.431] 
Economics & business gov. 
head 
0.0760** 0.0902*** 0.0481* 0.0437* -0.0004 0.0206 
  [0.018] [0.005] [0.077] [0.079] [0.989] [0.243] 
Tenure minister 0.0100** 0.0121** 0.0067 0.0049 0.0070* 0.0054** 
  [0.042] [0.022] [0.394] [0.369] [0.083] [0.034] 
Tenure gov. head -0.0045 -0.0066 -0.0003 -0.0044 -0.0020 -0.0054** 
 [0.253] [0.126] [0.957] [0.283] [0.521] [0.013] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gov. head FE No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 812 838 317 345 491 493 
R-squared (within) 0.761 0.850 0.720 0.826 0.768 0.848 
Number of countries 23 23 18 20 23 23 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.  
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Appendix B2.2. Development minister characteristics and ODA (election manifestos) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
Quality ODA 
 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 1995-2011 
Panel A (baseline specification)    
Right-wing minister 0.0008 -0.0356* -0.6600 
  [0.979] [0.088] [0.421] 
Panel B    
Right-wing minister (election manifesto) -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0191 
  [0.365] [0.471] [0.263] 
Notes: Column 1 is based on column 3 of Table 2.2. Column 2 is based on column 4 of Table 2.2. Column 
3 is based on column 3 of Table 2.3. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, all control 
variables, country-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the government-
head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-
percent, one-percent) level. 
 
 
 
Appendix B2.3. Development minister characteristics and ODA (ideological differences) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
Quality ODA 
 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 1995-2011 
Panel A (baseline specification)    
Ideological difference 0.0693*** 0.0371** -0.1828 
  [0.001] [0.015] [0.752] 
Panel B    
Ideological difference (more left-wing) 0.0410 0.0189 1.4534 
 [0.525] [0.643] [0.382] 
Ideological difference (more right-wing) 0.0987 0.0559 -1.9682 
  [0.179] [0.219] [0.140] 
Test for joint significance (p-value) 0.006 0.053 0.307 
Test for same coefficient size (p-value) 0.660 0.646 0.225 
Notes: Column 1 is based on column 3 of Table 2.2. Column 2 is based on column 4 of Table 2.2. Column 
3 is based on column 3 of Table 2.3. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, all control 
variables, country-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the government-
head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-
percent, one-percent) level. 
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Appendix B2.4. Development minister characteristics and ODA (various experience variables) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
Quality ODA 
 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 1995-2011 
Panel A (baseline specification)    
Tenure minister 0.0068* 0.0054** 0.1703** 
  [0.059] [0.047] [0.040] 
Panel B    
Tenure minister -0.00024 -0.00339 -0.22195 
  [0.980] [0.628] [0.313] 
Tenure minister squared 0.00070 0.00087 0.03514* 
 [0.440] [0.159] [0.052] 
Test for joint significance (p-value) (0.156) (0.035)** (0.018)** 
Panel C    
Tenure minister + General ministerial experience minister 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0007 
  [0.134] [0.088] [0.899] 
Panel D    
Tenure minister 0.0071** 0.0057** 0.1613** 
  [0.048] [0.037] [0.046] 
General ministerial experience minister 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0239** 
 [0.771] [0.533] [0.042] 
Panel E    
Tenure minister 0.0235* 0.0151 0.0035 
  [0.062] [0.102] [0.997] 
Minister FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel F    
Tenure minister 0.0064* 0.0054* 0.1677** 
  [0.070] [0.051] [0.045] 
Head of government in the future -0.0687* -0.0151 -1.1916 
  [0.051] [0.602] [0.371] 
Notes: Column 1 is based on column 3 of Table 2.2. Column 2 is based on column 4 of Table 2.2. Column 
3 is based on column 3 of Table 2.3. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, all control 
variables, country-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the government-
head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-
percent, one-percent) level. 
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Appendix B2.5. Development minister characteristics and ODA (various university degrees) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
Quality 
ODA 
 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 1995-2011 
Panel A (baseline specification)    
Economics & business minister -0.0050 0.0081 -0.5221 
  [0.753] [0.508] [0.304] 
Economics & business gov. head 0.0377* 0.0390*** -0.4718 
  [0.066] [0.005] [0.472] 
Panel B    
Economics minister -0.0141 0.0007 -0.6310 
  [0.428] [0.960] [0.268] 
Economics gov. head 0.0425* 0.0546*** 0.8200 
  [0.066] [0.001] [0.395] 
Panel C    
Business administration, commerce, or finance minister -0.0128 0.0264 0.4959 
  [0.719] [0.276] [0.520] 
Business administration, commerce, or finance gov. head 0.0291 0.0039 -2.0081** 
  [0.336] [0.860] [0.011] 
Panel D    
Law minister -0.0025 -0.0169 0.5245 
  [0.898] [0.240] [0.366] 
Law gov. head -0.0118 -0.0156 1.1910* 
  [0.576] [0.368] [0.071] 
Panel E    
Medicine, public health, or pharmacy minister 0.0062 -0.0455* -3.0340*** 
  [0.860] [0.074] [0.001] 
Medicine, public health, or pharmacy gov. head -0.1608** -0.0604 4.6814** 
  [0.020] [0.340] [0.019] 
Panel F    
Nat. sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agr. science 
minister -0.0322 0.0380 0.7383 
  [0.237] [0.123] [0.620] 
Nat. sciences, mathematics, engineering, or agr. science gov. 
head -0.0209 -0.0987** -1.2157 
  [0.685] [0.050] [0.595] 
Panel G    
Political science or other social sciences minister 0.0383* 0.0232 -0.2396 
  [0.060] [0.152] [0.703] 
Political science or other social sciences gov. head 0.0148 -0.0062 0.4000 
  [0.500] [0.716] [0.657] 
Panel H    
Teaching, social work, or pedagogics minister -0.0316 -0.0062 1.2208 
  [0.202] [0.715] [0.184] 
Teaching, social work, or pedagogics gov. head -0.0631 -0.0481 1.3535 
  [0.135] [0.143] [0.480] 
Notes: Column 1 is based on column 3 of Table 2.2. Column 2 is based on column 4 of Table 2.2. Column 
3 is based on column 3 of Table 2.3. All regressions include the lagged dependent variable, all control 
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variables, country-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the government-
head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-
percent, one-percent) level. 
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Appendix B2.6. Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets (1971-2012, 
contemporaneous explanatory variables) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
com. 
(log) 
Total 
ODA 
disb. 
Lagged DV 0.4553*** 0.6765*** 0.4608*** 0.6492*** 0.0909 0.3058*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.110] [0.000] 
(log) GDP per capita 1.3949*** 0.9555*** 1.5253*** 1.0437*** 2.3482*** 2.1493*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness 0.0012 0.0008 0.0013 0.0014** -0.0013 -0.0012 
  [0.245] [0.106] [0.259] [0.021] [0.239] [0.220] 
Gov. expenditure 0.0371*** 0.0244*** 0.0379*** 0.0228*** 0.0752*** 0.0628*** 
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Debt -0.0018*** -0.0009*** -0.0015*** -0.0009*** -0.0012** 0.0000 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005] [0.042] [0.999] 
Political globalization 0.0052*** 0.0030** 0.0075** 0.0038* 0.0038 0.0063* 
  [0.010] [0.047] [0.015] [0.092] [0.341] [0.072] 
Aid agency 0.0140 0.0447* 0.0077 0.0392 0.0239 0.0856* 
  [0.658] [0.069] [0.816] [0.109] [0.654] [0.056] 
(log) Colonial history -0.2583*** -0.1469*** -0.1869** -0.1288** -0.3636 -0.4715** 
  [0.001] [0.007] [0.013] [0.027] [0.280] [0.013] 
Female minister -0.0174 -0.0013 -0.0162 -0.0047 -0.0141 -0.0108 
  [0.468] [0.942] [0.496] [0.801] [0.606] [0.638] 
Female gov. head 
  
0.0197 0.0080 
  
  
  
[0.591] [0.789] 
  
Female parliament   0.0061** 0.0051***   
   [0.011] [0.005]   
Right-wing minister 0.0015 0.0099 0.0100 0.0006 -0.0090 0.0169 
  [0.943] [0.540] [0.760] [0.981] [0.749] [0.485] 
Right-wing gov. head 
  
-0.0163 -0.0038 
  
  
  
[0.679] [0.904] 
  
Right-wing parliament   -0.0835 0.1585*   
   [0.460] [0.052]   
Ideological difference   0.0345 0.0084   
   [0.160] [0.630]   
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0043 -0.0219 -0.0105 -0.0255 -0.0289 -0.0720** 
  [0.875] [0.395] [0.700] [0.320] [0.371] [0.024] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head 
  
0.0350 -0.0097 
  
 
  
[0.284] [0.708] 
  
Economics & business 
minister 
-0.0015 0.0014 -0.0153 0.0011 -0.0015 0.0007 
  [0.949] [0.908] [0.458] [0.926] [0.969] [0.968] 
Economics & business gov. 
head 
  
0.0477** 0.0210 
  
  
  
[0.021] [0.151] 
  
Tenure minister 0.0068* 0.0059** 0.0062 0.0056** 0.0040 0.0055** 
  [0.092] [0.014] [0.131] [0.021] [0.422] [0.025] 
Tenure gov. head 
  
-0.0006 -0.0012 
  
  
  
[0.849] [0.589] 
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Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 829 860 802 833 829 860 
R-squared (within) 0.818 0.919 0.823 0.917 0.473 0.664 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 181 186 178 183 181 186 
Average number of years 36.0 37.4 34.9 36.2 4.6 4.6 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.  
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Appendix B2.7. Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets as a share of 
government expenditures (1971-2012) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
(log) Total ODA 
disb. (% gov. exp.) 
(log) Total ODA 
disb. (% gov. exp.) 
(log) Total ODA 
disb. (% gov. exp.) 
Lagged DV 0.8017*** 0.7810*** 0.3513*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(log) GDP per capita 0.3821*** 0.5199*** 1.7588*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness 0.0013* 0.0022*** 0.0004 
  [0.097] [0.008] [0.779] 
Gov. expenditure -0.0135* -0.0149** 0.0139 
  [0.059] [0.050] [0.403] 
Debt -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004 
 [0.187] [0.103] [0.565] 
Political globalization -0.0001 0.0009 0.0057 
  [0.977] [0.737] [0.173] 
Aid agency 0.0911** 0.1005** 0.1825* 
  [0.017] [0.014] [0.067] 
(log) Colonial history -0.2430*** -0.2458** -1.0213*** 
  [0.008] [0.011] [0.002] 
Female minister -0.0196 -0.0272 -0.0727 
  [0.534] [0.420] [0.198] 
Female gov. head  0.0481  
   [0.210]  
Female parliament  0.0038  
  [0.139]  
Right-wing minister -0.0140 -0.0269 0.0426 
  [0.507] [0.382] [0.319] 
Right-wing gov. head  -0.0125  
   [0.746]  
Right-wing parliament  0.2056**  
  [0.020]  
Ideological difference  0.0048  
  [0.840]  
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0262 0.0306 -0.0106 
  [0.326] [0.235] [0.800] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head  -0.0148  
  [0.732]  
Economics & business minister 0.0150 0.0135 0.0058 
  [0.502] [0.544] [0.862] 
Economics & business gov. head  0.0513**  
   [0.022]  
Tenure minister 0.0082* 0.0094** 0.0090* 
  [0.059] [0.041] [0.086] 
Tenure gov. head  -0.0066**  
   [0.028]  
Country FE Yes Yes No 
Gov. head FE No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 866 838 866 
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R-squared (within) 0.829 0.835 0.494 
Number of countries 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 187 185 187 
Average number of years 37.7 36.4 4.6 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, 
***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.  
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Appendix B2.8. Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets (without potential “bad controls”) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
Quality ODA Quality ODA 
 
 1971-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012 1995-2011 1995-2011 
(log) GDP per capita 2.6919*** 2.9756*** 2.6820*** 3.1219*** 2.4534*** 3.1976*** 13.2682** 16.7866** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.049] [0.015] 
Openness 0.0033** 0.0053*** 0.0040*** 0.0067*** -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0079 -0.0055 
  [0.013] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.789] [0.248] [0.709] [0.754] 
Gov. expenditure 0.0536*** 0.1022*** 0.0535*** 0.0949*** 0.0374** 0.0856*** 0.9956** 0.8111* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] [0.017] [0.066] 
Debt -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0018*** -0.0024*** -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.1314*** -0.1106*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.289] [0.435] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness -0.4351*** -0.4067*** -0.3513*** -0.3406*** -0.5319 -0.5306** 15.7455*** 15.1474*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.176] [0.045] [0.002] [0.005] 
Female minister -0.0462 -0.0291 -0.0424 -0.0460 -0.0422 -0.0417 0.7275 0.8525 
  [0.118] [0.362] [0.163] [0.161] [0.193] [0.175] [0.218] [0.191] 
Female gov. head   0.0804 0.0871    -2.1743* 
    [0.208] [0.189]    [0.092] 
Female parliament   0.0112*** 0.0158***    0.1067 
   [0.001] [0.000]    [0.275] 
Right-wing minister 0.0158 0.0136 0.0056 -0.0426 0.0209 0.0420 0.6748 -0.7347 
  [0.646] [0.693] [0.919] [0.372] [0.704] [0.262] [0.423] [0.475] 
Right-wing gov. head   -0.0248 -0.0266    2.8666** 
    [0.734] [0.682]    [0.027] 
Right-wing parliament   -0.0031 0.6662***    -5.4174 
   [0.983] [0.005]    [0.125] 
Ideological difference   0.1135*** 0.0865***    0.3783 
   [0.001] [0.010]    [0.600] 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0378 0.0197 0.0087 0.0026 -0.0539 -0.0317 1.2071** 1.1823* 
  [0.307] [0.712] [0.804] [0.953] [0.163] [0.394] [0.049] [0.055] 
Prof. dev. coop.   0.0264 0.0487    -2.0780 
     gov. head   [0.595] [0.277]    [0.160] 
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Economics & business 0.0139 0.0276 -0.0129 0.0176 -0.0205 -0.0020 -0.7762 -1.0946* 
     minister [0.637] [0.373] [0.586] [0.516] [0.531] [0.938] [0.147] [0.087] 
Economics & business   0.0833** 0.1057***    -0.5075 
     gov. head   [0.011] [0.002]    [0.534] 
Tenure minister 0.0110** 0.0131** 0.0094* 0.0101* 0.0084 0.0082** 0.1402 0.1895* 
  [0.036] [0.018] [0.066] [0.056] [0.186] [0.043] [0.166] [0.056] 
Tenure gov. head   -0.0039 -0.0055    0.0804 
   [0.333] [0.243]    [0.421] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 840 866 812 838 840 866 840 866 
R-squared (within) 0.748 0.825 0.755 0.839 0.437 0.589 389 387 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 0.217 0.252 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-
percent, one-percent) level. 
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Appendix B2.9. Development minister characteristics and ODA quality (1995-2011, lagged 
explanatory variables) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Quality ODA Quality ODA Quality ODA 
Quality 
ODA 
Quality 
ODA 
Lagged DV   0.2100* 0.6967*** 0.0286 
    [0.059] [0.000] [0.723] 
(log) GDP per capita 13.9470** 18.5659** 10.6669 -0.0640 17.1457 
  [0.031] [0.017] [0.179] [0.954] [0.215] 
Openness 0.0284 0.0369 0.0198 0.0237** 0.0033 
  [0.250] [0.174] [0.426] [0.033] [0.874] 
Gov. expenditure 0.7766** 0.8748** 0.5335 0.2632 0.9219 
  [0.038] [0.029] [0.212] [0.125] [0.220] 
Debt -0.1224*** -0.1160*** -0.0721*** -0.0554** -0.0561* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.025] [0.100] 
Political globalization -0.2757** -0.1818 -0.1381 0.1491** -0.1491** 
  [0.018] [0.126] [0.152] [0.035] [0.039] 
Aid agency -1.5301* -1.7594** -1.7850** -1.2961 -1.7498 
  [0.074] [0.036] [0.010] [0.104] [0.183] 
(log) Colonial history 16.7812*** 14.7386** 12.9526** -0.0902* 13.5561 
  [0.001] [0.010] [0.028] [0.086] [0.237] 
Female minister 0.4325 0.6984 0.6109 0.3897 -0.0859 
  [0.424] [0.245] [0.235] [0.455] [0.876] 
Female gov. head  -2.3204* -2.5747* -0.7213 -2.2248* 
   [0.056] [0.059] [0.343] [0.078] 
Female parliament  0.0826 -0.0004 -0.0020 0.0496 
  [0.381] [0.997] [0.958] [0.759] 
Right-wing minister 1.0544 -0.0875 0.3154 -0.1010 0.2600 
  [0.154] [0.917] [0.685] [0.919] [0.799] 
Right-wing gov. head  1.4348 0.7836 -0.6174 -0.1320 
   [0.136] [0.438] [0.581] [0.917] 
Right-wing parliament  -0.3676 -0.9763 6.5968** 0.1840 
  [0.920] [0.781] [0.041] [0.973] 
Ideological difference  1.0091 0.5464 0.2978 0.2564 
  [0.106] [0.314] [0.635] [0.702] 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 1.3633*** 1.2758** 0.8779* -0.9362 0.0220 
  [0.008] [0.031] [0.069] [0.232] [0.975] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head  -2.9010*** -2.0997** 0.1754  
  [0.002] [0.011] [0.875]  
Economics & business minister -1.4710** -1.4336** -1.3003** -0.1462 -0.9289 
  [0.019] [0.033] [0.047] [0.818] [0.336] 
Economics & business gov. head  -0.4551 -0.3569 0.2854  
   [0.490] [0.516] [0.622]  
Tenure minister 0.1975* 0.2587*** 0.2131** 0.1411* 0.2130* 
  [0.052] [0.006] [0.020] [0.100] [0.061] 
Tenure gov. head  -0.0514 -0.0434 -0.0836  
  [0.446] [0.464] [0.212]  
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Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 388 385 364 364 364 
R-squared (within) 0.253 0.280 0.282 0.807 0.145 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 88 88 82 82 82 
Average number of years 16.9 16.7 15.8 15.9 4.5 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level. P-values are in parentheses. * (**, ***) 
indicates statistical significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Political Economy of International Finance 
Corporation Lending104 
Co-authored with Axel Dreher 
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
onsider the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) multi-million credit to Ghana 
approved in 2010. The credit was intended to facilitate the renovation of a five-star 
Mövenpick Hotel in Accra, the country’s capital. According to the IFC’s “summary 
of proposed investment,” the project company is a fully owned subsidiary of Kingdom Hotels 
Investments, a global player with operations in 18 countries, and owned by a Saudi Arabian 
prince.105 As the IFC points out, the project’s development impact consists of adding important 
business infrastructure, creating new jobs, and providing demand for local food and non-food 
supplies. According to the IFC, the project has been a “great success,” obtaining most revenue 
per room in all Accra.106 Despite the ongoing global financial crisis at the start of the project it 
is hard to imagine that private capital would not have been available to finance the project, or 
that other, more obviously developmentally oriented projects, could not have been more 
worthy of support. 
                                                     
104 An earlier version of Chapter 3 is available as working paper: Dreher, Axel and Katharina Richert 
(2017). The Political Economy of International Finance Corporation Lending. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
12290. 
105 See http://ifcext.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/DocsByUNIDForPrint/D8FCCDDFAFCFB6FF852577 
E5005E6194?opendocument (last accessed December 12, 2016). 
106 See http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/0a5122004c23a313bf56bfd8bd2c3114/The+Movenpick+ 
Ambassador+Hotel,+Ghana.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last accessed December 12, 2016). 
C 
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One might expect projects such as the five-star luxury hotel to be an exception in the 
IFC’s portfolio. However, two thirds of the IFC’s investments go to companies from the 
world’s richest countries, while only one fifth goes to companies of the poorest countries 
(Ellmers et al. 2010). What is more, the bulk of the IFC’s investments go to projects 
implemented in middle-income countries, rather than poorer ones (Ellmers et al. 2010). With 
the majority of projects, obvious developmental benefits are hard to find.107 It is implausible to 
assume (at least for the authors of this chapter) that international companies investing in 
middle-income countries like Brazil and Romania cannot easily access private capital markets. 
Overall, it seems that the typical IFC investment finances a project in a middle-income country, 
of dubious developmental impact, and executed by a large conglomerate from an 
industrialized country that would have enjoyed easy access to private capital. 
Still, as the IFC’s guidelines explain, its official mandate is to finance poverty-reducing 
projects for which “sufficient private capital is not otherwise available on reasonable terms” 
(e.g., IFC 2004: 4). The IFC is part of the World Bank Group, which features the ending of 
extreme poverty and promotion of shared prosperity as its key mandate. This mandate is 
explicitly shared by the IFC.108 
The apparent contrast between the IFC’s official mandate and observed reality presents 
an interesting and important puzzle. Over the last decade or so, the IFC became a major player 
in development lending, with a 2016 portfolio of new commitments amounting to almost US$ 
19 billion. Understanding the drivers of IFC lending is thus of vital importance. In this chapter 
– as we outline in some detail in Section 3.2. – we argue that the governments of industrialized 
country companies receiving IFC money form coalitions with governments of middle-income 
countries where the bulk of investments are executed. Both types of governments can 
influence IFC lending in various ways. We therefore expect preferential treatment when such 
countries hold positions of power. Preferential treatments should be most pronounced when 
                                                     
107 That is, unless one is willing to view every project that has a positive contribution to GDP, does not 
substantially hurt the environment, and creates some jobs as developmental. In 2016, of the US$ 19 
billion in long-term investments, less than one third went to countries eligible for concessional aid from 
the International Development Association – the so-called IDA countries (IFC 2016). More than half of 
the IFC’s investments go to ten middle-income countries – the BRICs alone receive about one third 
(Ellmers et al. 2010). According to the World Bank Group’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2007), 
43 percent of the IFC’s projects that were evaluated during the 2000-2005 period did not receive high 
development ratings.  
108 See, e.g., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ 
solutions/solutions (last accessed December 12, 2016). 
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the representatives of both the recipient’s and the company’s countries are best able to collude 
in exerting their influence. We argue that this will be the case when both countries’ 
governments are represented among the IFC’s Board of Directors109 – the body that makes the 
final decision about loan approval – and at times these countries are members of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), where they have extraordinary clout with major IFC 
shareholders who control the Board. 
As we outline in Section 3.3., we have collected data for more than 3,000 IFC projects 
over the 1995-2015 period. We test whether the (joint) influence of countries receiving the 
projects and countries hosting the companies that implement them helps these countries to 
garner a disproportionate share of IFC funding. To evaluate our hypothesis, we rely on two 
proxies for shareholder influence in international organizations widely used in the related 
literature. Kaja and Werker (2010), Morrison (2013), and Malan (2016) have shown that country 
representation on the Executive Boards of international organizations substantially increases 
the size of the loans that countries receive from these organizations. What is more, a large 
number of papers have shown that those countries with influence over an international 
organization’s major shareholders receive more of the organization’s loans at more favorable 
terms (Thacker 1999, Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher and Jensen 2007, Dreher et al. 2009a, 
2009b, Vreeland and Dreher 2014). We follow this literature and investigate whether the IFC 
extends larger loans at times when the recipient government and the government of the 
country whose company executes the project (i) are members of the IFC’s Board of Directors 
or (ii) are represented as members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is of 
paramount importance to major IFC shareholders.  
We extend the literature in three dimensions. One, we are the first to investigate the 
importance of political influences for IFC lending. Two, in addition to investigating the 
political importance of borrowing countries we also focus on the importance of countries that 
represent the interests of their private companies, which has received little attention in the 
international financial institutions literature.110 And finally, we speak to the recent policy 
                                                     
109 Throughout the chapter we use “representation” rather than “direct representation” when we refer 
to countries that nominate an Executive Director. Of course, the Board member for a group is supposed 
to represent all countries in the group. 
110 More broadly, our chapter thus also relates to the literature on politically connected firms. This 
literature typically focusses on individual countries and finds that firms with connections to the 
country’s government receive larger loans (e.g., Khwaja and Mian 2005). 
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debate on leveraging private funding for development (as for example highlighted in the 2015 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda). To the extent that the allocation of funding is shaped by political 
interests rather than need or expected rates of return, an allocation of private funds that gives 
politicians or international bureaucrats some weight might be less effective in promoting 
development than commonly thought, just as political considerations in allocating official aid 
make the aid less effective in raising growth (Dreher et al. 2018).  
Our results – presented in Section 3.4. – show that the representation of a country and 
in particular its project partners on the IFC’s Board of Directors or on the UNSC significantly 
and substantially increases IFC loan size. We find additional effects in cases where both 
countries hold one of these powerful positions, resulting in more IFC projects and larger loans. 
Given that these significant effects disappear in the years after countries’ joint representation, 
these estimates seem to represent the causal effect of membership rather than some permanent 
omitted characteristics shared by these countries. This is most true regarding the two-year 
spells of temporary membership on the UNSC, which has been shown to be rather 
idiosyncratic, and not determined by variables that also affect the lending behavior of 
international organizations (Dreher et al. 2014, Vreeland and Dreher 2014). 
Section 3.5. concludes the chapter. We argue that the commercial incentives of the 
political coalitions involved work contrary to the IFC’s goal of poverty reduction and 
economic development. Given the voting power of the current system’s beneficiaries in the 
IFC, however, reforming the IFC so that it truly fosters development will be all but impossible. 
3.2. THE ARGUMENT 
The IFC is the private sector arm of the World Bank Group.111 It has 184 member countries who 
provide the organization’s capital of US$ 2.56 billion. The paid-in capital in turn determines 
the members’ voting weight.112 In the fiscal year 2016, about one third of the World Bank 
Group’s commitments were through the IFC, amounting to US$ 19 billion committed to 344 
projects in 78 recipient countries. Within the World Bank Group, the IFC is becoming an 
                                                     
111 The Group’s original institution is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD). The Group also features the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID). The IBRD and the IDA are jointly known as the World Bank. 
112 More specifically, each share of the IFC’s capital stock comes with one vote. In addition, 5.55 percent 
of the total votes are shared as basic votes by all members equally. 
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increasingly important institution.113 Its current President sees the future of the Group as a 
broker between private lenders and developing countries, which would substantially 
strengthen the role of the IFC.114 According to Ellmers et al. (2010: 8) “private sector finance 
may even become the new core business of the Bank.” 
The IFC’s highest decision making body – the Board of Governors – has delegated the 
institution’s day-to-day business to the Board of Directors, which consists of the World Bank 
President and 25 representatives of the IFC’s member countries. The six countries with the 
largest shares in the World Bank Group each appoint one Director;115 the remaining Directors 
are elected by groups of countries116 and have the final say over all the votes of the group they 
represent. This gives some countries substantially more power over the IFC’s decisions than 
others. For example, the United States – by far the IFC’s largest shareholder – is in charge of 
almost 21 percent of the votes, Japan is in command of six percent, while no other country has 
a vote share exceeding five percent.117 The smallest vote share is 0.03 percent – held by 
Afghanistan, Belize, Benin, and Botswana, among others. Though formal voting over lending 
decisions is rare, and proposals are typically not voted down, decisions require a majority of 
the Directors and at least half of the total votes of the Board.118 It is thus well-known to IFC 
staff preparing the loans which countries are expected to receive favorable treatment and 
which loans, if proposed, would likely be rejected. We expect staff to make use of this 
knowledge when preparing a loan. Consequently, loans that favor countries whose interests 
are represented on the Board are more likely to be put forward. What we have in mind here is 
thus a combination of formal and informal influence in the IFC’s decision-making. Formal 
power derives from the voting weight of a country. The importance of informal channels for 
international organizations’ decision-making has been pointed out by Stone (2011, 2013) and 
Koremenos (2013), among others. As Lang and Presbitero (2017) explain, preemptive 
                                                     
113 Commitments have been as low as US$ 4 billion in the year 2000 only, which might explain why the 
IFC has received little attention in the academic literature so far. 
114 See President Jim Yong Kim’s lecture “Rethinking Development Finance” on 11 April 2017 at the 
London School of Economics, http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLectures 
AndEvents/player.aspx?id=3802.  
115 That is, France, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, United States, and China.  
116 The exception is Saudi Arabia whose vote share is high enough to “elect” its own Director. The 
Director nominated by Russia represents the votes of only one additional country, Syria.  
117 The World Bank Group provides details at https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/gsdw-avpz (last 
accessed September 7, 2017). 
118 Voting records are not publically available, so that analysis at the vote-level is impossible. 
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obedience by World Bank bureaucrats can give rise to political biases even in the absence of 
any direct major power intervention. 
Our argument rests on two pillars. First, we expect governments of countries where 
IFC projects are typically implemented and those of countries whose companies are interested 
in applying for IFC funding to hold some sway over the IFC. This is either because they are 
influential in the IFC themselves or because they have powerful allies who support their 
interests. Second, we argue that the private companies applying for IFC loans exert pressure 
on these governments. We outline our expectations regarding these two channels of influence 
in turn.119 
The influence of international organizations’ major shareholders on the organizations’ 
policies has been investigated before. Among others, international organizations grant their 
major shareholders and their shareholders’ political allies more and larger loans at more 
generous terms and with shorter preparation times, better growth and inflation forecasts and 
policy surveillance reports, and better risk ratings in the Debt Sustainability Framework of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).120 These types of political influences 
have received particular attention for the IMF, the International Development Association 
(IDA), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). We expect the 
same mechanisms to hold for the IFC. The governing structure of the IFC is very much in 
analogy to that of the IMF, and the other World Bank Group institutions. In fact, its Board of 
Directors is identical to those of the IDA and the IBRD.121 To the extent that the other 
institutions of the World Bank Group are receptive to shareholder influence, there is little 
reason to expect this influence to be absent from IFC lending. 
Countries represented on the IFC’s Board of Directors have direct control over the loans 
approved by the IFC. We thus expect the countries that are represented there to receive more 
favorable treatment. As Kaja and Werker (2010) point out, the boardroom culture created by 
frequent meetings within the same group of decision-makers leads to the Directors engaging 
                                                     
119 We do not explore other potentially important explanations for the IFC’s lending pattern, such as the 
institutional pressures for the IFC to grow and to generate funds for other branches of the World Bank 
Group. 
120 See Aldenhoff (2007), Kuziemko and Werker (2006), Dreher et al. (2008), Kaja and Werker (2010), 
Fratzscher and Reynaud (2011), Vreeland and Dreher (2014), Dippel (2015), Kilby (2011, 2013, 2015), 
Kersting and Kilby (2016), Lang and Presbitero (2017). For a broader overview of the political economy 
of international organizations see Dreher and Lang (2016). 
121 This is even though some members of the IBRD are not members of the IDA or IFC. 
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in logrolling behavior. The Board is thus likely to support loans that are in the interest of a 
specific director, who in turn supports loans in the interest of other members of the Board. 
Indeed, the results of Kaja and Werker (2010) show that countries represented on the Board 
receive substantially more loans from the IBRD compared to what these same countries receive 
at other times, including the years directly before joining the Board and after leaving the Board. 
Until the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) gained substantial 
weight in the decision of which countries receive IDA support in recent years, the same was 
true for the IDA (Morrison 2013).122 Given the similarity between these organizations and the 
IFC we expect that countries represented on the IFC’s Board of Directors as well as their allies 
will receive larger IFC loans at times they request them.  
Previous research has indeed shown that countries of importance to the World Bank’s 
major shareholders receive more and larger loans from the IDA and the IBRD. A widely used 
proxy for political importance is membership on the UNSC. This follows the seminal work by 
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) who show that temporary UNSC members receive a surge in 
foreign aid from the United States during the two years of their membership. The United States 
apparently cares a great deal about the UNSC,123 and the same holds for other important 
shareholders of the World Bank (Vreeland and Dreher 2014). With respect to the World Bank, 
Dreher et al. (2009b) find that temporary members receive substantially more IBRD and IDA 
projects during their time on the UNSC.124 They attribute this to the interests of the major 
shareholders in doling out favors to countries of importance to them and the resulting 
shareholders’ pressure on the Bank for more favorable terms. Given that the major 
shareholders of the World Bank care about whether or not a country is a member of the UNSC, 
we expect them to be attentive to these countries’ interests at the IFC as well. 
The second pillar in our theory – the influence of private companies on international 
organizations’ lending behavior – is key in deriving our hypotheses, as it is these companies 
that apply for IFC loans. The motives of private companies have received much less attention 
than the direct interests of governments. Notable exceptions are Broz and Hawes (2006), Malik 
and Stone (2016) and McLean (2017).  
                                                     
122 See Malan (2016) for similar results on the IMF. 
123 Also see Lai and Lefler (2016). 
124 Kersting and Kilby (2017) show that UNSC membership is an important determinant of the Bank’s 
supplemental loans. 
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Broz and Hawes (2006) focus on banks. They show that countries with larger exposure 
to U.S. banks are more likely to receive IMF programs and larger loans. They attribute this to 
the banks’ influence over U.S. politicians and the politicians’ power over the IMF. McLean 
(2017) investigates contract allocation in the IDA and the IBRD. As she explains (2017: 257): 
“donor governments pay significant attention to the inflow of contracts funded by multilateral 
aid to their economies due to domestic political and economic considerations.”125 Malik and 
Stone (2016) point out that large multinational companies are important political actors, with 
some influence over both their home country and the country where they invest. They show 
that IDA and IBRD projects involving multinational U.S. companies receive larger 
disbursements and better evaluations relative to their performance, compared to other 
companies. Malik and Stone investigate political influences at the disbursement – rather than 
the commitment – level. They consequently attribute their result to lobbying with World Bank 
employees who are in charge of disbursing funds and evaluating projects. 
Malik and Stone describe a number of channels by which private companies can 
influence the World Bank’s decisions. Among them is lobbying with the local congressional 
office, which then passes on the company’s request to the country’s authorities in charge of 
the World Bank – the Treasury in case of the United States. A Treasury representative could 
then pass on the request to the United States representative on the Bank’s Board of Directors, 
in charge of approving loans, or to the director of a specific department preparing the loan.126 
For everyone involved complying is easier than ignoring the request. As Malik and Stone 
(2016: 8) put it “Lobbying is effective because the chain of delegation ensures that there is no 
one holding the door shut.” As they explain (p. 8), the congressional office routinely forwards 
requests like these, because compliance comes at almost no cost, while non-compliance might 
easily become costly in the future. The Treasury to some extent depends on congressional 
votes to pass appropriations bills, while costs to put pressure on the World Bank are hardly 
significant.127  
                                                     
125 Broz and Hawes (2006) and Broz (2008, 2011) show that this holds true for U.S.-policies on 
international organizations as well. They show that U.S. commercial banks hold some sway over how 
U.S. congress legislates the IMF. 
126 Parízek (2017) shows that powerful states are over-represented among the staff of international 
organizations’ secretariats, which facilitates the exercise of power over them. Also see Novosad and 
Werker (2018). 
127 Oatley and Yackee (2004) argue that commercial banks’ influence in part runs through domestic 
interest groups within the United States. U.S. policymakers are receptive to U.S. commercial bank 
134 
 
Overall, our argument is thus an indirect one. Private companies have a clear interest 
in receiving the IFC’s loans. This is because, even though the interest rates on loans are 
comparable to market rates, IFC loans are subsidized. The IFC raises its funds in the 
international debt markets. Due to its high paid-in capital it has a AAA rating and can borrow 
at prime conditions. The IFC does not pay dividends to its shareholders and is exempt from 
corporation taxes. These subsidies are to some extent passed on to borrowers, in the form of 
longer maturing loans or longer grace periods compared to market conditions (Te Welde and 
Warner 2007). As Te Welde and Warner (2007) point out, technical assistance – underpriced 
compared to market conditions – is a key subsidy in support of IFC projects. What is more, 
complementary private money might be more easily available for projects with IFC support, 
for example because private creditors rely on the IFC’s screening of projects or expect 
preferential political treatment for these projects in the recipient country.128 
Private companies lobby their national government which, in turn, either holds some 
influence at the IFC itself, or uses its political influence with other governments that are 
powerful in the IFC (for example because they hold positions on the UNSC). We expect 
companies to lobby the government of the country where the projects are implemented as well. 
Large multinational corporations can have substantial influence on low- and middle-income 
governments (e.g., Jensen 2008). These governments arguably have an interest in promoting 
business in their country, in particular if it comes at little cost to them. Using their seat on the 
IFC Board or their clout with important shareholders of the IFC, we expect recipient country 
governments to give in to companies’ demands, and extend their influence at times they have 
some. 
In summary, we expect country representation on the UNSC and the IFC’s Board to 
result in larger loans to companies from that country. We also expect that the larger the 
number of actors interested in a certain Board decision, the easier it will be to build an effective 
coalition in the Board that favors this outcome. The effect of these countries’ presence on 
projects in their shared interest could easily be larger than the sum of their individual 
influences. We therefore investigate the joint influence of the government in the country 
                                                     
pressure to use their privileged access to IMF decision-making to represent the banks’ interests in the 
Fund. 
128 This might work across similar lines as the IMF’s “seal of approval” – the catalyzing impact attributed 
to IMF programs with respect to private capital flows (e.g., Biglaiser and DeRouen 2010). 
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receiving the project and the government of the company implementing it as well. We expect 
that loan size will be maximal during times of joint representation. This should hold most with 
respect to the low- or middle-income countries receiving the project, which are arguably less 
well politically connected compared to rich country governments and will find it more difficult 
to muster effective support from the IFC’s shareholders at times they do not form such 
coalitions.  
3.3. DATA AND METHOD 
Our key dependent variable is new IFC loan amounts committed. These data are available 
from the World Bank Group’s website.129 Crucially, we require data on the country of 
investment (“recipient country”) and on the country of the project company (“sponsor”). 
While the former can easily be extracted from the World Bank Database, the latter had to be 
hand-coded for each individual project based on the information about the project company’s 
headquarters given on the website.130 For example, the project sheet for the Mövenpick project 
in Ghana given in the introduction details that the project company is KHI Ghana Limited, 
which is a fully owned subsidiary of Kingdom Hotels Investments, owned by Prince Walid of 
Saudi Arabia. We therefore coded Ghana as the country receiving the project and Saudi Arabia 
as the sponsor. 
Appendix A3. shows the shares of projects and loan volumes committed to the 30 
largest sponsor and recipient countries. As can be seen, the highest percentage of loan volumes 
has been committed to companies from the United States with 7.8 percent of overall 
commitments and 4.8 percent of all projects over our sample period. In addition to the United 
States, the ten sponsor countries receiving the bulk of IFC funding are Brazil, India, Turkey, 
China, Russia, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Indonesia. Overall, companies from 
these ten countries received almost half (49 percent) of the total investment volume in our 
sample period.131 The largest recipient country is India, with a share of 8.5 percent of total IFC 
commitments over the sample period. 
                                                     
129 See http://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/$$Search?openform (last accessed April 29, 2017). 
130 As an interesting extension, future research might consider coding the individual shareholders of 
multinational companies as well.  
131 Note that a substantial number of projects in a specific host country are implemented by a company 
from the same country (69 percent of the loans; 67 percent of the projects). However, in 27 percent of 
the observations with such projects at least one additional project is implemented by a company from 
another country. 
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Our variables of interest are membership on the IFC’s Board of Directors and 
membership on the UNSC. We code a binary indicator showing whether or not a country was 
represented on the IFC’s Board of Directors relying on information from the World Bank’s 
Annual Reports for our sample years. We updated data on temporary membership on the 
UNSC from Dreher et al. (2009a) and added the five permanent members – United States, 
China, Russia, United Kingdom, and France.132  
Our first set of regressions focus on the benefits to the recipient country.133 They are 
consequently at the recipient-year level: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4#𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 are (logged) IFC loan amounts committed to recipient country i in year t, in constant 
2010 US$.134 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 represents positions of power that country i holds in a year t – either 
resulting from membership on the UNSC or from membership on the Board of the IFC.135 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 tests whether a country’s IFC loans turn out larger at times where it receives 
greater support from other influential governments. More precisely, it measures the share of 
a country’s project partners that are represented on the Bank’s Board or hold positions as 
members of the UNSC. A country is coded as partner when it sponsors at least one project in 
a specific recipient country in a given year. While we include projects where the sponsor and 
recipient countries are identical in most regressions, we do not code recipients to be their own 
partners (i.e., the share variable is zero for countries that only receive projects which are 
implemented by companies from the same country). The interaction between 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 tests the effect of their joint presence over and in addition to them being 
present themselves. 
                                                     
132 The previous literature excludes the permanent members given that they are multicollinear with 
country fixed effects included in most studies. Given that we focus on interactions between members 
with positions on the UNSC these permanent members add variation even in the presence of country 
fixed effects. 
133 We exclude high-income economies from the set of recipient countries, as they are not eligible for IFC 
financing. However, there are some exceptions of high-income countries receiving projects anyway. We 
keep the high-income countries with at least one project approved in our recipient sample. This makes 
a total number of 155 potential recipient countries, of which we lose two in the regressions below, due 
to missing data for our control variables. 
134 We added one dollar to all values before taking the logarithm to avoid losing zero observations. 
135 In what follows, we refer to positions on the UNSC or the IFC Board as positions of power, or 
influence. 
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In most regressions, we also control for the total number of a country’s project partners 
(#𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡). We thus test whether countries that are equal in terms of the overall number of 
their partners receive larger loans when these partners are more influential. This is an 
important variable to control for in our setting. At any point in time, a country’s influence in 
the IFC is likely to increase with the number of its project partners – whether or not these 
partners are represented on the Board. This influence arguably gives them easier access to 
loans. At the same time, the number of partners is highly correlated with the share of partners 
in positions of influence.136 Controlling for the number of project partners is thus essential for 
our identification strategy, as we would otherwise not be able to separate the influence of the 
share of partners in positions of influence from that of the number of partners itself. We also 
include an interaction between a country’s influence and the influence of its total number of 
partners to test whether their joint influence gives them larger sway, above the sum of their 
individual powers. We include this interaction for the same reason we include the number of 
project partners per se: At any time a country enters positions of influence it is likely to be 
more successful in achieving its goals with a larger number of project partners, independent 
of whether these partners hold extraordinary positions of influence at the same point in time.  
We control for (lagged and logged constant 2010 US$) GDP per capita of the recipient 
country as well as its (lagged and logged) population. All regressions include dummies for 
each recipient country (𝛾𝑖) and year (𝜏𝑡); finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the error term. The inclusion of 
country fixed effects is of particular importance. Members of the UNSC and the IFC’s Board 
of Directors systematically differ from non-members, on average (Vreeland and Dreher 2014). 
We therefore compare the amount of loans a country receives at the time it holds extraordinary 
power compared to what the same country receives from the IFC at other times. This does not 
fully rule out endogeneity of IFC Board membership, where countries tend to hold positions 
for protracted periods of time, and thus might be different in other respects compared to the 
same country at other times. With regards to UNSC membership however the inclusion of 
country-fixed effects makes it unlikely that omitted variables bias our estimates. While larger 
and more developed countries enter the UNSC more frequently than others, these variables 
do not predict the timing of temporary membership (Dreher et al. 2014). Temporary 
membership on the UNSC is limited to two years, with no immediate re-election possible. 
                                                     
136 Most obviously, a country with more partners has a higher probability that the share of its partners 
holding positions of influence exceeds zero in any year. 
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Given that most countries announce their intention to compete for a seat on the UNSC many 
years in advance, and 80 percent of the elections are uncontested, it is unlikely that a country 
receives higher IFC loans for exactly the two years of membership for any reason unrelated to 
membership itself (Dreher et al. 2014, Mikulaschek 2017). This is even more true for the share 
of a country’s project partners that hold a seat on the UNSC at any particular point in time.  
To further increase confidence that membership on the UNSC and the Board of 
Directors are not driven by time-varying country-specific variables that are correlated with the 
amount of IFC loans, we also estimate specifications that exclude the interaction between 
recipient and sponsor influence (thus reducing complexity), but instead include leads and lags 
of our membership variables. Some countries might be more important at certain points in 
time than at others. As a consequence, they receive larger IFC loans while, at the same time, 
they might be more likely to enter the UNSC or the Board of the IFC’s Directors. A more 
important country might have more important partners, so that the share of a country’s project 
partners on the UNSC and the Board might increase as well. To test whether time-varying 
country-specific events bias our estimates we rely on the following specification: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝐼,ℎℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ + ∑ 𝛽𝑃𝐼,ℎℎ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ + 𝛽1#𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗
#𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (2) 
with h indicating the years t-2 to t+2. Any trend in country-specific time-varying variables that 
affects the probability that a country or its project partners enter positions of influence should 
be reflected in the years before or after a country holds such a position. It is often known years 
in advance who will run for election and, as in the bulk of cases election is uncontested, who 
will eventually be elected. For example, European countries announce their decision to run for 
election between five and fifteen years ahead of the actual election (Mikulaschek 2017). For 
these countries it is, more often than not, known at least five years in advance – when no other 
country decided to run – who will be on the UNSC in future (Mikulaschek 2017).  
The logic of diffuse reciprocity discussed in Vreeland and Dreher (2014) for the IMF 
and the World Bank leads us to expect significant increases in loans in the years immediately 
prior to membership. Countries in positions of power are not necessarily bribed or rewarded 
for any particular vote they cast in line with the interests of powerful allies on the UNSC (or 
the IFC Board). Instead, these allies hold them in their debt by supporting their requests as 
soon as it becomes known that these countries will hold positions of power, relying on these 
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countries’ goodwill when casting votes in decisions to come (also see Thorvaldsdottir 2015, 
Mikulaschek 2017). Given that in many cases it is well known which country will be on the 
UNSC or hold a seat on the IFC’s Board in one or two years, it might well be that loans increase 
in the immediate years before a country enters the UNSC or the Board. We take this as an 
advantage rather than a disadvantage of our estimation strategy. While the timing of UNSC 
membership is idiosyncratic,137 the consequences of membership might not be, and might 
potentially be correlated with IFC loan size. As one example, joint membership in international 
fora might lead to enhanced opportunities for cooperation between countries, so that more 
IFC projects result from such cooperation at the time of membership. Given the manifold 
possibilities of interaction between countries outside these fora, we consider this unlikely.138 
In any case, the effects of cooperation can hardly explain an increase in IFC loans prior to 
entering the IFC Board or the UNSC. 
Some projects agreed on during a country’s time on the UNSC or Board might also 
formally be committed only in the following years, so that larger loans occur in the first or 
second year following the end of a country’s term in these positions of influence. However, 
the significance of longer lags would threaten the plausibility of our identification strategy. 
In a second step we change perspectives, focusing on sponsor- rather than recipient-
countries.139 We repeat the regressions shown in specifications (1) and (2), explaining (logged) 
loan commitments to sponsor country j: 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4#𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡. (3) 
While the regression is similar to those discussed above, note that 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 now 
reflects the membership of countries receiving the IFC’s loans, rather than other sponsor 
countries. We also test an event-time specification, in analogy to that discussed above. 
                                                     
137 We are not aware of studies that investigate the determinants of membership on the IFC’s Board 
across countries. For a study of Switzerland’s election to the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank – 
and thus, implicitly, of the IFC – see Vreeland (2011). 
138 To the extent that shared positions on the Board and the UNSC improve information about IFC 
projects, we would expect countries with previous experience there to receive more projects compared 
to those without. Membership should then become less important as determinant of IFC projects over 
time, given the easier spread of information via modern technology and due to the increase in IFC 
activity over time. We find no evidence for this.  
139 We include all 184 IFC member countries as potential sponsor countries (of investing companies), 
but exclude two of them from our regressions due to missing data on the control variables. 163 of these 
countries actually are ”sponsor countries” in our sample period. 
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Our third set of regressions investigates the interaction among recipient- and sponsor-
power in more detail. We aim to test potential mechanisms behind the expected increase in 
IFC loans at times where countries enjoy (joint) political power. While focusing on the country-
year level is crucial to test whether and to what extent temporarily influential countries benefit 
from their positions overall, regressions at the recipient-sponsor-year level can help shedding 
light on the mechanisms driving such increases. Specifically, we test whether countries on the 
UNSC or the Board of Directors receive a larger number of projects or larger projects, on 
average, when they operate in tandem with countries that also hold positions of influence. We 
therefore proceed at the dyadic level and estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡−1𝑘 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,  (4) 
with 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 representing one of our dependent variables (number of projects or (logged) average 
project volumes committed) involving projects to recipient country i and a company from 
sponsor country j in year t. 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 reflects the recipient country’s influence at the IFC in 
year t, either indicated by membership on its Board of Directors or on the UNSC. 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 
measures the influence of the sponsor country. The levels of these variables are captured by 
fixed effects for recipient-years (𝛾𝑖𝑡) and sponsor-years (𝛿𝑗𝑡). Our variable of interest is the 
interaction between the two, 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡, which measures the joint influence of the 
recipient country and the sponsor country. 
We include a number of control variables that vary at the recipient-sponsor-year level. 
Our most conservative regressions also include dyadic sponsor-recipient-fixed effects (𝜏𝑖𝑗). At 
the dyad-year level, we control for whether, in year t-1, the recipient and sponsor country 
shared a common currency. We include the (lagged and logged) amount of foreign aid from 
the sponsor to the recipient country, the (lagged and logged) recipient country’s imports from 
the sponsor, and a binary variable indicating whether both countries were part of the same 
trade agreement in the previous year.140  
We also estimate less conservative regressions, excluding dyad-fixed effects. These 
regressions in addition include a binary variable indicating that for a specific project the 
                                                     
140 The indicators for a common currency and a joint regional trade agreement are taken from Head et 
al. (2010), data on gross aid disbursements from the OECD (2017), and data on imports from the sponsor 
to the recipient from the IMF (2016). All monetary values are logged constant 2010 US$. See Appendix 
B3. for details. Note that the number of countries is slightly lower compared to the monadic regressions, 
due to missing data for control variables. 
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sponsor is identical to the recipient. We control for whether the sponsor and recipient share a 
border (“Neighbors”), a common official language or minority language, ethnicity, colonizer, 
or legal origin. We include a variable indicating a colonial relationship between the two (after 
1945) and control for the population-weighted distance between them as well as their time 
difference, and for whether one of the two countries is a current or former hegemon of the 
other (“Recipient Hegemon” and “Sponsor Hegemon”).141 Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
3.4. RESULTS 
Table 3.1. shows the results for specification (1), at the recipient-country-year level. Columns 
1-4 start with simple regressions that exclude the number of partners and the two interactions. 
While these regressions ignore the potential bias arising from countries with more partners 
also having a higher share of partners in positions of influence, they are appealing due to their 
comparably straightforward interpretation. 
                                                     
141 Appendix B3. shows the definitions and sources for all variables, while Appendix C3. provides 
descriptive statistics. One might also think of controlling for recipient and sponsor country voting 
power at the IFC, their (log) real per capita GDP and (log) population size. These variables however are 
captured by the set of fixed effects we include. 
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Table 3.1. IFC Loans to Recipient Countries, 1995-2015, OLS 
             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC 
IFCEB/UNSC 0.714 -0.339 0.364 0.581 1.260** 0.544 1.342** 0.626 
             (1.60) (0.61) (0.68) (1.33) (2.28) (0.86) (2.57) (1.01) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share) 7.459*** 7.224*** 12.675*** 11.881*** 2.044*** 1.406** 2.364*** 1.665*** 
             (14.55) (11.95) (30.71) (20.02) (4.08) (2.45) (4.71) (3.26) 
Member*Share of partners     1.356 1.591*   
                 (1.07) (1.66)   
Member*Number of partners     -3.459*** -3.814*** -3.074*** -3.547*** 
                 (4.64) (5.68) (4.03) (5.11) 
Number of partners     5.232*** 5.690*** 5.087*** 5.623*** 
                 (9.16) (10.96) (9.35) (11.03) 
GDP p.c. (log, t-1) 2.771** 2.396** 0.576 -0.136 2.688** 2.600** 2.672** 2.586** 
             (2.36) (2.11) (1.05) (0.25) (2.39) (2.33) (2.38) (2.32) 
Population (log, t-1) 0.883 1.448 0.090 1.012 1.050 1.388 1.036 1.375 
             (0.42) (0.70) (0.08) (0.78) (0.54) (0.72) (0.53) (0.71) 
Own loans included? Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145 
Number of recipient countries  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R-squared (within) 0.13 0.08 0.35 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Notes: Robust t-values (clustered at the recipient-level) in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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According to the results, IFC loan size increases significantly with the share of a 
country’s partners on the IFC’s Board (column 1) or the UNSC (column 2), while there is no 
significant effect of a country’s membership itself (though the coefficient in column 1 is only 
marginally insignificant).142 Columns 3 and 4 exclude loans that are executed by a country’s 
“own” companies. The results are similar, though the coefficients for the share of a country’s 
partners in positions of influence increase substantially.  
Columns 5 and 6 report the full specification (1). The results show that loan size 
increases with the number of partners a country has projects with and its (logged) per capita 
GDP, at least at the five-percent level of significance, but not with its population. Column 5 
again focuses on the IFC’s Board of Directors; column 6 shows the results for membership on 
the UNSC. As can be seen, the interactions between a country’s own positions of influence and 
the share of influential partners are positive and sizable. While the coefficient is marginally 
insignificant for IFC Board membership, it is significant at the ten-percent level for UNSC 
membership.143 In both regressions, holding a seat, the share of partners holding a seat, and 
the interaction between the two is jointly significant at the one-percent level. The coefficients 
of column 6 imply that an increase in the share of a country’s partners that hold a seat on the 
UNSC by ten percentage points increases loan size by 35 percent at times the recipient country 
is represented on the UNSC itself, compared to an increase of 15 percent at times it is not (the 
average loan in the sample being US$ 27.4 million). According to column 5, the corresponding 
                                                     
142 Results are similar when we control for a country’s number of partners, though the coefficients of a 
country’s share of partners in positions of influence are half in size, as could be expected. Results are 
also similar in regressions with a binary dependent variable that indicates the presence of at least one 
project, as well as in regressions explaining the amount of loans conditional on receiving at least one 
project (i.e., in the first and second stage of a two-step model). 
143 The extent to which countries vote the same as major shareholders of international organizations in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is another widely used proxy for political influence (e.g., 
Humphrey and Michaelowa 2013). There is evidence that the United States government cares about 
UNGA voting and uses its foreign aid and power over international organizations to influence how 
countries vote. Andersen et al. (2006) show that countries voting more frequently in line with the United 
States receive substantially larger loans from the IDA. Kersting and Kilby (2016) provide evidence that 
World Bank disbursements accelerate during the run up to a competitive election if the recipient country 
government voted in line with the U.S. in the UNGA but decelerate if that government voted against 
the United States. Given that voting in the UNGA could be determined by omitted variables that also 
affect IFC lending we do not use it here. Note however that the average voting coincidence of a country’s 
project partners in line with the United States (the major shareholder of the IFC) is significant at the one-
percent level when it is included in the regressions of columns 5 and 6 instead of membership on the 
UNSC and the IFC’s Board. A country’s own voting pattern as well as an interaction between the two 
is not significant at conventional levels.  
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increases resulting from partner country representation on the IFC’s Board are 40 percent and 
23 percent. 
According to the coefficients of both column 5 and column 6, loan size decreases with 
the total number of partners at times a country holds a position of influence, at the one-percent 
level of significance. It thus seems that countries that already have a large number of projects 
(proxied by the number of project partners) are less able to benefit from positions of power. 
The coefficients imply that membership on the UNSC or the Board of Directors only benefits 
those 17 percent of our sample countries that enter these positions of power while they 
exclusively receive projects they themselves sponsor (i.e., the company implementing the 
project is from the same country). Given that this holds true for the economically and 
politically more powerful countries in our sample, our results seem to indicate that more 
powerful countries benefit from entering positions of power, while less powerful countries 
lose out.144 Potentially, these results can be explained with the possibility of weaker countries 
receiving substantial increases in loans from another part of the World Bank Group – the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Dreher et al. 2009b, Kaja and Werker 
2010).145 
In columns 7 and 8 we exclude the interaction between a country’s influence and those 
of their partners. Column 7 focuses on the IFC’s Board. The results show that loan size 
increases with the share of a country’s partners that hold a seat at the Board, at the one-percent 
level of significance. The coefficient indicates that a one percentage point increase in the share 
of a country’s partners that hold a seat on the Board of Directors increases loan size by 2.4 
percent (the average share of a country’s partners on the Board being 0.1 and the average loan 
size US$ 27.4 million). At the five-percent level, the point estimate indicates that a seat at the 
Board increases loan size by more than 280 percent (as long as a Board member only receives 
                                                     
144 When we split the sample according to a country’s vote share in the IFC’s Board we indeed find a 
significant and positive effect of membership on the IFC’s Board and the share of partners on the Board 
(but not the interaction between the two) for countries with a vote share above the median. Focusing on 
those below, the impact of a Board seat turns negative and marginally insignificant, while the share of 
partners on the Board and the interaction between the two are significantly positive. We have also run 
similar regressions for the UNSC using a country’s share of senior positions in the United Nations 
Secretariat to proxy for countries’ influence in the United Nations (Novosad and Werker 2018). We find 
however no significant interaction between the share of senior positions and UNSC membership. 
145 We intend to investigate the nexus between IFC and IBRD financing for countries holding positions 
of power in future work. 
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projects that are implemented by its own companies).146 Again, the effect of membership on 
the Board on loan size decreases with the total number of a country’s partners. A seat on the 
Board can increase loan size when the number of partners is zero or one, depending on the 
share of partners that also hold a position on the Board. For example, a seat amounts to an 
increase in loan size of almost 90 percent for a recipient country with one partner that also 
holds a seat on the Board. The effect turns negative when the number of partners exceeds one 
(which holds for less than one percent of the recipient-years in our sample).  
Column 8 shows that members of the UNSC do not receive larger loans (though the 
coefficient is positive, the t-value indicates that it is not precisely estimated). The results also 
show that a larger share of a country’s project partners on the UNSC increase loan size at the 
one-percent level of significance. According to the estimate, a one percentage point increase in 
the share of a country’s partners that hold a seat on the Board of Directors increases loan size 
by 1.68 percent.  
Overall, we conclude that positions of power matter. We find robust evidence that the 
share of a country’s partners holding positions of influence increases loan size. We find weaker 
evidence that a country’s own position of power increases loans; the same holds for the 
interaction between recipient and sponsor power. 
Table 3.2. investigates the timing of membership (specification (2) above). Neither IFC 
Board membership nor UNSC membership are unanticipated.147 We therefore test whether 
substantial changes in influence begin to occur in the years before a country enters a board or 
council position. As a placebo test, we also investigate loan size after membership has ended. 
When structural changes make a country more likely to enter influential positions in 
international fora and this influence is correlated with the number of IFC projects implemented 
in one country and executed by companies from another, it is unlikely that this change 
disappears at the time the country leaves its board or council position. To the extent that loans 
increase at times a country holds positions of influence but not thereafter and UNSC 
membership is uncorrelated with variables that typically determine lending by international 
organizations (as shown in Dreher et al. 2014), the increase during membership is arguably 
                                                     
146 For comparison, note that Kaja and Werker (2010) show that a seat at the Board increases IBRD loans 
by roughly 300 percent. 
147 See Dreher et al. (2014), Vreeland and Dreher (2014), and Lai and Lefler (2017) for evidence on UNSC 
elections. 
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the consequence of membership itself, rather than those of structural changes more broadly. 
We follow Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Kaja and Werker (2010) and include binary 
indicators for the two years before and after a country assumes membership on the UNSC and 
the IFC Board.148 
Table 3.2. IFC Loans to Recipient Countries, Event-Time Specification, 1995-2015, OLS 
                     (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                     IFCEB UNSC UNSC UNSC 
IFCEB/UNSC (t-2)           0.826 -0.258 -0.266 -0.627 
                     (0.93) (0.36) (0.37) (0.85) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t-1)           0.790 0.067 0.050 0.099 
                     (0.99) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t)           1.395* 0.750  0.802 
                     (1.97) (1.22)  (1.27) 
UNSC first year (t)   1.335  
                       (1.62)  
UNSC second year (t)   0.112  
    (0.14)  
IFCEB/UNSC (t+1)           0.282 0.340 0.338 0.370 
                     (0.28) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t+2)           -0.675 0.100 0.086 -0.347 
                     (0.50) (0.11) (0.10) (0.38) 
UNSC (t+3)              1.202 
     (1.52) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t-2) -0.436 0.428 0.393 0.572 
                     (0.64) (0.56) (0.51) (0.72) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t-1) 0.869 1.436** 1.424** 1.253* 
                     (1.24) (2.30) (2.27) (1.92) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t) 2.390*** 2.301***  2.260*** 
                     (3.31) (3.77)  (3.41) 
UNSC partner first year (share, t)   2.583**  
                       (2.42)  
UNSC partner second year (share, 
t) 
  -0.451  
    (0.43)  
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t+1) 0.325 1.533** 1.534** 1.333* 
                     (0.44) (2.19) (2.21) (1.75) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t+2) -0.065 1.425 1.371 1.546 
                     (0.09) (1.53) (1.47) (1.54) 
UNSC partner (share, t+3)    0.214 
                        (0.25) 
Number of partners (t-3)    0.206 
                        (0.75) 
Number of partners (t-2) 0.501* 0.231 0.240 0.170 
                     (1.78) (0.82) (0.85) (0.61) 
Number of partners (t-1) 1.108*** 0.983*** 0.988*** 1.025*** 
                     (3.71) (3.41) (3.44) (3.23) 
Number of partners (t) 5.077*** 5.517*** 5.552*** 5.516*** 
                     (9.26) (11.58) (11.48) (11.95) 
Number of partners (t+1) -0.017 0.037 0.024 0.084 
                     (0.07) (0.16) (0.11) (0.35) 
Number of partners (t+2) 0.206 -0.050 -0.053 -0.086 
                     (0.78) (0.19) (0.20) (0.33) 
                                                     
148 We continue to include the interaction of the number of a country’s partners with positions of 
influence, but do not introduce additional interactions between the number of partners in past and 
future years. Our results are overall unchanged when we (i) exclude the interaction or (ii) include 
interactions with the number of partners in previous and future years. 
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Number of partners (t+3)    -0.043 
                        (0.16) 
IFCEB/UNSC * Number of 
partners (t) 
-3.341*** -3.666*** -3.570*** -3.875*** 
  (4.19) (5.42) (4.88) (5.51) 
GDP p.c. (log, t-1) 2.259** 2.056* 2.056* 2.174* 
             (2.00) (1.85) (1.85) (1.90) 
Population (log, t-1) 0.081 0.341 0.333 -0.667 
                     (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) 
Number of observations 2,843 2,843 2,843 2,554 
Number of recipient countries  153 153 153 153 
R-squared (within)   0.19  0.19  0.19  0.18  
Notes: Robust t-values (clustered at the recipient-level) in parentheses. All regressions include country 
fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Column 1 shows that neither membership on the IFC’s Board nor the share of project 
partners on the Board affects the size of previous or future loans, at conventional levels of 
significance. Compared to column 5 of Table 3.1. – excluding the leads and lags – results for 
our variables of interest are basically unchanged. Column 2 shows similar results for the 
UNSC. Note however that loan size increases with the share of project partners on the UNSC 
in t, and both in the year before and the year after a country's temporary membership. Given 
that most members announce their intention to run for election to the UNSC years in advance 
and the election takes place in September of the year before tenure begins, we are not surprised 
by the significance of the share of a country’s partners on the UNSC on loan sizes in the election 
year. In fact, the logic of diffuse reciprocity outlined in Vreeland and Dreher (2014) for the IMF 
and the World Bank makes us expect the effect of political importance to be visible as soon as 
the election to the UNSC becomes likely (or even, in September, certain). To the extent that 
formal commitments are given with some delay, political power in one year could also explain 
increases in loans in the year after holding the position of influence. Note that loan size is 
unaffected two years before and two years after membership. The coefficients associated with 
the share of a country’s partners on the UNSC increases from two years before to one year 
before; is largest in the year of membership, and then declines. Overall, this pattern is in line 
with our expectations. 
Column 3 separates the first from the second year of membership on the UNSC.149 
Results are basically unchanged. Note however that we observe the increase in loans resulting 
from a higher share of a country’s partners being on the UNSC during the first year of 
                                                     
149 We do not run this regression for the IFC’s Board, given that tenure is not limited to a fixed number 
of years (among the non-permanent members the average number of years on the Board is 4.6 with a 
maximum of 21 years). 
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membership, a result that is again in line with the logic of diffuse reciprocity. In column 4 we 
add an additional lag, given that a skeptical reader might remain unconvinced by previous 
specifications, showing the second year of the share of a country’s partners on the UNSC to be 
just marginally insignificant, and positive in sign. As can be seen, the coefficient of the third 
lag is completely insignificant, and its introduction does not change any of the results. We thus 
conclude that the timing of effects is overall in line with our hypotheses. 
We next turn to the sponsor- rather than recipient-country (specification (3) above). 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3. show the full specifications. We then subsequently exclude the 
interaction between the sponsor country’s position on the IFC or the UNSC with the share of 
its partners holding these positions (columns 3 and 4) and the number of the country’s partners 
and its interaction with the share of partners in positions of influence (columns 5 and 6). 
The results are overall similar to those at the recipient level. There is a strong and highly 
significant effect of the number of a sponsor-country’s partners on the IFC Board and the 
UNSC on the volume of IFC lending the country receives. A country’s presence on the Board 
also results in larger loans (at the one percent level), while the interaction between the 
country’s own presence and those of a larger number of partners on the Board is again only 
marginally significant. A country’s own presence on the UNSC and its interaction with the 
number of partners on the UNSC do not affect loan size, at conventional levels of significance. 
According to column 3, a one percentage point increase in the share of a country’s partners 
that hold a seat on the Board of Directors increases loan size by 4.12 percent for countries that 
only receive projects that are implemented by its own companies, while a seat on the Board is 
rewarded with an increase of 267 percent. A one percentage point increase in the share of a 
country’s partners on the UNSC increases IFC loans by 4.16 percent (column 4).  
Columns 7 and 8 show that the increase in loans starts two years before membership, 
and holds in the first year a country’s partners have left their positions of influence. There is 
no significant effect in the second year after the end of membership. Again, this pattern is 
broadly in line with our expectations. 
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Table 3.3. IFC Loans to Sponsor Countries, 1995-2015, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC 
IFCEB/UNSC (t-2)       1.451* 1.153* 
        (1.80) (1.73) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t-1)       1.467 0.425 
        (1.65) (0.57) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t) 1.242*** 0.235 1.299*** 0.228 0.797* -0.539 2.119*** 0.492 
  (2.61) (0.43) (2.70) (0.41) (1.80) (1.05) (2.82) (0.78) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t+1)       0.787 0.417 
        (0.86) (0.51) 
IFCEB/UNSC (t+2)       -0.768 0.688 
        (0.71) (0.93) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t-2)       3.130*** 3.589*** 
         (3.43) (4.31) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, t-1)       1.876* 1.161 
          (1.92) (1.15) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share) 2.736** 4.196*** 4.037*** 4.073*** 8.720*** 8.075*** 5.525*** 5.250*** 
     (2.46) (4.81) (5.73) (5.89) (11.19) (8.84) (7.02) (6.64) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, 
t+1) 
      1.824** 2.333** 
          (1.98) (2.37) 
IFCEB/UNSC partner (share, 
t+2) 
      0.996 0.801 
           (0.82) (0.71) 
Member*Share of partners 2.518* -0.488       
     (1.89) (0.30)       
Number of partners (t-2)       -0.231 -0.308 
           (0.88) (1.29) 
Number of partners (t-1)       -0.150 -0.260 
          (0.71) (1.40) 
Number of partners (t) 7.447*** 5.297*** 7.181*** 5.311***   7.172*** 5.366*** 
     (5.68) (4.88) (5.79) (4.98)   (6.04) (5.15) 
Number of partners (t+1)       0.243 0.325 
          (1.01) (1.34) 
Number of partners (t+2)       -0.132 -0.130 
         (0.45) (0.50) 
Member*Number of partners (t) -4.702*** -2.974** -4.367*** -3.010**   -4.302*** -2.965** 
     (3.17) (2.26) (3.10) (2.41)   (3.11) (2.43) 
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GDP p.c. (log, t-1) 3.039*** 3.156*** 3.045*** 3.159*** 3.427*** 3.556*** 2.284** 2.401** 
  (2.64) (2.68) (2.64) (2.68) (2.70) (2.77) (2.06) (2.10) 
Population (log, t-1) 2.077 1.871 2.117 1.871 2.768 2.652 0.217 -0.053 
  (0.99) (0.86) (1.01) (0.86) (1.16) (1.10) (0.10) (0.02) 
Number of observations 3,746 3,746 3,746 3,746 3,746 3,746 3,386 3,386 
Number of sponsor countries 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
R-squared (within) 0.153 0.141 0.153 0.141 0.08 0.07 0.161 0.148 
Notes: Robust t-values (clustered at the sponsor-level) in parentheses. All regressions include country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.
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Table 3.4. IFC Projects and Mean Investments at the Sponsor-Recipient-Dyad, 1995-2015, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Projects 
 
Mean investment (log) 
  IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC IFCEB UNSC 
Sponsor and recipient on 
IFCEB/UNSC 
 
0.001 0.011 0.069*** 0.114** 0.026 0.025 0.280*** 0.460*** 
 (0.42) (1.06) (2.80) (2.56) (1.18) (0.60) (4.77) (4.06) 
Aid disbursements (log, t-1) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
  (2.32) (2.29) (0.35) (0.54) (3.75) (3.75) (5.53) (5.68) 
Imports from sponsor (log, t-1) -0.000** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (2.23) (2.23) (3.56) (3.55) (3.10) (3.12) (5.82) (5.83) 
Regional trade agreement (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 0.005* 0.005* -0.017 -0.017 0.023** 0.024** 
  (0.87) (0.87) (1.85) (1.87) (0.95) (0.94) (2.26) (2.31) 
Common currency (t-1) 0.002* 0.002 0.005** 0.006** 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.008 
  (1.75) (1.26) (2.00) (2.12) (1.24) (1.02) (0.42) (0.60) 
Recipient and sponsor identical   0.621*** 0.618***   4.460*** 4.451*** 
    (6.63) (6.63)   (12.36) (12.36) 
Neighbours   0.002 0.002   0.052*** 0.054*** 
    (0.79) (1.07)   (2.84) (2.98) 
Common language   0.007*** 0.007***   0.040*** 0.039*** 
    (3.71) (3.71)   (3.76) (3.74) 
Common ethnicity   -0.001 -0.001   0.003 0.003 
    (0.33) (0.34)   (0.26) (0.25) 
Common colonizer   0.005* 0.005*   0.035*** 0.035*** 
    (1.84) (1.88)   (3.51) (3.53) 
Colonial relation   0.004 0.005   -0.011 -0.005 
    (0.28) (0.42)   (0.12) (0.06) 
Common legal origin   -0.001 -0.001   -0.014*** -0.014*** 
    (0.91) (0.85)   (3.28) (3.22) 
Distance   -0.000 -0.000   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
    (0.42) (0.34)   (2.69) (2.63) 
Time difference   -0.001 -0.001   0.002 0.002 
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    (1.02) (1.08)   (0.76) (0.69) 
Recipient hegemon   -0.017 -0.019   0.002 -0.005 
    (0.96) (1.05)   (0.01) (0.04) 
Sponsor hegemon   0.005 0.004   0.165** 0.159** 
    (0.58) (0.39)   (2.32) (2.21) 
Number of observations 570,706 570,706 570,664 570,664 570,706 570,706 570,664 570,664 
Number of sponsor countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Number of recipient countries 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Dyad-fixed effects yes yes no no yes yes no no 
R-squared (within) 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.18 
Notes: Robust t-values (clustered at the dyad-level) in parentheses. All regressions include sponsor-year and recipient-year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 3.4. investigates the interaction between recipient and sponsor countries in more 
detail, focusing on potential mechanisms behind the (marginally significant) results in Tables 
3.1. and 3.3. We test whether the increase in loan size resulting from joint positions of power 
can be explained by an increase in the number of projects or larger mean loan sizes between 
countries holding joint positions of influence. We therefore turn to the dyadic recipient-
sponsor-year level (specification 4 above).  
We focus on the presence of a recipient and sponsor country on the UNSC or the Board 
of Directors at the same point in time, netting out as much variation as possible. Controlled 
for dyad-specific fixed effects, recipient-year and sponsor-year fixed effects, and the variables 
varying at the recipient-sponsor-year level, we do not find a significant effect of joint sponsor- 
and recipient-country presence on either the Board of the IFC or the UNSC on the number of 
new IFC projects (columns 1 and 2). 
Columns 3 and 4 exclude the dyad-fixed effects (and include the additional control 
variables that do not vary at the recipient-sponsor-level). At the one-percent level, the number 
of projects increases between countries in years they both hold a seat at the IFC’s Board of 
Directors (column 3). According to column 4, the same holds in years the recipient and sponsor 
countries share membership on the UNSC. The coefficients show that these effects are of 
moderate size. In years of joint membership on the Board (UNSC), 0.07 (0.11) additional 
projects are initiated between the two countries, according to our estimates.150 
Columns 5-8 replicate the regressions focusing on (log) mean loan size rather than the 
number of projects, with similar results. With the inclusion of the dyad-fixed effects, 
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels (columns 5 and 6). When we exclude 
them, we find that the average loan between two countries with joint membership on the 
Board (UNSC) is 32 percent (58 percent) larger compared to loans for countries without joint 
representation. 
Overall, these results are in line with our hypotheses. The strictest specifications 
including dyad-fixed effects do not allow us to identify significant effects. This might 
potentially be because countries that share positions of power are different from those that do 
                                                     
150 We also estimated these regressions with sponsor- and recipient-country fixed effects and year fixed 
effects instead, including Memberit and Memberjt rather than their interaction. Both coefficients are 
completely insignificant for UNSC membership and sponsors being IFC Board members. IFC Board 
membership of recipient countries is marginally significant with the expected positive coefficient. 
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not at any point in time. Given that at least for the UNSC the timing of a country holding 
power – let alone the timing of two countries holding power at the same time – is random 
(Dreher et al. 2014, Mikulaschek 2017) we consider this unlikely. However, in order to increase 
the readers’ confidence that dyad-specific, time varying factors that might be correlated with 
the number and mean size of IFC loans and joint membership on the Board do not bias our 
results, we further investigate these findings in Table 3.5. 
Column 1 of Table 3.5. again focuses on the timing of IFC Board membership. 
Specifically, we include binary indicator variables for the four years before and the four years 
after joint membership on the Board. When IFC-supported countries are different at any point 
in time we would expect these leads and lags to be significant as well. To the extent that the 
coefficients shown in Table 3.4. represent the causal effect of joint membership, we expect the 
deeper lags to be insignificant. Increases directly before assuming positions of power could be 
attributed to diffuse reciprocity; increases directly after to delays between a company’s 
application of a project and the actual commitment.151 
The results show significant coefficients for the years of membership as well as the year 
directly before and after leaving the Board. We interpret the insignificance of the deeper leads 
and lags as evidence in support of our hypothesis. 
Column 2 turns to the UNSC. Rather than focusing on the full sample, we restrict our 
regressions to countries from the African continent. This is because the African seats on the 
UNSC follow a pattern closest to rotation, so that the timing of membership is most plausibly 
exogenous (Dreher et al. 2014, Vreeland and Dreher 2014).152 Our results are similar to those 
for the full sample shown in column 4 of Table 3.4. Given the exogenous timing of UNSC 
membership of any specific country in Africa, the joint membership of any two countries is 
exogenous as well. 
                                                     
151 The IFC’s project cycle includes seven stages prior to commitment: business development, early 
review, appraisal, investment review, negotiations, public notification, and Board review and approval. 
See http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/solutions/ifc-
project- 
cycle (accessed July 10, 2017). 
152 Note that Africa has three seats on the UNSC. There are 114 country-year observations of joint 
membership in our sample. Aid disbursements are excluded in this regression as no aid is disbursed 
from African sponsors to African recipient countries. 
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Table 3.5. IFC Projects and Mean Investment at the Sponsor-Recipient-Dyad, Event-Time-Specification, 1995-2015, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Projects Mean investment (log) 
  IFCEB UNSC 
(exogenous) 
UNSC 
(exogenous) 
IFCEB UNSC 
(exogenous) 
UNSC 
(exogenous) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC 0.069*** 0.107** 0.119** 0.280*** 0.817** 0.911** 
  (2.80) (2.52) (2.56) (4.75) (2.24) (2.34) 
Recipient and sponsor identical 0.614*** 0.306*** 0.268*** 4.423*** 2.978*** 2.687*** 
  (6.60) (5.33) (5.79) (12.44) (6.80) (6.89) 
Aid disbursements (log, t-1) 0.000   0.004***   
  (0.29)   (5.46)   
Imports from sponsor (log, t-1) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (3.54) (3.31) (3.46) (5.84) (3.55) (3.70) 
Regional trade agreement (t-1) 0.005* -0.003 -0.001 0.023** -0.025 -0.011 
  (1.81) (0.74) (0.29) (2.23) (0.68) (0.32) 
Common currency (t-1) 0.005** 0.010 0.011* 0.006 0.049 0.063 
  (1.98) (1.56) (1.75) (0.41) (1.04) (1.35) 
Neighbours 0.002 0.010** 0.010** 0.052*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
  (0.80) (2.50) (2.52) (2.84) (2.75) (2.75) 
Common language 0.007*** 0.002 0.002 0.040*** 0.003 0.005 
  (3.73) (0.41) (0.50) (3.77) (0.07) (0.15) 
Common ethnicity -0.000 -0.007 -0.006 0.003 -0.055 -0.050 
  (0.29) (1.42) (1.35) (0.29) (1.34) (1.28) 
Common colonizer 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.035*** 0.038 0.030 
  (1.84) (0.33) (0.15) (3.53) (0.88) (0.75) 
Colonial relation 0.003 -0.039 -0.036 -0.012 -0.218 -0.193 
  (0.28) (1.03) (1.01) (0.13) (0.69) (0.65) 
Common legal origin -0.001 0.007 0.006 -0.015*** 0.044 0.043 
  (1.00) (1.57) (1.59) (3.36) (1.43) (1.42) 
Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.41) (1.14) (0.94) (2.68) (1.46) (1.33) 
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Time difference -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.016 0.013 
  (1.05) (0.47) (0.36) (0.72) (0.64) (0.55) 
Recipient hegemon -0.017 -0.008 -0.010 0.001 -0.111 -0.129 
  (0.96) (0.56) (0.74) (0.01) (0.84) (0.98) 
Sponsor hegemon 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.166** -0.010 -0.027 
  (0.60) (0.16) (0.31) (2.32) (0.07) (0.19) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC (t-1) 0.118**  0.201** 0.471**  1.643** 
  (1.99)  (2.27) (2.51)  (2.24) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC (t-2) 0.094  0.144 0.462*  1.335 
  (1.32)  (1.49) (1.76)  (1.61) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC (t-3) 0.021  0.275 0.222  2.020** 
  (0.35)  (1.62) (0.75)  (2.10) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC (t-4) -0.054  0.305** 0.013  2.627** 
  (1.05)  (2.22) (0.04)  (2.45) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC 
(t+1) 
0.134*  0.177* 0.613***  1.508* 
  (1.83)  (1.79) (2.64)  (1.90) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC 
(t+2) 
0.067  0.253* 0.308  1.367* 
  (0.72)  (1.71) (0.96)  (1.85) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC 
(t+3) 
0.046  0.143 0.082  1.014 
  (0.73)  (1.35) (0.29)  (1.43) 
Sponsor and recipient on IFCEB/UNSC 
(t+4) 
0.077  -0.015 0.697  -0.184 
  (0.86)  (0.25) (1.25)  (0.35) 
Number of observations 570,664 58,989 58,989 570,664 58,989 58,989 
Number of sponsor countries 180 53 53 180 53 53 
Number of recipient countries 151 53 53 151 53 53 
Dyad-fixed effects no no no no no no 
R-squared (within) 0.150 0.188 0.203 0.190 0.220 0.231 
Notes: Robust t-values (clustered at the dyad-level) in parentheses. All regressions include sponsor-year and recipient-year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Column 3 adds the leads and lags, in analogy to those of column 1.153 The results turn 
out to be similar to those of column 1. Joint membership on the UNSC increases the number 
of projects, at the five-percent level of significance. The same holds for the year of election to 
the UNSC, and the first and second year after UNSC membership (at the ten-percent level). 
However, the number of projects increases four years prior to membership as well, which 
might be due to the logic of diffuse reciprocity, omitted variables that we fail to control for, or 
random chance. Columns 4-6 replicate the regressions for (log) mean IFC loan size. Results are 
similar, though project size increases in the third year prior to membership as well.  
Overall, our dyadic results are in line with the hypothesis that recipient and sponsor 
countries can exploit positions of joint influence to their benefit. At times they share a seat on 
the IFC’s Board or the UNSC they receive more and larger projects. This increase occurs in the 
years prior to joining these organizations, but fades out afterwards. This pattern does not fit a 
potential alternative explanation for our main results, according to which the countries that 
are represented on the Board of the IFC or the UNSC might increase collaboration between 
themselves more broadly. If collaboration is the prime explanation, we would expect a 
different pattern: the number of IFC projects would only increase at the time of membership 
and would be likely to continue thereafter. We find this not to be the case. To the contrary, the 
patterns shown by the data are well in line with the logic of diffuse reciprocity: As soon as it 
is known that countries will assume positions of influence in future, influential countries hold 
them in their debt by granting favors they would not receive at other times. Importantly, such 
favors could be granted years ahead of actual membership on the UNSC or the IFC’s Board of 
Directors. On average, we find a pattern that fits such a mechanism in the two years preceding 
membership. 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Two thirds of the IFC’s investments go to companies from the world’s richest countries, while 
only one fifth go to companies of the poorest ones (Ellmers et al. 2010). What is more, the bulk 
of the IFC’s investments benefits projects implemented in middle-income countries, rather 
                                                     
153 We also estimated this regression for the full sample. While the interaction between recipient and 
sponsor membership on the UNSC is significant at the one-percent level, the regressions excluding 
dyad-fixed effects do not seem to sufficiently control for omitted variables, so that leads and lags turn 
out to be significant as well. 
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than poorer ones (Ellmers et al. 2010). The majority of its projects do not serve obvious 
development goals. 
In this chapter, we argued that coalitions between middle-income countries receiving 
the bulk of the IFC’s projects and countries representing the companies that receive the loans 
influence IFC decisions in their favor. Our results based on more than 3,000 IFC projects over 
the 1995-2015 period show that during the years that countries are jointly represented at the 
IFC Board or the UNSC they indeed attract significantly more and larger IFC projects. 
Recipient and sponsor countries receive larger overall lending as well, at times they and – most 
robustly – a larger share of their project partners are in positions of influence. These results are 
in line with the pattern of IFC lending at large.154 
IFC lending distorts markets in two ways. First, the IFC competes with alternative 
types of financing. Due to exemptions on dividends and corporation tax, it can offer better 
deals compared to private competitors. Coming back to the Mövenpick example from the 
introduction, we find it hard to believe that no private lender would have been willing to 
finance the project, even with the ongoing global financial crisis. Second, IFC-funded investors 
receive an unfair advantage over their competitors. The subsidized loan to Mövenpick, for 
example, gives it an edge over other hotels in Accra, who have access to capital on inferior 
terms. 
Additionally, the IFC’s lending is unlikely to result in the most efficient allocation of 
funds to achieve its mandate of “ending of extreme poverty.” According to the results in 
Dreher et al. (2018) political motives in granting foreign aid reduce the effectiveness of the aid 
in promoting economic growth. To the extent that IFC lending is driven by the interests of 
powerful companies rather than the interests of the poor, we expect these loans to be less 
successful in reducing poverty.155 
                                                     
154 Note that we do not claim to explain the IFC’s lending pattern in total. Like other international 
bureaucracies, IFC management and staff face incentives to expand their mandate if they can (Vaubel 
et al. 2007). What is more, the IFC’s profits generate funds for other branches of the World Bank Group. 
IFC staff thus has incentives to increase the volume of lending whenever there is demand for their loans. 
Loans to companies from richer countries are typically larger and repayment is more secure, arguably 
resulting in larger loans to richer countries.  
155We would like to test this proposition making use of the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
data. Unlike for the IBRD and IDA these data are however not available to the public at the project level. 
Preliminary tests with country-level data show no significant effect of lagged membership on the Board 
or UNSC on the share of projects with a positive evaluation. Interestingly, there is some evidence that 
evaluations improve with countries’ contemporaneous positions of power, however. The benefits of 
these positions could thus extend to the project evaluation stage as well. 
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Our results also speak to the policy debate on leveraging private funding for 
development. The 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Germany’s recent “Compact with 
Africa” are just two of the recent examples for development initiatives highlighting the need 
to combine private and official efforts in financing sustainable development. The World Bank’s 
President envisions the Bank to become a broker that leverages private capital rather than 
mainly providing its own funds.156 To the extent that the allocation of these funds can be 
shaped by the politically powerful, they might instead be captured to finance projects that 
benefit powerful middle-income countries and the companies that implement the projects. The 
additional funds might then be ineffective in achieving development goals, just as political 
considerations in allocating official aid make the aid less effective in raising growth.  
Fundamental reforms would be required. However, the interests represented by the 
IFC’s major shareholders hardly focus on poverty reduction. The voting power of the world’s 
poorest countries, where companies’ access to private capital is scarcest, is minuscule. So is the 
political influence of companies that implement projects with mainly developmental aims in 
mind compared to largely commercially oriented multinational conglomerates. We therefore 
expect that – given the incentives of the political coalitions involved and these countries’ 
voting power in the IFC – reforming the IFC will be all but impossible. Those who would gain 
from a more development-oriented policy are politically weak.  
The limited influence of emerging powers in the IFC and the reluctance of major 
shareholders to agree to substantial reforms have contributed to China initiating the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which also has a mandate to lend to the private sector. 
Its governing structure is however similar to the IFC’s, with mainly rich countries being 
represented on its Board of Directors. Investigating the influence of private companies and 
coalitions between countries representing the investor and those receiving the investment 
projects funded by other international organizations is an important question that we leave to 
future research. 
  
                                                     
156 Again, see the reference given in footnote 114. 
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Appendix A3. Loan Commitments and Projects Over Sponsor and Recipient Countries, 1995-
2015 
Sponsor country 
Share in 
total 
investment
s 
Share in 
total 
projects 
Recipient country 
Share in 
total 
investments 
Share in 
total 
projects 
United States 7.80 4.78 India 8.50 7.88 
Brazil 6.97 4.69 Brazil 8.17 5.04 
India 6.76 7.08 Russia 7.28 5.83 
Turkey 6.38 5.12 Turkey 6.76 4.76 
China 5.40 4.75 China 6.68 6.02 
Russia 3.81 3.60 Mexico 4.76 3.53 
France 3.47 2.08 Indonesia 3.35 2.36 
Mexico 3.08 2.86 Argentina 2.77 2.49 
United Kingdom 2.93 1.99 Colombia 2.66 1.80 
Indonesia 2.75 2.17 Philippines 2.55 1.73 
Argentina 2.25 2.05 Ukraine 2.16 1.89 
Colombia 2.20 1.65 Egypt 2.01 1.95 
Philippines 1.87 1.37 Peru 1.97 1.70 
South Africa 1.70 1.77 Nigeria 1.76 2.17 
Germany 1.68 2.05 Romania 1.51 1.42 
Nigeria 1.50 1.96 South Africa 1.45 1.80 
Chile 1.48 0.96 Thailand 1.44 0.72 
Ukraine 1.39 1.21 Pakistan 1.36 1.48 
Netherlands 1.33 0.87 Chile 1.33 0.85 
Peru 1.26 1.46 Ghana 1.26 1.17 
Pakistan 1.09 1.18 Kazakhstan 1.11 0.91 
Italy 1.08 0.62 Kenya 1.10 1.70 
Thailand 1.08 0.59 Bangladesh 1.02 1.04 
Austria 1.05 0.65 Jordan 0.99 1.26 
Singapore 1.04 0.71 Korea, Rep. 0.91 0.54 
Romania 1.02 0.93 Vietnam 0.84 1.17 
Kenya 1.01 1.55 Croatia 0.81 0.66 
Lebanon 0.94 1.06 Bulgaria 0.79 0.82 
Egypt 0.88 1.15 Morocco 0.76 0.60 
Switzerland 0.88 0.78 Panama 0.76 0.54 
Notes: 30 largest recipient and sponsor countries in terms of their share in total IFC 
commitments. 
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Appendix B3. Definitions and Sources  
Variable Description Data Source 
Total investment (log) 
Log of total IFC investments approved by 
the IFC Executive Board per country or 
country-pair (constant 2010 US$) 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
Mean investment (log) 
Log of mean IFC investments per project 
approved by the IFC Executive Board per 
country or country-pair (constant 2010 
US$) 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
Projects 
Number of IFC projects approved per 
country or country-pair 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
IFCEB 
1 for IFC Executive Board (IFCEB) 
membership 
Own construction based on 
World Bank Annual Reports 
1995-2015 
UNSC 1 for UNSC membership Dreher et al. (2009a) 
IFCEB partner (share) 
Share of a country’s project partners that 
are represented on the IFC Executive 
Board (IFCEB) 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
UNSC partner (share) 
Share of a country’s project partners that  
hold positions as members of the UNSC 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
Number of partners 
Total number of a country's IFC project 
partner countries 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
Recipient and sponsor 
identical 
1 if the approved IFC project is sponsored 
and received by the same country 
Own calculations based on 
IFC (2017) 
Aid disbursements (log) 
Log of total gross ODA disbursements 
(constant 2010 US$). 
OECD (2017), Table DAC2a 
Colonial relation 
1 for pairs in colonial relationship post 
1945 
Head et al. (2010) 
Common colonizer 1 for common colonizer post 1945 Head et al. (2010) 
Common currency 1 for common currency Head et al. (2010) 
Common ethnicity 
1 if a language is spoken by at least 9 
percent of the population in both 
countries 
Head et al. (2010) 
Common language 1 for common official primary language Head et al. (2010) 
Common legal origin 1 for common legal origin Head et al. (2010) 
Distance 
Weighted distance (population-weight, 
km) 
Head et al. (2010) 
GDP p.c. (log) 
Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 
US$) 
WDI (World Bank 2016) 
Imports from sponsor (log) 
Log of value of imports from sponsor to 
recipient country, defined as goods, cost, 
insurance, freight (CIF) (constant 2010 
US$) 
IMF (2016) 
Neighbours 1 for contiguity Head et al. (2010) 
Population (log) Log of population WDI (World Bank 2016) 
Recipient hegemon 
Recipient is current or former hegemon of 
sponsor 
Head et al. (2010) 
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Regional trade agreement 
1 for joint regional trade agreement in 
force 
Head et al. (2010) 
Sponsor hegemon 
Sponsor is current or former hegemon of 
recipient 
Head et al. (2010) 
Time difference 
Number of hours difference between 
sponsor and recipient country 
Head et al. (2010) 
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Appendix C3. Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Tables 3.1. and 3.2. Mean Sd Min Max 
Total investment (log) 6.49 8.32 0 20.71 
IFCEB 0.10 0.30 0 1 
IFCEB partner (share) 0.10 0.29 0 1 
UNSC 0.07 0.25 0 1 
UNSC partner (share) 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Number of partners 0.19 0.53 0 6 
GDP p.c. (log) 7.88 1.22 4.75 11.10 
Population (log) 15.60 2.07 9.76 21.04 
     
      
Variables Table 3.3. Mean Sd Min Max 
Total investment (log) 6.05 8.22 0 21.59 
IFCEB 0.16 0.36 0 1 
IFCEB partner (share) 0.03 0.15 0 1 
UNSC 0.08 0.27 0 1 
UNSC partner (share) 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Number of partners 0.16 0.59 0 8 
GDP p.c. (log) 8.31 1.51 4.75 11.62 
Population (log) 15.63 2.01 9.76 21.04 
     
      
Variables Table 3.4. Mean Sd Min Max 
Projects 0.004 0.13 0 22 
Mean investment (log) 0.04 0.84 0 19.56 
IFCEB Sponsor 0.16 0.36 0 1 
IFCEB Recipient 0.10 0.30 0 1 
UNSC Sponsor 0.08 0.27 0 1 
UNSC Recipient 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Recipient and sponsor identical 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Aid disbursements (log) 1.51 4.44 0 23.24 
Imports from sponsor (log) 7.60 7.91 0 26.83 
Neighbours 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Common official language 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Common ethnology 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Common colonizer 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Colonial relation 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Distance 7946.36 4503.73 0 19650.13 
Time difference 4.60 3.38 0 12 
Recipient hegemon 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Sponsor hegemon 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Regional trade agreement 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Common legal origin 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Common currency 0.01 0.12 0 1 
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Variables Table 3.5. Mean Sd Min Max 
Projects 0.01 0.12 0 7 
Mean investment (log) 0.07 1.06 0 18.86 
UNSC Sponsor 0.05 0.23 0 1 
UNSC Recipient 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Recipient and sponsor identical 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Imports from sponsor (log) 5.85 6.95 0 22.26 
Neighbours 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Common official language 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Common ethnology 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Common colonizer 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Colonial relation 0.00 0.03 0 1 
Distance 3587.52 1945.68 0 9772.06 
Time difference 1.36 1.05 0 5 
Recipient hegemon 0.00 0.03 0 1 
Sponsor hegemon 0.00 0.03 0 1 
Regional trade agreement 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Common legal origin 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Common currency 0.09 0.28 0 1 
 
166 
 
CHAPTER 4 
What Makes a Successful Development 
Intervention?  
The Theory of Planned Behavior – An Application 
to Implementation Research 
 
Co-authored with Lennart Kaplan, Jana Kuhnt and Sebastian Vollmer 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
“Wouldn't economics make a lot more sense 
 if it were based on how people actually behave,  
instead of how they should behave?”  
― Dan Ariely,  
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions 
 
 large focus in the literature studying development co-operation naturally lies on 
its effectiveness. On the macroeconomic cross-country level, the effectiveness of 
aid is studied to an impressive extent, while results are still inconclusive (Burnside 
and Dollar 2000; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004). In focus of the literature typically stand 
donor characteristics (Berthélemy 2006; Minasyan, Nunnenkamp, and Richert 2017), recipient 
characteristics (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian 2008; The World Bank 1998), or certain types of 
development assistance (e.g, Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 2012; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, 
and Thiele 2008; Roodman 2015). Much less attention is drawn to the specific implementation 
features of development interventions, which might likewise and very likely predict success 
A 
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or failure of interventions. Take for instance two very similar interventions on HIV/Aids 
education for young people in Uganda from Kinsman et al. (2001) and Karim et al. (2009). 
While  Karim et al. (2009) show quite positive effects of the intervention on female participants 
with regard to increased condom use, Kinsman et al. (2001) see almost no effect of their large-
scale intervention. Can we accordingly assume that HIV/Aids education works in all 
evaluated eight districts, but Masaka, where Kinsman et al. (2001) conducted their study? 
Alternatively in 2009, but not in 2001? Possible, but unlikely. The probability is higher that the 
implementation strategy, which Karim et al. (2009) tested, led more successfully to behavioral 
change than the approach evaluated by Kinsman et al. (2001) in the given setting. However, 
what makes a successful development intervention? 
At the heart of development interventions is regularly the aim to change human 
behavior – generally as a mediator to reach a certain goal (e.g., increased use of condoms to 
reduce sexually transmitted diseases). Limited participation or support from the respective 
study population challenges these interventions (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2010; Cole et al. 2013). In 
this chapter, we want to address the puzzle of success and failure of interventions and examine 
incentivizing factors for intervention uptake. What we have in mind here, is a framework 
guiding researchers and practitioners in designing successful interventions. A systematic and 
deep understanding of what drives behavioral change in response to development activities 
is in high demand and studies partly acknowledge this by building a theory of change 
(UNICEF 2014; Nayiga et al. 2014). However, the application of a general framework is missing 
(Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2010; World Bank 2015). Instead, most interventions in 
development economics still predominantly rely on monetary incentives to increase uptake. 
Other important drivers of human behavior have attracted limited attention (e.g., Kettle et al., 
2016). This is the case, despite insights from behavioral economics stressing the importance of 
elements besides monetary incentives that shape human motivation and behavior (e.g., 
Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011), and scholarly work 
showing that these factors play a role in the successful design of interventions (e.g., Banerjee 
et al. 2010; Cole et al. 2013; Ashraf, Field, and Lee 2014).157 
                                                     
157 These factors ‘disturbing’ the rational decision-making are increasingly acknowledged by economists 
(here often-called psychological biases and cognitive limitations) and insights from behavioral 
economics are applied to public policy (e.g., Behavioral Insights Team in the UK; Mind, Behavior and 
Development Unit at the World Bank; Madrian 2014). 
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We make use of a psychological theory called the “Theory of Planned Behavior” (TPB), 
which provides a straightforward framework to identify and respond to facilitating and 
hindering factors related to human behavior. The framework rests upon three determining 
factors that influence a person’s behavior (Ajzen 1985; Fishbein and Ajzen 1980). The first 
determinant is the personal attitude towards the behavior, which refers to the degree to which a 
person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of performing the behavior in question. A 
certain attitude (e.g., dis-/trust) is mostly acquired through knowledge or learning, which can 
be influenced by various factors, including information or previous experience (Perugini and 
Bagozzi 2001; Vogel and Wanke 2016). The second predictor termed ‘subjective norm’ reflects 
the social influence felt by the individual. It refers to the perceived social pressure to perform 
or not to perform the behavior. The third behavioral determinant is the degree of ‘perceived 
behavioral control’, which refers to the perceived own control over the behavior, i.e., ease or 
difficulty in its performance. Individuals, in general, rather perform tasks, if they believe they 
are able to (Armitage and Conner 2001). Generally speaking, individuals are more likely to 
intend a certain behavior if they judge it beneficial (attitude toward behavior), if they think 
important others want them to do it (subjective norm), and if they feel, they are able to do it 
(perceived behavioral control). Importantly, the TPB links its three predictors to intended 
behavior, which is the immediate antecedent and, thus, a close predictor of an individual’s 
actual behavior (Ajzen 1991; Bilic 2005). 
The TPB is currently the most widely used and accepted social cognition model across 
disciplines and researchers (e.g., Hobbis and Sutton 2005; McEachan et al. 2011; Ogden 2003) 
and seems particularly suitable to development economics. This is the case as there is a 
substantial body of literature which shows the applicability of the TPB to a wide variety of 
behaviors in different cultural and geographical settings including high- and low-income 
countries (e.g., Hsu, Chang, and Yansritakul 2017; Kassim et al. 2017; Kiene et al. 2014; 
Walrave, Heirman, and Hallam 2014; Protogerou et al. 2012). The TPB’s predictive power was 
for instance shown in different settings with regard to technology, health-care, consumption 
choices, voting or education (Appleby, Roskell, and Daly 2016; Armitage and Conner 2001; 
Barnard-Brak, Burley, and Crooks 2010; Bilic 2005; Blue 1995; Cheon et al. 2012; Cooke et al. 
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2014; Landmann 2017).158 To the best of our knowledge, however, the framework has not yet 
been used in implementation research to guide interventions in the field of development 
economics. 
We apply the TPB to a real-world intervention, which we conducted ourselves, 
specifically, the introduction of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Safe Childbirth 
Checklist (SCC) within two randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in Pakistan (Kuhnt and 
Vollmer 2017) and Indonesia (Kaplan, Richert and Vollmer, 2017). Evidently, the checklist can 
only be effective if health personnel complies with the intervention and actually uses the SCC. 
Hence, the behavior in question is the uptake (use) of the checklist during deliveries. Based on 
the TPB determinants, we analyze incentivizing factors. In addition, we will strengthen the 
analysis by looking into one specific parameter that is likely to influence the behavioral 
reaction towards development programs. Recently, studies have started to shed light on softer 
preconditions for the support of interventions: the implementer’s characteristics (e.g., Cilliers, 
Dube, and Siddiqi 2015; Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016). These fall into our determinant 
attitude towards the behavior, because they influence trust levels. As this determinant is 
particularly well in control of implementers, the realization of potential incentives should be 
comparably easy and promising. Accordingly, we deepened our analysis of the determinant 
attitude towards checklist use by conducting a framed field experiment. Within the context of the 
Indonesian SCC trial, we assess whether health personnel’s attitude and support towards 
checklist use changes conditional on whether the participation of local or international agents 
in the study is highlighted.159 
Our results show that the TPB can indeed help in disentangling the puzzle about 
intervention success and failure and consequently serve as a guideline in determining and 
shaping factors affecting intervention uptake. In both country settings, all three proposed TPB 
determinants are positively related to the uptake of the intervention. A focus on the 
implementation design on stimulating these factors is thus likely to increase the success of 
interventions through increased support and consequently higher participation rates among 
the targeted population. Furthermore, our framed field experiment indicates that the change 
                                                     
158 Studies also looked into long-term predictions of the TPB. While the predictive power oftentimes 
drops with time, the TPB is still able to predict behavior for time periods as long as 15 years (e.g., Fichten 
et al. 2016b; McEachan et al. 2011). 
159 For a visualization of our study design, see Figure A4.1. 
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in attitudes due to the salience of international involvement in projects seems to have 
advantages over solely locally organized programs in the Indonesian context. The population 
under study shows higher trust and support for interventions with international involvement. 
Previous exposure to international research projects drives those positive behavioral reactions 
towards international agents.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2. links the “Theory of Planned 
Behavior” to our intervention and describes our research design and data. Section 4.3. 
elaborates on the methods used, and the results are described in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5., the 
generalizability and policy relevance of the results is discussed, and the study concluded.  
4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA  
The interventions used in this study address safe childbirth. For a detailed description 
of the interventions, see the evaluation articles of the main RCTs (Kaplan, Richert, and Vollmer 
2017; Kuhnt and Vollmer 2017). Two-thirds of mother and newborn deaths globally occur due 
to causes which could largely be prevented if well-established essential practices were 
followed (WHO 2017). However, the gap between the knowledge about what should be done 
to ensure safe deliveries and what is actually done is large. Following the ideas of the rational 
choice theory that describes independent agents thriving to maximize their utility (Simon and 
Feldman, 1959), the deviation should be a matter of information or knowledge availability, 
assuming that incentives to ensure the well-being of the patient are functioning (e.g., 
humanity; prestige or punishment and investigation in case of death of mother or child). The 
WHO Safe Childbirth Checklist (SCC) initiative aims at providing health personnel with a 
checklist to be used around the delivery process entailing the essential practices addressing 
the major risk factors for mothers and children in low- and middle-income countries. 
Experience from other medical fields suggests that checklists could be a promising tool to 
motivate health personnel to follow essential practices and tackle the know-do gap. Checklists 
compress and bundle the necessary information into easy-to-use actionable items and, 
herewith, reduce a possible ‘information overload’ (e.g., Borchard et al. 2012; Haugen et al. 
2015; Workman, Lesser, and Kim 2007). Insights from behavioral economics suggest that 
human behavior is bounded by limitations of the working memory. In situations characterized 
by high levels of cognitive load – the amount of mental activity imposed – the successful 
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execution of certain tasks might be interrupted or impaired (e.g., Burgess 2009; Deck and 
Jahedi 2015; Hoffman et al. 2011; Croskerry 2002; Lichand and Mani 2016). Checklists can be 
especially helpful to reduce additional cognitive load and allow a reduction of complexity of 
the task at hand by reminding the user of the essential steps to follow.  
Using cluster randomized controlled trials, we evaluated the SCC in 32 health facilities 
in Indonesia, as well as in 17 health facilities and among 149 individual health providers in 
Pakistan. In both countries, the intervention we conducted was very similar. The treatment 
(SCC) was randomly introduced to approximately half of the health providers to causally 
identify the effect of the intervention on studied outcomes. The randomization took place at 
the facility level. Hence, all staff working in the same facility were jointly allocated to either 
treatment or control group. 
4.2.1 THE TPB IN THE SETTING OF OUR INTERVENTION 
In this section, we transform our SCC intervention into the logic of the Theory of 
Planned Behavior. This identifies the TPB determinants as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In the logic 
of Ajzen (1991) the attitude towards the checklist, the subjective norm of health personnel and the 
perceived behavioral control about checklist use will jointly determine whether health staff intents 
to use the checklist, which finally leads to whether the checklist is actually used during 
deliveries. We will go into more detail in the following. 
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Figure 4.1. Theory of Planned Behavior in the SCC Setting 
  
Source: Own illustration based upon Ajzen (1991) 
The puzzle of this study is as follows: If health personnel know that the checklist entails 
necessary essential practices supporting the safety of deliveries, why would they decide not 
to use the checklist. This is where we apply the TPB to carve out how the perception about the 
checklist’s usefulness and relevance (‘Attitude towards the Behavior’), support, and peer-
pressure among staff members (‘Subjective Norm’), as well as perceived ability to use the 
checklist (‘Perceived Behavioral Control’), shape intended (‘Intentions’) and actual uptake 
(‘Behavior’). Specifically, the know-do gap can be translated into the TPB determinants: The 
easiest explanation of why people would not use the checklist is because they do not know its 
benefits. The research design assured all health personnel to be informed about the checklist’s 
benefits. Knowing the benefits, however, presumes that health personnel also believed in the 
information attained. Trusting in the checklist would therefore be a first important 
precondition for checklist uptake, which is subsumed under attitude towards the behavior within 
the TPB. On the perspective of the do-side from the know-do gap, people might still not use 
the checklist as they feel unable to use it (perceived behavioral control) or not obliged to do so 
(subjective norm). Using the real-world setting of the SCC interventions in Indonesia and 
Pakistan, we are able to empirically test the influence of the TPB determinants on intended 
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and actual use of the SCC.160 Of all TPB determinants, the attitude towards the behavior building 
on how trust-worthy the intervention is perceived seems to be particularly well in control of 
the intervention implementer. We therefore elaborate additionally on this determinant within 
our field experiment. 
 
Data: Measuring TPB Determinants and Outcomes 
We measured our data through surveys with health personnel and clinical 
observations of the delivery process. Our TPB determinants were collected through survey 
questions and serve as explanatory variables in our analysis. We conducted baseline and 
endline surveys at the health facilities in Indonesia and Pakistan at the beginning and the end 
of the interventions. Importantly, the data for the TPB analysis was only collected for the 
respondents working in treatment facilities, as at the time of the endline survey health staff in 
control facilities had not been in contact with the SCC. Hence, asking about the perceptions of 
the SCC would not have been possible and limits our sample to those interviewed at treatment 
facilities. This leaves us with 79 respondents in Pakistan and 163 health workers in 
Indonesia.161 Including only the treatment facilities, gives us a non-random sample limiting 
causal inference, which is discussed below.  
The numerous applications of the TPB to a wide array of contexts ease the 
measurement of TPB determinants (e.g., French and Hankins 2003; McEachan et al. 2011).162 
We were thus able to follow the respective literature when formulating survey questions. The 
first determinant attitude towards the behavior, here towards the use of the SCC, we prompt by 
asking the respondents to judge the usefulness of the SCC in their professional context (based 
upon Kam et al. 2012). Subjective norm would translate into the degree of support by health 
                                                     
160 Theoretically, opportunity costs of using the SCC might be an impeding factor. However, monetary 
costs are very low and non-monetary components are implicitly part of attitudes and subjective norms. 
161 The Pakistani health staff worked at 70 different providers (including individual providers but also 
larger health facilities). While we surveyed every individual provider, we increased the number of 
interviews at health facilities proportionally with their number of delivery staff to get a more nuanced 
picture within larger teams. The Indonesian trial involved interviews at 16 health facilities. 
162 It has to be noted that the TPB can be applied in various ways, which is likely to influence its effects 
(Lugoe and Rise 1999). In order to increase the TPB’s explanatory power and flexibility to address also 
varying intentions and behavior, several studies extended the original framework by further constructs 
and components (e.g., Armitage and Conner 2001; Bilic 2005; Cheon et al. 2012; Conner and Armitage 
1998; Perugini and Bagozzi 2001; Klöckner and Blöbaum 2010). We will stick to the original theory when 
applying it to development economics, while we acknowledge the propositions made to deepen or 
broaden the TPB. 
174 
 
practitioners’ superiors. Perceived behavioral control takes into account how easy the health 
practitioners judge the checklist to be applicable in their daily work routine. Additionally, 
surveys included demographic background information, which serves as control variables. 
Following the TPB, the three components then influence whether health staff intends 
to use the checklist and, ultimately, if they actually use it during deliveries conducted (see 
Figure 4.1.). Intentions to use the checklist and actual checklist use represent our outcome 
measures. We investigated respondents’ intended behavior towards the SCC use, by asking 
whether they intend to continue using the SCC after termination of the study applying a 6-
point Likert scale.163 Descriptive statistics show that the SCC is generally valued by the 
practitioners in Indonesia and Pakistan (Figure 4.2.). Yet, there is some distinct variation 
within and across the settings.  
Figure 4.2. Intended behavior in Pakistan and Indonesia 
 
 
Additionally, Figure 4.3. describes the actual SCC use by health practitioners in 
Indonesia and Pakistan. It indicates a limited uptake and, hence, a potential gap between 
intended and actual use. Therefore, it is important to examine the factors that possibly 
constrain the behavior more carefully.164 
                                                     
163As an additional outcome measure we asked participants whether they would recommend the SCC 
to colleagues. Results are displayed in the Appendix.  
164 More detail on the data collected can be found in Kuhnt and Vollmer (2017) and Kaplan, Richert, and 
Vollmer (2017).  
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Figure 4.3. Actual behavior in Pakistan and Indonesia – fraction of use (“Yes”) and non-use 
(“No”) 
                                               Pakistan                                                     Indonesia 
Notes: Based upon 212 treated providers in Pakistan and 233 in Indonesia 
In line with the previously reviewed literature, we suggest that attitudes towards 
interventions – one of the three TPB determinants – is linked to attitudes towards the 
implementing agent. These, in turn, are likely to be influenced by previous exposure to and 
herewith experience with program implementers. In the Acehnese health sector, 10 percent 
(17.5 percent) of the surveyed providers have previously participated in research projects by 
international (local) actors. Those interactions date back significantly before our intervention 
as only 2.5 percent of the respondents faced international research projects in their facility 
during the previous two years.  
To also assess the actual use of the SCC, we additionally conducted standardized 
clinical observations in a subsample of the health facilities. Trained observers documented the 
delivery processes and marked whether the attending health staff had used the checklist.165 
This information was collected for 212 deliveries at 9 treatment providers in Pakistan and 233 
deliveries at 15 treatment facilities in Indonesia.166  
All measures (except for the actual behavior measure through clinical observations) 
are perception-based and, hence, subjective indicators. While this sheds light on subjective 
experiences, these questions are more difficult to compare across individuals and are subject 
                                                     
165 Checklist use was either defined by whether the checklist was picked up during or directly after care, 
or whether the checklist poster was observed during the delivery process. To hang up a checklist poster 
in the delivery room for simultaneous consultation formed part of our intervention. 
166 In Pakistan, our observations capture 50 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at the observed 
health facilities as well as 94 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at observed individual 
providers. In Indonesia, the fraction relates to 64 percent of all monthly conducted deliveries at 
observed health facilities.  
61%
39%
No
Yes
Based upon treated providers n=233 in Indonesia
Was SCC used or looked at during delivery process?
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to social desirability bias.167 However, evidence from TPB studies suggests that self-reported 
behavior can have higher explanatory power for intended behavior than objective measures 
as the latter can hardly reflect intentions, which are by nature subjective (e.g., Armitage and 
Conner 2001; McEachan et al. 2011). 
4.2.2. WHAT SHAPES ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERVENTIONS? A FRAMING EXPERIMENT 
We investigate further on the TPB determinant attitudes towards the behavior in a framed 
field experiment, as this is particularly in control of intervention implementers. If we can 
identify positive incentives with our analysis, those should be comparably easy to implement 
and therefore promising to actually materialize in improved uptake. Precisely, the experiment 
aims at shedding more light on what influences people’s trust in the intervention. For practical 
reasons, we conducted the experiment within the Indonesian trial only. 
Experimental evidence within the context of the SCC intervention strengthens the real-
world applicability and external validity. It has been prominently voiced that these types of 
experiments are a valuable and important tool to generate policy-relevant insights, e.g., by 
better understanding structural parameters obtained from experimental interventions like 
RCTs (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2010; Viceisza 2016). The experiment is, hence, not only 
designed to inform our specific intervention but to generate insights for international 
development interventions in more general terms. 
Recent literature suggests that our channel in focus – attitudes towards the behavior – in 
implemented interventions is influenced by characteristics of the implementers themselves. 
International development interventions are mostly implemented in collaboration between 
international and local actors. These might include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
governmental agencies, or profit-oriented service providers. Also, the growing number of 
impact evaluations in the domain of development economics are often implemented by a 
research team working at an institution of higher education in a high-income country that 
collaborates with varying intensity with local partners of low- and middle-income countries 
to evaluate development policies or programs (Cameron, Mishra, and Brown 2016).168 Based 
                                                     
167 The social desirability bias describes the bias respondents can have in their responses due to the 
desire to act in a socially acceptable manner (Kemper et al. 2014). 
168 Cameron, Mishra, & Brown (2016) find that in a random sample of development evaluation studies 
more than 50 percent of first authors were affiliated to an institution in North America or Europe. More 
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on insights from previous studies, we propose that the implementer’s local or international 
background might influence the participants’ attitude towards the intervention.  
Scholarly work has developed driving factors explaining this phenomenon. Cilliers, 
Dube, and Siddiqi (2015) show that the presence of a foreigner versus a local as a third-party 
bystander positively affects the contributions of participants in a dictator game in Sierra Leone 
and identify two potential channels: First, an increase in contributions to impress the foreigner 
and, second, reduced contributions in areas that were previously exposed to the aid-industry. 
In the latter locations, they show that participants more frequently believed that the game 
tested their need for aid, and subsequently contributed less. Milner, Nielson, and Findley 
(2016) find that the support of Ugandans for foreign-funded as compared to national 
government-funded programs is substantially larger. They stress the importance of general 
levels of confidence and trust towards the implementing agents for the support of projects. 
Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018), as well as Winters, Dietrich, and Mahmud (2017) show 
more specifically that donors are linked to higher quality perceptions vis-à-vis the national 
government. This relates to the general debate on how aid can be delivered most successfully, 
and whether foreign funding undermines state legitimacy (e.g., Dietrich and Winters 2015). 
Previous involvement and experiences with the respective agents might play a substantial role 
in shaping those attitudes and support vis-à-vis an implementer’s project. In this vein, 
Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) condition their experimental effect on previous 
political participation and Milner, Nielson, and Findley (2016) find that the support for 
foreign-funded as compared to national government funded programs is substantially larger, 
if participants are in favor of opposition parties, and had negative experiences with the 
government in the past.169 Here, the authors, especially, stress the role of corruption and 
clientelism (e.g., Findley et al. 2017; Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016).170 In contrast, the 
‘home bias’-phenomenon suggests that participants have more trust in locals than in 
                                                     
specifically in our Indonesian context, seven out of nine RCTs in Indonesia registered with the 
‘American Economic Association: RCT Registry’, had an US-based principal investigator and only one 
out of nine was led by an Indonesian investigator (American Economic Association 2018). 
169 Milner, Nielson, and Findley (2016) also assess sub-group effects with regard to gender, education, 
poverty, media exposure, geographic region, experience with aid, type of donor and political 
connections, but find mainly insignificant results. 
170 Although not testing it explicitly, Findley et al. (2017) name perceptions on accountability, capacities, 
and level of control as further potential channels.  
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internationals as cultural proximity could increase people’s trust (e.g., Fuchs and Gehring 
2017).  
To the best of our knowledge, the described strand of the literature is currently limited 
to state versus non-state actors. However, against the background of the numerous 
international development cooperation projects and in light of the increasing number of large 
research projects as outlined above, it is important to understand whether the origin of the 
program implementer also matters, irrespective of an affiliation to the state. To this question, 
we dedicate our framed field experiment.171 
 
Experimental Design  
In the aggregate, our experiment compares whether the salience of international versus 
local program implementers affects support for the respective project. Stressing certain aspects 
of a particular situation and otherwise equivalent descriptions can lead to very different 
perceptions and behavioral reactions (Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Payne 
et al. 2013; Hossain and List 2012; Johnson and Goldstein 2003). The result is what is called the 
framing effect.172 Stressing certain aspects invokes different associations and leads to different 
evaluations by the decision maker.173 Framing effects have been incorporated into theories on 
human behavior to explain deviations from rational choices (e.g., prospect theory). Their 
application to real-world decision-making can have important practical implications. Based 
upon their own intervention, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2006) specifically point out 
that framing might be a particularly cost-effective way to increase interventions’ uptake, 
which we aim to test here.  
                                                     
171 We follow the classification of experiments proposed by Harrison and List (2007). 
172 The framing effect became popular through its essential role in Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) in which they describe gambles either by their loss or gain 
probability. There are three different types of framing approaches that have been described and used 
in the literature: Most prominently and widely researched is the risky choice framing (risk of losing vs. 
risk of winning) as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Attribute framing makes certain 
characteristics of a choice or good more salient (ground beef that is 75 percent lean vs. 25 percent fat). 
Lastly, goal framing where either punishment or reward is emphasized (behavioraleconomics.com 2017).  
173 Since then, framing experiments have been extensively applied in medical sciences both in 
hypothetical (Wilson, Kaplan, and Schneiderman 1987) and real contexts, often related to message 
framing experiments, e.g., with regard to smoking cessation, HIV screening as well as skin and breast 
cancer prevention (Detweiler et al. 1999; Kalichman & Coley 1995; Schneider et al. 2001; Toll et al. 2007). 
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We make use of the randomized phase-in design of the SCC intervention in Indonesia. 
Within the endline survey of the larger RCT project, we performed the experiment with 
midwives at control facilities that neither have received the SCC nor were in contact with the 
implementation team. Within this group of midwives, we used a between-subject design and 
randomly assigned the study participants to two different framing information on the actually 
conducted SCC intervention: The first framing information stressed the involvement of 
international actors in the SCC program, while the second made the participation of local 
counterparts more salient (see Figure A4.1. in the Appendix for an overview over the study 
design).174 We use the fact that the SCC evaluation has been implemented jointly by both – 
international and local – actors and therefore, highlight different attributes of the project. We 
then investigated the participants’ respective behavior towards the intervention by assessing 
the support for the SCC project. Since we randomized participants into different treatment 
groups, we can make causal inference on how the origin of implementers affects behavioral 
reactions (i.e., different levels of support for the SCC intervention).  
In a short pre-experimental survey, we collected background information, including 
socio-economic and contextual work characteristics, of each participant.175 In appreciation of 
participants’ survey participation, each respondent received a voucher for a phone credit top-
up worth 25.000 IDR (approx. 1.75 US$). Afterwards, the respondents were offered to 
participate in the experiment.176 Lastly, we conducted a short post-experimental survey, 
including questions capturing potential framing mechanisms and additional control variables, 
like the experience of current financial distress.  
The ‘experimental commodity’ was derived from the on-going RCT intervention on 
the SCC. First, the idea and structure of the SCC was explained to the participants. Afterwards, 
they were presented with one of the two framings that selectively either stressed the 
involvement of ‘local’ or ‘international’ actors  respectively, in the SCC intervention.177 A 
                                                     
174 The framing experiment does not include a control group as development programs are always either 
conducted exclusively locally or have an international component. We believe that it is very unlikely 
that the implementer’s identity is unknown to program participants.  
175 This survey was included in the endline survey of the larger SCC intervention. 
176 All respondents chose to continue the survey and participated in the following framing experiment.  
177 As it is likely that respondents equate an international actor as a donor, we specifically addressed the 
relevant actors as researchers and professionals in our framing component. 
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qualitative investigation was conducted prior to the experiment to ensure that the correct 
terms were used to describe ‘local’ versus ‘international’ agents.178  
Our framing information reads as follows: 
“Among other researchers, [INTERNATIONAL / LOCAL] researchers took an active role in 
introducing the checklist to 17 facilities in Aceh province. The research team received approval from the 
provincial health office of Aceh. However, no funding was provided by the provincial health office. 
[LOCAL / INTERNATIONAL] research assistants and [INTERNATIONAL / LOCAL] health 
professionals with a lot of experience in delivery services were important partners and greatly supported 
the project.” 
In order to be able to draw broader conclusions and to generalize the findings to 
different types of interventions, we named different actors (e.g., researchers, practitioners). To 
prevent potential effects through assumptions on political involvement, we specifically 
address the role of the provincial health office in the information given to the study 
participants. Further, to counter potential bias through speculations on the financial 
capabilities of different actors, we stress that funding of the intervention is ensured 
irrespective of the framing given to the participant. For the detailed experimental protocol see 
Appendix A1. 
We hypothesize that the level of support would significantly differ between the local 
and the international framing. Following the literature, there are arguments for directive 
effects on both sides, which leads us to handle the issue as an empirical question. 
 
                                                     
178 For this purpose, we talked to health-care providers from different facilities, which were not part of the sampled 
institutions. In the Acehnese setting ‘local’ is understood as ‘Acehnese’ identity, whereby ‘Indonesian’ would be an 
external concept. Certainly, it would have been of large interest to examine the difference between local and 
Indonesian implementers. However, due to power constraints, we decided to focus on this more specific framing 
without splitting the group and reducing the sample. The distinctness of ‘Acehnese’ and ‘Indonesian’ is also 
underlined by the fact that a small set of respondents named Indonesia and certain provinces as 
international countries. To deepen our understanding of the term ‘international’ in the Acehnese 
context, we asked respondents to name the three countries, they first think of when hearing this term 
(see Figure A4.2. in the Appendix). There is a large consensus among respondents regarding the main 
countries associated with ‘international’, namely Germany (24 percent), Malaysia (19 percent), USA 
(13 percent), Australia (8 percent). The high prominence of Germany among the foreign countries 
named, could first – of course – be attributed to the fact that parts of the implementing researchers, were 
German. Second, it is nevertheless likely, that Germany is indeed particularly present the Acehnese 
people as it was the largest European donor after 2004’s Tsunami (BBC 2005). Moreover, Germany’s 
reconstruction efforts were characterized by a strong focus on health interventions (Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 2005). 
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Experimental data 
In total, the experiment was conducted with 236 female midwives from the SCC 
intervention’s control group. The average study participant was 33 years old (minimum: 21 
years, maximum 50 years), had 10 years of work experience (minimum: 0 years; maximum 28 
years) and 15 years of education (minimum: 12 years; maximum 17 years) (see Table A4.1. in 
the Appendix). Participants in the experiment were comparable in their characteristics to 
health workers of the main RCT study (see Appendix Table A4.2.).179 Individual characteristics 
and further contextual variables are balanced across treatments indicating that the 
randomization was successful (Table A4.1.). In our main analysis, we focus on those 
participants that have not been in prior contact with the SCC as 27.92 percent of the 
respondents state that they were previously exposed to the SCC.180 As we cannot infer how 
much these respondents know about the SCC intervention and how intense the exposure was, 
excluding them is the more conservative choice.181 This reduces our sample to 173 
participants.182 Balance on important covariates is still given in this reduced sample (see 
Appendix Table A4.3.). Previous SCC exposure was equally distributed across the framing 
treatments, ruling out selection concerns and enabling us to interpret the estimates causally. 
We proxy SCC support by asking the respondents whether they would contribute 
parts of the money they had received through the voucher for phone credit top-up in 
appreciation of their survey participation to buy checklist copies, which would then support 
the implementation of the SCC in other anonymous health facilities within the province.183 The 
contribution was made anonymously. After the experiment, all participants received a 
                                                     
179 Health workers in the treatment group seem to have experienced on average five more months of 
education.  
180 Reasons for previous exposure might be a second job at another (treatment) facility (11.11 percent of 
respondents have a second job) or communication with other health practitioners within the district. 
Contact to midwives from other facilities is also significantly correlated with prior checklist contact. 
181 As a robustness check, we also report the full sample results including a prior contact binary variable 
in the regression model in Appendix Table A4.11. However, as we assume a large heterogeneity of 
exposure – health practitioners with a job at another facility might have worked with the SCC, others 
might have just heard the name of the SCC from colleagues - we prefer the reduced sample for our main 
results. 
182 Due to two outcome measures that could not be matched to respondents and 4 respondents that 
refrained from answering on control questions, the sample is reduced to n=165 in our main 
specifications. 
183 If they wanted to contribute, we offered them five options from 5,000 to 25,000 IDR (equivalent to 0.4 
- 1.86  US$) due to pragmatic reasons of specific top-up values. 
182 
 
debriefing.184 To create transparency on the use of the collected funds, we publicly made 
information on total amounts available after the end of the study and informed the participant 
about this procedure. In addition to this traditional monetary outcome, we also collected 
measures suggested by other disciplines. Psychologists commonly assess the respondent’s 
behavior through time investments (Wildschut et al. 2014).185 Hence, we asked the 
participant’s willingness to invest additional time to practice checklist use during regular 
working weeks. Further, in order to counter potential social desirability bias, we asked the 
participants to estimate the average monetary contribution of colleagues in other health 
facilities in the province.186 Those elicitation exercises based on introspection have been shown 
to reduce potential conformity bias in the experimental literature (Trautmann and van de 
Kuilen 2015). We focus on the traditionally employed monetary outcome as due to the costs 
incurred by the respondent (hypothetical or real) this is likely to be the strongest measure, 
while the additional outcomes are presented in the Appendix. Summary statistics for all 
measures employed can be found in Appendix Table A4.4. for Indonesia and A4.5. for 
Pakistan. 
In the post-experimental survey, we asked several questions on potential mechanisms 
to explain differential preferences towards implementers. Following Milner, Nielson, and 
Findley (2016), we measured participants’ level of trust towards different actors 
(international/local actors) and towards the previously named countries that they understood 
by the term ‘international’. We used 4-point Likert scales. In addition, we asked participants 
                                                     
184 After the debriefing, we offered participants to change their monetary contribution. 39 (16.5 percent) 
participants made use of this option. Generally, this led to an increase in contributions by on average 
one category (about 4200 IDR), but the amount is not contingent on the framing applied. The main 
analysis focuses on the pre-debriefing contribution, as we are interested in the framing effect.  
185 Actual behavior measured by contributing money may be strongly influenced by general or 
situational economic living conditions of respondents (Wildschut et al. 2014). In case respondents face 
strong economic constraints, small or zero contributions might reflect a high neediness rather than lack 
of support for the intervention. 
186 We incentivized an honest answer through an additional payment if the respondent’s estimate was 
close to the real average within our study sample. The underlying idea is that respondents might be 
biased to not perfectly reveal their preferences in order to keep their face. However, when being 
financially incentivized to assess the potential answer of an anonymous third person, opportunity costs 
of not revealing the own true assessment increase. Moreover, in a resource constrained setting the 
beliefs about the willingness of others to contribute could provide more accurate information about 
preferences as they are less subject to the idiosyncratic financial situation of the respondent. 
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whether they have previously participated in interventions by international or local experts or 
researchers, respectively.187  
4.3. METHOD 
In the first part of our regression analysis we address the role of the TPB determinants for 
intended behavior with regard to checklist use. Our regression line for intended behavior 
reads as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑃𝐵 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘𝛴𝑘𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                       (1) 
As throughout the study, we estimate models for Indonesia and Pakistan separately 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Our level of analysis is the individual health 
worker i (79 respondents for Pakistan and 163 individuals for Indonesia). 𝑦𝑖 determines our 
outcome variable, which measures intended behavior employing 6-point Likert scales. 𝛼 is a 
constant, and TPB determinanti capture our variables of interest (also using 6-point Likert 
scales)188 via our three perception measures for the three TPB pillars: Attitudes, subjective norms, 
and perceived behavioral control. In adjusted regressions we add 𝛴𝑘𝑋𝑖, which represents our set 
of 𝑘 control variables. These include a variable indicating the type of facility,189 a binary 
variable indicating the location of the facility (rural versus urban), a variable capturing the 
district where the provider is located and we include the level of service provision, which is 
proxied by a dummy for 24/7 opening hours. The idea is that those time-invariant facility 
characteristics might affect the drivers of the TPB. Perceived behavioral control could be 
affected by staffing and equipment, which is captured by facility type and geographical 
remoteness (district dummies and rural/urban distinction) as well as the 24/7 service 
                                                     
187 To investigate additional potential mechanisms, we also collected information on perceived 
corruption, skills and control to implement interventions, sufficient funding capabilities, and 
accountability. All these data were collected after the experiment was conducted in order to not affect 
our main outcome measures. However, this procedure comes with the trade-off of potential justification 
bias, where individuals would adapt their answers ex-post to justify the previously indicated support. 
We indeed find that the framing statistically significantly affects some of these variables. Hence, in our 
analysis, we focus on those variables not significantly affected to avoid bad control issues. Not 
statistically significantly affected were: Participation in international or local projects, trust in 
internationals, trust in named foreign countries and trust in locals. We use these later in our regression 
analysis. 
188 Further, we also estimated regressions with an alternative coding for robustness, where we defined 
a dummy variable with the value one for the highest category and zero otherwise.  
189 Our sample included a wide heterogeneity of facilities from primary to tertiary health providers.  
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provision. Provider’s attitudes and the subjective norms of superiors towards the SCC are subject 
to the facilities’ safety culture, which is captured again by facility type, service provision, and 
geographical remoteness (district dummies and rural/urban distinction). 
Our second part of regressions is the equivalent to the first but changes the outcome 
variable to birth observations 𝑗 measuring the actual behavior. Here, 𝑦𝑗, is a binary variable 
equalling one if the checklist was used by the health worker during the delivery. As we cannot 
link each delivery to the specific health workers’ responses, we take averages of attitudes, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioral control per health facility. This would provide us with 
an intuition of more supportive environments being associated with more or less take-up.190 
The control variables 𝑋𝑗 stay the same as in regression (1). 
Following the clustered setup of the intervention, in all specifications, the error terms 
are clustered at the facility level to account for joint correlation within the clusters.191 We 
employed Likert scales to all perception-based survey questions, which are relatively 
continuous measures. Hence, we consider them as continuous variables in the estimations, 
which is the preferred method of analysis proposed in the literature (Pasta 2009).192 As our 
sample is restricted to our treatment group and includes, thus, a non-random set of 
individuals, estimations are not derived within the randomization framework and do not 
allow a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, controlling for several potentially confounding 
variables, we will receive informative correlations about how behavioral processes are 
associated with intervention uptake. 
The third part of our regression analysis concerns the experimental data. Our analysis 
of the experiment aims to identify the existence of a systematic difference in the support for 
                                                     
190 As our analysis, thus, involves different aggregation levels and our measure of intention and actual 
behavior capture slightly different concepts, we do not estimate a model on the direct link between 
intentions and behavior. 
191 Due to a limited number of clusters we also present results with wild bootstrapped standard errors 
following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for all our baseline models in the Appendix. However, 
this is only possible for the unadjusted regressions (without controls). In the regressions which include 
control variables and bootstrapped SE, we face problems of overfitting. This is the case as our controls 
consist mainly of dummy or categorical variables, which reduce variation among our relatively small 
number of observations too strongly to calculate meaningful adjusted standard errors. Accordingly, we 
prefer to present regressions without bootstrapped standard errors in our main models. 
192 We also assessed the feasibility of continuous items with a scale from 0 to 100, but learned that those 
were harder to comprehend for respondents in the field. 
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our intervention by health practitioners, conditional on whether the local or international 
implementation was more salient. Our results are based on the following regression equation: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝛴𝑚𝐶𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                  (2) 
In our most parsimonious model, 𝑦𝑖 is the outcome variable, indicating the support of 
the SCC by health worker 𝑖. 𝛼 is a constant, and 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is a binary variable, which equals 
one if the respondent was exposed to an international, and zero for a local framing. Moreover, 
heterogeneous effects are assessed by the inclusion of an interaction between the framing and 
channel 𝑐𝑖, which is prior participation in international or local projects. In adjusted 
regressions we add 𝛴𝑚𝐶𝑖, which is our set of control variables. The controls include a variable 
indicating the respective facility type, where the participant is employed, as this is likely to 
influence the attitude of the respondent towards the tool, and a binary variable marking 
whether the respondent experienced financial problems within the past days as this might 
affect monetary contributions.193 Further, to control for a potential social desirability bias, we 
measured social conformity following the social desirability scale developed by Kemper et al. 
(2014). This measure was adopted to the Acehnese context and we transformed its five items 
into a composite index.194 We control also for the subjective perception regarding the amount 
of paperwork during deliveries, which was motivated by an often-experienced perception 
during implementation that the new tool adds to the already existing paperwork. Finally, 𝑣𝑖 
describes the residual. Errors are clustered at the facility level to take into account similarities 
within teams. We are, thus, mainly interested in the effect sizes of β1 and β2.195 
 
                                                     
193 Previous research on the SCC has shown differential effects of the checklist across different healthcare 
facility settings. Applicability to the respective work environment is likely to be influenced by factors 
like e.g., team size, resource access, or delivery load. Related research has similarly controlled for a 
constructed wealth index (e.g., Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2015). 
194 We adapted the social desirability measures to the respective context in cooperation with Indonesian 
counterparts. For instance, one of the items reads “I have occasionally thrown litter away in the 
countryside or on to the road.” As environmental concerns are less salient in the Acehnese context than 
religious concerns, we changed the item to “When I had the chance to donate for religious purposes, I 
always contributed a lot.” The full set of questions we used for the construction of the social desirability 
index are displayed in Appendix A4.2.   
195 Estimates using ordered probit regressions are shown for robustness in the Appendix. For the ease 
of interpretation, we prefer to present OLS results in the main part. 
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4.4. RESULTS 
Main results: TPB determinants and SCC support 
For all three TPB determinants, attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, in 
both study sites Pakistan and Indonesia, we find that coefficients point towards a consistently 
similar direction. Table 4.1. displays the regression results of the intended and actual SCC 
uptake for the data from Pakistan and Indonesia. While the first row always presents the 
unadjusted coefficients, the second displays results adjusted for control variables as described 
in Section 4.3. Results show that respondents who express a strongly positive attitude towards 
the SCC are also more likely to intend to use the new tool even if it is not freely provided to 
them anymore (columns (1a) to (2b)). In Pakistan and Indonesia the coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant (ranging from the 1-percent to 5-percent level). This is also 
supported by the actual SCC use (columns (3a) to (4b)). The stronger the positive stance 
towards the checklist, the more often health staff actively uses the SCC during the delivery 
process. If the SCC is perceived to be more useful (attitude), its actual use among Indonesian 
health workers increases by 39.4 percentage points and among Pakistani practitioners by 47.1 
percentage points. Further, we find consistently positive coefficients in both countries with 
respect to the support of superiors for the new tool (social norms). While it seems to play an 
important role for intended and actual SCC uptake in Indonesia, it is less important for 
intended behavior as compared to the actual SCC use in the Pakistani setting. This can be 
explained by different samples across our outcome measures. While the actual behavioral 
outcome was mainly collected for health practitioners working in facilities, the sample 
measuring the intended SCC uptake is dominated by individual health workers (like 
community midwives). Hence, for them the opinion of superiors is less of a concern but rather 
the perceived usability (perceived behavioral control). In this regard, we see that the ease of use 
is a statistically significant predictor of intended SCC use in Pakistan (at the 5 percent level in 
the adjusted regression), while it is positive but not statistically significant in the Indonesian 
context or for actual SCC uptake in both countries.196 
                                                     
196 As outlined above, we use wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors as robustness tests in samples 
with small number of clusters (9 in Pakistan and 15 in Indonesia). Results are displayed in Appendix 
Table A4.6. showing that results are by and large robust to this standard error correction. When we 
generate a dummy variable as an outcome, equalling one for the highest category only (“fully agree” to 
“Would try to use SCC even if copies are not provided”) results are qualitatively unchanged (see 
Appendix Table A4.7.). 
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These results – though not allowing the establishment of a causal pathway – give a 
consistent indication: Influencing the TPB determinants into the respective positive direction 
is associated with increased intended and actual uptake of the SCC. The regressions without 
controls in the (a)-columns indicate that the TPB determinants capture 5 to 13 percent of the 
variation in intentions among Indonesian respondents, and 0.3 to 4 percent of the variation in 
actual behavior (measured by the adjusted R-Squareds between 0.048 and 0.132). Adjusted R-
Squareds for the Pakistani case are exceeding those from Indonesia and range between 
explaining 0.8 to 19 percent of the variation in intensions with the TPB determinants. The 
explanatory power for actual behavior lies between 10 and 29 percent. Hence, the three TPB 
determinants are important predictors for intended and actual behavioral outcomes here the 
use of the SCC.  
Differences in the adjusted R-Squareds across TPB determinants are well in line with 
qualitative evidence. Indonesian coaches, who assisted health personnel in using the checklist, 
were seldomly asked for help regarding the content of the SCC, which corresponds to the ease 
of use of this intervention. In contrast, the assessment of the supervisor seems to play an 
important role in the hierarchically structured Indonesian society. This is also borne out by 
inter-facility staff meetings and midwives’ correspondence with coaches in Indonesia, 
stressing the salience of supervisors and colleagues reminding each other to use the checklist 
regularly. In the Pakistani case, we see the strongest explanatory power for the determinants 
attitudes and control and far behind for norms (12 to 19 percentage points difference). In line 
with explanations from above, the effect is likely to be driven by the sample of community 
midwives, who work rather self-employed and do not depend on superiors’ norms, 
accordingly. 
Both sets of results imply that in both countries, specifically, attitudes are crucial in 
shaping intentions and actual behavior. As indicated in the previous literature review, 
perceptions about the implementer can be strong predictors in shaping intentions and 
behavior. This is assessed in the subsequent section. 
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Table 4.1. Main regressions – Intended and Actual SCC uptake (1 "disagree strongly" - 6 "agree strongly") 
 
Intended SCC Uptake:  
Would try to use SCC even if copies are not provided 
 
Actual SCC Uptake:  
Was Checklist actively used or looked at during 
delivery process? 
Pakistan Indonesia  Pakistan Indonesia 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)  (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Attitudes: Using the SCC in my 
professional role is:     1 "completely 
useless" - 6 "completely useful" 
0.984*** 0.818*** 0.4535*** 0.3088**  0.655*** 0.471** 
 
-0.356 
 
0.394*** 
p-value (0.00001) (0.00024) (0.00422) (0.01181)  (0.00285) (0.01948) (0.24536) (0.00000) 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.187 0.254 0.114 0.272  0.288 0.346 0.017 0.061 
N 79 79 163 163  212 212 219 219 
Subjective Norms: SCC is supported by 
superiors: 1 "not at all" - 6 "completely" 
0.143 0.164* 0.5356*** 0.3162***  0.207* 0.0781** 
0.654* 
 
0.279*** 
 
p-value (0.115) (0.0597) (0.00740) (0.00082)  (0.09708) (0.02679) (0.09143) (0.00002) 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.008 0.304 0.132 0.261  0.095 0.325 0.041 0.062 
N 58 58 163 163  212 212 219 219 
Perceived Behavioral Control: Ease to use 
SCC in work environment: 1 "very 
difficult" - 6 "very easy" 
0.439*** 0.366** 0.2614* 0.0226  0.306*** 0.112 
 
0.0589 
 
0.0154 
p-value (0.00319) (0.0290) (0.08960) (0.86269)  (0.00026) (0.16877) (0.42346) (0.97900) 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.128 0.211 0.048 0.222  0.253 0.318 0.003 0.057 
N 78 78 163 163  212 212 219 219 
Control variables no yes no yes  no yes no yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4.628 4.628 4.847 4.847  0.344 0.344 0.389 0.389 
Median of dep. var. 5 5 5 5  - - - - 
Standard Deviation of dep. var. 1.452 1.452 0.634 0.634  0.476 0.476 0.489 0.489 
Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are based upon the treated providers and standard errors (SE) are 
clustered at the facility level. Adjusted regressions (b) additionally control for a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating 
rural/urban location, a variable indicating the district and a binary variable indicating whether the facility is open 24/7.  
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Main results: framing experiment 
Table 4.2. displays the main results of the framing experiment conducted in Indonesia. 
We only include our main outcome measure (monetary investment) here, while results of the 
alternative outcomes are presented in the Appendix (Table A4.8.).197 The first column presents 
the unadjusted results, whereas the second column gives the results adjusted for additional 
control variables.198 We limit our sample to those respondents who were not exposed to the 
SCC prior to this experiment. Full sample regression results controlling for prior contact, are 
shown in the Appendix (Table A4.11.) and are comparable to the findings presented here.199 
As conservative robustness check, we also present random inference based p-values.200  
Table 4.2. Main regression results of the framing experiment 
 
Financial Contribution in support of SCC 
project (in IDR) 
(a) (b) 
Framing  
(=1 if 'international') 
557.6236 1,283.7717** 
p-value (0.39637) 
 
(0.02119) 
 
RI p-value (0.4500) (0.0570) 
 
N 165 165 
Control variables no yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4757.576 4757.576 
Std. dev. of dep. 
var. 
4711.366 4711.366 
                                                     
197 Similarly, we present estimates using ordered probit regressions in the Appendix Table A4.9. Results 
are qualitatively unchanged to OLS regressions. 
198 In line with the randomized setup of the study, results are robust to the inclusion of further covariates, 
which increases the precision of estimates. The full specification including all control variables is 
presented in the Appendix Table A4.10. 
199 As a further robustness check we estimate a regression which controls for an interaction of the 
framing with the indicator for past contact. First, this is more conservative as the framing should have 
a lower effect on the persons that are acquainted to the SCC and induce, thus, a downward bias. Second, 
individuals with prior contact to the checklist might react heterogeneously due to more comprehensive 
information. 
Table A4.12. depicts the corresponding results. While the framing indicator decreases slightly in size, 
but stays significant in the adjusted regressions, there is no significantly different treatment effect for 
those respondents with past contact. 
200 Randomization inference takes the randomization explicitly into account and follows R.A. Fisher’s 
idea of statistical inference via permutation tests of treatment allocation (Young 2016). The idea is to 
assume uncertainty about the treatment allocation and compare the actual treatment allocation to 
possible alternative allocations. 
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Asterisks indicate p-values based on standard errors clustered at the facility level 
according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based upon the 
sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC contact. Standard errors 
(SE) are clustered at the facility level. RI p-values are computed with a 
permutation test based on Hess (2017). Specifications (b) include a variable 
indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the respondent had 
financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a 
variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of paperwork. The 
same regression with wild cluster bootstrapped SE can be found in Appendix 
Table A4.13., for which significance levels hold. 
 
In the unadjusted regressions, international framing has a positive but at conventional 
levels insignificant effect on financial contributions of respondents. Once adjusting for control 
variables, this coefficient turns significant at the 5-percent level. Respondents facing an 
international framing contribute on average more money in support of the SCC project than 
their counterparts being confronted with the local framing. In the adjusted specification, their 
contribution is 1,284 IDR higher. These results are supported by the alternative outcome 
measures presented in Appendix Table A4.8.201 Hence, our results suggest that the 
intervention is increasingly supported by the respondents, if it is perceived as an 
internationally-led endeavor. The representativeness of the experiment is supported by the 
balance of important individual and contextual characteristics between the experimental 
sample and the larger sample of the SCC intervention.  
 
  
                                                     
201 Our alternative outcome measures are first, whether respondents would recommend the SCC to 
fellow colleagues, second, whether they would be willing to invest additional time for the SCC project, 
third, how high they estimate the average contribution by others and fourth an index of all four outcome 
measures, using principal component analysis (PCA). Estimates in Table A4.8. show robustly positive 
coefficients, when controls are included and reach statistical significance for recommending the SCC to 
others and for the PCA-index. Here, however, the financial contribution is the variable that explains the 
major part of the variance in the index. Additionally, one’s willingness to support an intervention might 
also be strongly determined by the beliefs about others’ contribution. However, reporting one’s 
perception about others might be subject to conformity bias, especially, in the Indonesian society, where 
a large focus is put on keeping one’s face. Elicitation exercises based on introspection have been shown 
to reduce potential conformity bias in the experimental literature (Trautmann and van de Kuilen 
2015).  We, thus, incentivized respondents with an additional pay-off of 5,000 IDR to estimate the 
average contribution category of respondents at other facilities. Therefore, we use the outcome variable 
elicitation as control in our main specification as robustness (see Table A4.14.). As expected, elicitation 
shows to be highly significant and positive, while the framing effect holds. 
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Channels: previous exposure  
In order to understand in more detail why respondents show stronger support towards 
projects implemented by international actors as compared to local implementers, we 
investigate a mechanism that could influence the attitude of respondents. Previous exposure is 
one prominent factor determining attitudes. Hence, it might play a role whether respondents 
have been in contact with locally or internationally-led research projects in the past. Their 
respective experiences are likely to influence their present attitudes and reactions to the 
intervention. 
Descriptive correlations (see Appendix Table A4.15.) indicate that first-hand 
experiences – both with local and international research programs – are associated with 
positive perceptions towards the corresponding implementer – though no claims regarding 
the causal direction can be made here. Hence, it seems that those positive experiences affect 
not only the respective implementer but also the support for other actors.202 It is, therefore, of 
particular interest to examine the interaction of the international or local framing with 
previous exposure vis-à-vis the implementing agent. Table 4.3. displays the results for the 
interaction of our experimental framing with the binary variables indicating if respondents 
already participated in international or local research projects. While the randomization 
ensured that the framing could be considered as exogenous, project participation is potentially 
endogenous regarding other traits of the surveyed respondent. However, as recent research 
by Bun and Harrison (2018) and Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) indicates, the interaction 
of an exogenous and an endogenous variable can be considered as exogenous, when 
controlling for the endogenous variable.203 Moreover, balancing tests provided in Table A4.2. 
and A4.3. underscore that previous participation is balanced across both framing treatments. 
The results in columns (1a-b) are structured to compare respondents with similar previous 
experience (e.g., participation in international/local projects) across framings. The 
corresponding comparison group are locally framed respondents, who did neither participate 
in a local nor in an international project. Rows I and II show that if a person had been exposed 
                                                     
202 The results in Table A4.15. also hold if including as control variable local or international 
participation, respectively, and if standard errors are bootstrapped. The majority of respondents, who 
participated in international projects also participated in local projects, but not vice versa.  
203 Nonetheless, one needs to be aware that, especially, with a limited sample size omitted variables 
might not be homogenously distributed and, hence, it is not inherently clear, which other factors are 
correlated with our interaction variable of interest. 
 192 
 
both to an international and local research project in the past, their contribution is approx. 
6,500-8,500 IDR (e.g., 0.45-0.65 US$) higher if framed international.204 Thus, the effect of the 
attitude towards the intervention in the unadjusted and adjusted specification is significantly 
higher if respondents knowing both implementers are framed internationally (p-value: 0.025 
and 0.000, respectively). Respondents who previously participated in local projects do not 
contribute different amounts of money when faced with an international framing. However, 
if respondents were only exposed to international projects in the past, they do contribute 
significantly less if locally framed, both significant with and without adjusting for controls (p-
value: 0.012 and 0.052, respectively). Finally, row VII does not depict any significant framing 
effects, if respondents did not have any prior experience. Those estimates suggest that the 
positive effects of the international framing are driven by previous experience with the 
respective implementer. The reduced willingness to contribute to local projects is most 
pronounced if respondents have participated both in local and international projects.  
Table 4.3. Main regression results – Previous participation in international and local projects 
 
Financial Contribution  
in support of SCC project (in IDR) 
(1a) (1b) 
I. International Framing (1) 
x Int Partipation (1) x Loc 
Participation (1) 
2,708.3333 4,202.8921** 
p-value (0.2369) 
 
(0.0186) 
 II. International Framing 
(0) x Int Partipation (1) x 
Loc Participation (1) 
-3,791.6667*** -4,313.2256*** 
p-value (0.0067) 
 
(0.0001) 
 Coefficient Equality Row 
(I) & (II) 
0.0247 0.0000 
III. International Framing 
(1) x Int Partipation (0) x 
Loc Participation (1) 
-2,291.6667* -1,196.6307 
p-value (0.0684) 
 
(0.2871) 
 
IV. International Framing 
(0) x Int Partipation (0) x 
Loc Participation (1) 
-148.8095 -537.1762 
p-value (0.9183) 
 
(0.7621) 
                                                      
204 Although this amount seems small, it corresponds to one meal or half an hour of work of a midwife 
in the local context. 
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Coefficient Equality Row 
(III) & (IV) 
0.1864 0.6602 
V. International Framing 
(1) x Int Partipation (1) x 
Loc Participation (0) 
-625.0000 1,433.0596 
p-value (0.7101) 
 
(0.5073) 
 IV. International Framing 
(0) x Int Partipation (1) x 
Loc Participation (0) 
-4,791.6665*** 
 
-4,184.6089 
 
p-value (0.00001) 
 
(0.1275) 
 
Coefficient Equality Row 
(V) & (VI) 
0.0124 0.0520 
VII. International Framing 
(1) x Int Partipation (0) x 
Loc Participation (0) 
646.9298 1,009.8640 
p-value (0.4626) 
 
(0.2006) 
 N 165 165 
Control variables No Yes 
 Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All 
specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without 
prior SCC contact. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. 
Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable 
indicating if the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social 
desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the 
amount of paperwork. 
 
The positive attitudes towards international projects might, however, depend on the 
local context as every country will have its specifics in experiences with and attitudes towards 
the local and international community. The Acehnese context is a very interesting case to study 
as to its large exposure to various international as well as local actors in the aftermath of the 
Tsunami 2004 causing more than 130 000 deaths in the country.205 Due to previous experiences 
with both local and international implementers, the assessment of attitudes towards the 
different implementers is facilitated. However, this context of ultimate human emergency, 
might have induced a more positive attitude towards the international assistance and could 
make the interpretation specific to the context.206 Qualitative data based on 66 surveys with 
health practitioners suggest that positive attitudes towards internationals are mostly linked to 
                                                     
205 Despite the individual tragedies, the natural disaster was perceived by parts of the population as a 
chance to restart, as it coincided with the cessation of the Aceh insurgency after almost 30 years of 
combat and successful reconstruction efforts. 
206 Moreover, Aceh might be specific due to its strong Muslim heritage and introduction of Islamic law 
in 2006. 
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perceptions of better knowledge and more structured implementation approaches.207 This is 
in line with the positive and significant correlation of the international framing with positive 
perceptions of international control capabilities and skills vis-à-vis local implementers (confer 
Table A4.16.) and corresponds to higher trust levels after previous project participation (see 
Table A4.15.).208  
Taken together, those results, first, suggest to consider the previous experience of the 
targeted population when aiming to achieve high project uptake and accordingly frame 
development policies. Second, they call for caution when thinking about scalability of projects 
by the local government if piloted by internationals. Third, they call for caution, both from 
internationals and locals, when implementing development policies. Their past actions might 
affect subsequent take-up and success of other projects.  
4.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Evidence from behavioral economics supports the importance of non-monetary incentives, 
trust, or peer effects to explain human behavior. These insights are also of utmost importance 
to the design of interventions in development economics. This chapter makes use of the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB) – a well-established theory originating from social psychology – 
offering a systematic approach to explain and influence supportive human behavior by 
considering three determinants: A positive attitude towards the behavior or intervention, 
supporting subjective norms, and a high degree of perceived behavioral control. We provide 
evidence of the positive association of these mechanisms with the uptake of a program by 
study participants in two different cultural contexts. Using the settings of two randomized 
controlled trials in Pakistan and Indonesia, we show that a more positive attitude towards the 
new tool (here the Safe Childbirth Checklist (SCC)), more salient subjective norms in favor of 
the intervention, and greater perceived behavioral control to actively use and implement the 
checklist were associated with increased intended and actual use of the checklist. Applying 
                                                     
207 These were the most often named categories in an open question reading “Please describe 
your experience working with international teams. What did you find surprising?” 
208 We asked midwives if they would attribute certain attributes rather to local or international 
researchers (e.g., skills, corruption, financial capabilities) in order to carve out how those channels might 
affect support for the intervention. Those questions were asked intentionally after collecting the 
outcomes in order to not confound the results. However, this comes with the risk of justification bias, 
indicated by the significant framing effects in Table A4.16. Hence, we did not use those channels for 
further analysis. Yet, they might be still informative in terms of general attribute ascription. 
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the TPB in two diverse study contexts strengthens the claim of generalizability of the results. 
Previous studies on the TPB also support its broad applicability to explain and influence 
human behavior. However, it is important to note that we left the random setting for the TPB 
analysis and, hence, our study does not allow us to infer causal effects of the TPB on intended 
and actual behavioral reactions.  
Recent evidence shows the importance of implementers’ characteristics in shaping 
behavior towards an intervention and it is likely that this affects the TPB determinant attitude 
towards the behavior. Hence, we further investigate how the salience of the implementer’s 
background, in particular, whether a project is led by an international or local agent, influences 
the participants’ support for the project. The implementer’s background is particularly 
interesting with regard to increasing experimental research in low- and middle-income 
countries, which is often a collaboration between international and local researchers and 
practitioners. The results of the framed field experiment in Indonesia indicate that respondents 
are more supportive towards interventions (measured through monetary support) 
implemented by international actors as compared to solely locally led projects. This finding is 
in line with previous research on behavioral reactions towards international and multilateral 
donor agencies (e.g., Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016; Winters, Dietrich, and Mahmud 2017). 
Even though research projects might be characterized by different conditions than practical 
development cooperation, our findings could be informative for development cooperation in 
practice and development research likewise. Our results might be important for potential 
replication or scaling of interventions by local actors that were previously implemented by 
international agents. Extra effort might be needed to generate a positive, supportive behavior 
towards the intervention if solely implemented by local agents (or probably vice-versa in 
countries with higher trust in local than international implementers). Generally, trust towards 
both groups is high in the Indonesian case. Interestingly, those respondents that have already 
been exposed to previous internationally-led research interventions take a more positive 
stance towards future international projects. This relationship cannot be established for those 
who already participated in local research projects. Overall, the results suggest that previous 
experience with the respective agents influences the attitude and support for future 
interventions, underscoring the importance of responsible conduction of interventions.  
By investigating potential pathways of the framing effects, particularly previous 
project participation towards the respective agents, we aim at opening this ‘black box’ to foster 
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the explanation of the effects found. The chapter also stresses the effect of the salience of project 
implementers to influence support and contribution towards an intervention in case trust 
levels towards the implementer are high. However, experiences with local and international 
actors might differ across contexts. For this reason, our results can be considered as one of the 
first steps of evaluating the TPB and, more specifically, attitudes towards implementers, 
experimentally. 
This study provides evidence in favor of an active consideration of the TPB 
determinants in the design and implementation of interventions to increase uptake, 
cooperative behavior, and general support by the targeted population. Certainly, researchers 
and practitioners will already have intuitively taken determinants of the TPB into account 
when designing their intervention. In our study, however, we argue for a systematic 
application of the TPB to increase interventions’ success. A qualitative investigation prior to 
the project implementation and close cooperation with people knowing the local context to 
identify behavioral, normative, and control beliefs (that underlie the TPB determinants) within 
the study sample is recommended (Protogerou et al. 2012). Following the logic of the TPB, 
changing the respective beliefs in the appropriate direction will increase supportive behavior 
towards the intervention (Hobbis and Sutton 2005). Further research needs to contribute to a 
clearer understanding by randomly altering the other TPB determinants or replicating results 
in different settings. This way, important knowledge can be gained to improve not only 
research interventions, but also practical development cooperation in more general terms.  
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Figure A4.1. Study design flow chart 
 
 
 
Figure A4.2. 'International' country concept  
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Appendix A4.1. Experimental Protocol209 
General Remarks 
If respondent asks you something, kindly answer by mentioning that you are only involved 
as an enumerator in the project and that you do not have any information on the Safe 
Childbirth Checklist. Furthermore, please connect the respondent with the contact number, 
which has been stated before 
Of course if there are misunderstandings, you should repeat the provided information. 
However, please do not explain the information in different words. 
Part A 
“Now, we would like to present you a new tool and would like to learn about your opinion 
towards it.”   
[Before the start of the experiment (after the completed Survey); give 25.000 IDR voucher to 
the respondent]  
“This is in appreciation of your time. Thank you very much. Subsequently, we will provide 
you with some information on a new tool for health-care in Aceh province. After this, you 
can decide whether you want to take the money for yourself or if you want to contribute 
some for the implementation of this tool.” 
Part B 
 [Enumerator: Please, read this introduction out aloud and clear.]) 
 “During complex events, like performing a surgery or a delivery, people can be forgetful or 
might be distracted by other emergencies or duties. This can potentially have terrible 
consequences, in the worst case losing the patient. Research proofs that checklists can save 
lives and prevent these mistakes. Like a surgeon is responsible for patients’ lives in the 
operation theater, the delivery team can have great impact on the safety of mothers and 
babies. We would like to present you a new tool, which was developed especially for your 
everyday work: The Safe Childbirth Checklist. It comprises 30 easy to use items. The 
checklist begins with the admission of the patient and ends with the discharge of mother and 
baby from the hospital. In each delivery, the doctor or midwife fills in one checklist for every 
patient. You will fill-in the checklist step by step and the checklist will remind you to 
                                                     
209 The Indonesian version of the experimental protocol is available upon request. 
 200 
 
perform the important steps during delivery. If you would like to know more about the 
checklist, here it is.” 
 [Enumerator: Please hand a checklist copy over to the doctor or midwife.] 
 “For example, the checklist reminds you to perform easy things, which are nevertheless very 
important like hand washing.” 
 [Enumerator: Show item “Confirm supplies are available to clean hands and wear gloves for 
each vaginal exam.” on checklist] 
“The checklist also reminds you to share important information with patients, including 
danger signs.” 
[Enumerator: Show item “Danger Signs” on checklist to the midwife or doctor]  
“All these steps are already part of the study curriculum. Hence, every checklist item is easy 
to understand. Generally, most of the health workers already practice these important steps 
in the delivery process. The checklist just has the purpose to remind you of all the important 
steps during the delivery process. Especially, when health practitioners are under a lot of 
pressure, e.g., during night shifts or if complications arise, it can be very helpful. For 
instance, a research study has proven that during surgeries simple checklists can help to 
reduce death rates even by almost half.” 
Part C 
 “Among other researchers, [INTERNATIONAL / LOCAL] researchers took an active role in 
introducing the checklist to 17 facilities in Aceh province. The research team received 
approval from the provincial health office of Aceh. However, no funding was provided by 
the provincial health office. [LOCAL / INTERNATIONAL] research assistants and 
[INTERNATIONAL / LOCAL] health professionals with a lot of experience in delivery 
services were important partners and greatly supported the project.” 
Part D 
 “I will now read to you information about the funding of the Safe Childbirth study 
conducted by the [INTERNATIONAL / LOCAL] researchers. The following is a page of 
paper containing information on the checklist.”  
[Enumerator: Please hand over the SCC leaflet to the participant]  
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“The funds for the study have been used to implement the Safe Childbirth Checklist in 17 
health facilities in Aceh province during October 2016. Funds are still available to introduce 
the checklist to 16 further facilities. The budget is enough to provide the 17 health facilities 
over six months with checklist copies. Therefore, every delivery during these six months can 
be conducted with the checklist. After this survey ends, the first six months of the checklist 
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implementation are also over. There will be no funds remaining to provide additional 
checklists to those 17 health facilities, where the checklist was already introduced before.” 
Part E 
 “The researchers are collecting funds to be able to provide checklist copies at those health 
facilities. Are you willing to support the activity? Remember that the money collected will 
exclusively be used to provide Checklist copies to the health facilities. The total amount of 
money that was contributed by all donors together will be made transparent. After finalizing 
the data collection, the amount of money collected will be published openly in every 
participating facility of this research.” 
“If you would like to support the activity, please decide on the amount of money you would 
like to contribute and note it down on the voucher. You can choose to not contribute at all, or 
you can give 5,000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 or 25,000 IDR. Every contribution can help to 
conduct more deliveries with a Safe Childbirth Checklist. When you are done, please put the 
voucher in the envelope and seal it. If you do not wish to contribute anything, please put the 
number 0 on the voucher. In the end, only the aggregate amount of contributions from all 
participating facilities will be announced. Your individual contribution will be treated 
confidentially.” 
Part F 
[Enumerator: Read this introduction out aloud to the participant] 
 “During the following task you have to estimate the most chosen answer, which neither 
refers to the total amount nor the average.” 
“We have asked also other health practitioners/workers in the district how much is their 
willingness to contribute to the provision of checklist copies. Which amount do you think 
was contributed to the checklist copies by your colleagues per person at other facilities? This 
estimation is not at all related to your personal opinion. Instead, we would like you to 
estimate which amount of contribution that was given by most of the other health 
practitioners per person.” 
“For this question, if you assessed the most chosen amount per person correctly, you will be 
given an additional 10,000 IDR. If you estimated the right amount, the 10.000 IDR will be 
topped up to your phone credit together with the voucher within the next few days.”  
“The other health practitioners also had to choose to contribute 0; 5,000 ; 10,000 ; 15,000 ; 
20,000 or 25,000 IDR. Which category do you think was the most frequently chosen by the 
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health workers?/ Which amount do you think most other health workers chose to contribute 
per person?” 
Part G 
 “Your facility is one of the other 16 facilities, where the research team would like to 
implement the Safe Childbirth Checklist. Experience shows that checklist use needs to be 
practiced with coaches regularly in order to make deliveries safer. How committed are you 
in investing your time to practice the use of the checklist in every week?” 
Debriefing 
“Thank you very much for your participation. We asked you previously several questions. 
The aim is to find out what is your opinion about [local/international] researchers and how 
this opinion influences your motivation to use the Safe Childbirth Checklist. The checklist 
was previously pilot tested in other countries around the world. This way the most crucial 
practices during child delivery were identified. The research collaboration was led by the 
Harvard School of Public Health and the World Health Organization. Local researchers from 
Syiah Kuala University worked together with international researchers to adapt the checklist 
to the local context. Both parties hope that the Safe Childbirth Checklist can be implemented 
sustainably to serve as a tool for safe deliveries in Aceh province.” 
“Thank you very much for your participation. We asked you previously several questions. 
The aim is to find out what is your opinion about [local/international] researchers and how 
this opinion influences your motivation to use the Safe Childbirth Checklist. The checklist 
was previously pilot tested in other countries around the world. This way the most crucial 
practices during child delivery were identified. The research collaboration was led by the 
Harvard School of Public Health and the World Health Organization. Local researchers from 
Syiah Kuala University worked together with international researchers to adapt the checklist 
to the local context. Both parties hope that the Safe Childbirth Checklist can be implemented 
sustainably to serve as a tool for safe deliveries in Aceh province.” 
“If these information change your attitude towards contributing to the checklist copies in 
any way, you are free to to change your indicated contribution.” 
 [Enumerator: If the respondent decides to change his/her contribution, please hand the 
envelope back.] 
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Table A4.1. Balancing table for the experimental sample – comparison between treatment (international framing) and control (local framing) 
Variable 
N 
Full Sample 
Mean 
Full sample 
SD  
Full sample 
Mean  
Control 
SD  
Control 
Mean 
Treatment 
SD  
Treatment 
p-value of 
difference in 
means t-test 
Facility Type 236 1.538  1.690  1.433  0.021** 
Respondent's Gender (1=m, 
2=f) 
236 2.000  2.000  2.000   
Respondent's Age 236 33.314 7.493 33.650 7.806 33.112 7.316 0.593 
Respondent's Education (Yrs) 236 15.051 0.527 15.020 0.603 15.067 0.462 0.619 
Experience (Yrs) 236 9.576 7.271 9.690 7.736 9.537 6.979 0.886 
Sufficient Income 236 3.208 1.008 3.160 1.012 3.246 1.014 0.526 
Financial problems 236 1.678  1.720  1.642  0.081* 
Donate Less if others donate 236 4.657 1.264 4.710 1.225 4.627 1.296 0.564 
Social Acceptability Index 236 3.411 0.838 3.450 0.821 3.381 0.857 0.513 
Social Acceptability Item 1 236 4.966 0.690 5.000 0.778 4.940 0.622 0.480 
Social Acceptability Item 2 236 4.568 1.027 4.600 0.932 4.545 1.101 0.650 
Social Acceptability Item 3 236 5.343 0.558 5.310 0.506 5.366 0.595 0.172 
Social Acceptability Item 4 233 4.644 1.074 4.694 1.069 4.602 1.087 0.475 
Social Acceptability Item 5 236 2.229 1.254 2.250 1.298 2.216 1.235 0.784 
Paperwork takes too much 
time 
236 2.814 1.343 3.000 1.497 2.664 1.195 0.173 
Routines make work easier 236 5.153 0.734 5.150 0.626 5.179 0.764 0.660 
Previous checklist experience 236 2.564 1.831 2.500 1.795 2.627 1.871 0.536 
Previous checklist use 236 0.547  0.540  0.560  0.772 
Access to essential resources 236 3.470 0.517 3.530 0.502 3.425 0.526 0.080* 
Team efficacy indicator 236 5.246 0.513 5.220 0.462 5.261 0.547 0.570 
Participation in local projects 236 1.831  1.870  1.806  0.235 
Participation in int projects 236 1.898  1.880  1.910  0.511 
Participation in donor projects 236 1.907  1.920  1.896  0.511 
* Notes: Proportions in the two groups are significantly different from each other, p ≤  0.05 (t test). Based upon the full sample with N denoting the number 
of observations, SD gives the standard deviation. Standard errors were clustered at the facility level. 
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Table A4.2. Balancing table – Experiment and respective comparison group of SCC intervention 
Variable N  
 
Full Sample 
Mean  
 
Full Sample 
SD  
 
Full Sample 
Mean  
SCC 
Intervention 
SD  
SCC 
Intervention 
Mean 
 
 Experiment 
SD  
 
Experiment 
p-value of  
difference in 
means t-test 
Facility Type 335 1.676  1.859  1.503  0.002 
Respondent's Gender (1=m, 
2=f) 
335 1.994  1.988  2.000  0.150 
Respondent's Age 335 32.529 0.403 32.706 0.606 32.379 0.539 0.687 
Respondent's Education (Yrs) 335 15.195 0.064 15.405 0.121 14.994 0.040 0.001 
Experience (Yrs) 335 8.928 0.404 8.969 0.600 8.905 0.547 0.937 
Resource Access 335 3.486 0.027 3.534 0.039 3.444 0.038 0.102 
Team Efficacy 335 5.240 0.025 5.282 0.036 5.195 0.034 0.081 
* Notes: Proportions in the two groups are significantly different from each other, p ≤  0.05 (t test). ‘Full Sample’ refers to the pooled Indonesian SCC 
intervention (treatment and control group), ‘SCC Intervention’ to the treatment group of the SCC intervention, and ‘Experiment’ to the SCC intervention’s 
control group where framing experiment was conducted. N denotes the number of observations, SD gives the standard deviation. Standard errors are 
clustered at the facility level. 
 
Table A4.3. Balancing table – Reduced sample used for empirical analysis (excluding those with prior SCC contact) 
Variable 
N 
Full Sample 
Mean 
Full sample 
SD 
Full sample 
Mean 
Control 
SD 
Control 
Mean 
Treatment 
SD 
Treatment 
p-value of 
difference in 
means t-test 
Facility Type 170 1.500  1.618  1.409  0.050 
Respondent's Gender (1=m, 
2=f) 
170 2.000  2.000  2.000   
Respondent's Age 170 32.359 6.997 33.118 7.680 31.774 6.395 0.232 
Respondent's Education (Yrs) 170 14.994 0.516 14.974 0.565 15.011 0.478 0.742 
Experience (Yrs) 170 8.888 7.094 8.974 7.494 8.849 6.824 0.908 
Sufficient Income 170 3.200 1.069 3.118 1.083 3.269 1.065 0.348 
Financial problems 170 1.741  1.763  1.720  0.396 
Donate Less if others donate 170 4.606 1.411 4.658 1.381 4.581 1.440 0.613 
Social Acceptability Index 170 3.329 0.827 3.316 0.852 3.344 0.814 0.808 
Social Acceptability Item 1 170 5.000 0.738 4.987 0.887 5.011 0.599 0.834 
Social Acceptability Item 2 170 4.459 1.142 4.461 1.026 4.462 1.239 0.991 
Social Acceptability Item 3 170 5.429 0.584 5.408 0.521 5.452 0.634 0.436 
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Social Acceptability Item 4 167 4.545 1.063 4.649 1.065 4.457 1.063 0.239 
Social Acceptability Item 5 170 2.118 1.286 2.184 1.334 2.065 1.258 0.375 
Paperwork takes too much 
time 
170 2.906 1.364 3.145 1.547 2.720 1.174 0.150 
Routines make work easier 170 5.100 0.727 5.079 0.648 5.151 0.722 0.471 
Previous checklist experience 170 2.765 1.983 2.632 1.945 2.882 2.026 0.298 
Previous checklist use 170 0.541  0.553  0.538  0.854 
Access to essential resources 170 3.441 0.498 3.513 0.503 3.387 0.490 0.060 
Team efficacy indicator 170 5.200 0.443 5.158 0.434 5.226 0.445 0.459 
Participation in local projects 170 1.829  1.868  1.796  0.131 
Participation in int projects 170 1.918  1.895  1.935  0.272 
Participation in donor projects 170 1.935  1.934  1.935  0.959 
* Notes: Proportions in the two groups are significantly different from each other, p ≤  0.05 (t test). Based upon the reduced sample excluding observations 
with prior contact to the checklist. N denotes the number of observations, SD gives the standard deviation. Standard errors were clustered at the facility 
level. 
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Table A4.4. Summary statistics for Indonesian data 
Variable 
N 
Full 
Sample 
Max 
Full 
Sample 
Min 
Full 
Sample 
Mean 
Full 
sample 
SD  
Full 
sample 
Actual Behavior      
Active SCC Use 219 1 0 0.389 0.489 
Intended Behavior      
Would try to use SCC 
even if copies are not 
provided 
163 6 3 4.847 0.634 
Would recommend the 
SCC to fellow colleagues 
163 6 2 5.092 0.495 
Using the SCC in my 
professional role is 
163 6 4 5.325 0.483 
Ease to use SCC in work 
environment 
163 6 4 5.141 0.565 
SCC is supported by 
superiors 
163 6 4 5.828 0.439 
Urban (1) – Rural (2) 
Dummy 
163 2 1 1.515 0.501 
CEmONC Service 
Provision 24/7 
163 1 0 0.178 0.384 
Facility Type: 
Community Health 
Centre 
163 1 0 0.589 0.494 
Facility Type: Public 
Hospital  
163 1 0 0.135 0.343 
Facility Type: Private 
Hospital 
163 1 0 0.190 0.394 
Facility Type: Private 
Midwife Clinic 
163 1 0 0.086 0.281 
District: Aceh Besar 163 1 0 0.276 0.448 
District: Banda Aceh 163 1 0 0.331 0.472 
District: Bireuen 163 1 0 0.393 0.490 
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Table A4.5. Summary statistics for Pakistani data 
Variable 
N 
Full 
Sample 
Max 
Full 
Sample 
Min 
Full 
Sample 
Mean 
Full 
sample 
SD  
Full 
sample 
Actual Behavior      
Active SCC Use 212 1 0 0.344 0.476 
Intended Behavior      
Would try to use SCC 
even if copies are not 
provided 
78 6 1 4.628 1.452 
Would recommend the 
SCC to fellow colleagues 
78 6 1 5.141 1.090 
Using the SCC in my 
professional role is 
79 6 1 5.380 0.821 
Ease to use SCC in work 
environment 
79 6 1 4.962 1.305 
SCC is supported by 
superiors 
58 6 1 5.155 1.508 
Urban (1) – Rural (2) 
Dummy 
80 1 0 0.813  0.393 
Open 24/7 80 1 0 0.150 0.359 
Facility Type: Health 
Facility 
80 1 0 0.2125 0.412 
Facility Type: 
Community Midwife 
80 1 0 0.5625 0.500 
Facility Type: Lady 
Health Visitor 
80 1 0 0.225 0.420 
District: Haripur 80 1 0 0.45 0.501 
District: Nowshera 80 1 0 0.55 0.501 
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Appendix A4.2. Social desirability index 
 
We modify social desirability questions developed by Kemper et al. (2014) to reflect social desirability norms in the Acehnese context. The social 
desirability index was constructed by adding up the top categories (5 and 6) indicated in the subsequent questions. 
 
1. “In an argument, I always remain objective and not become 
emotional.” 
2. “Even if I am sad, I always smile when talking to others.” 
3. “When talking to someone older, I always listen carefully to what 
she/he says.” 
4. “When I had the chance to donate for religious purposes, I always 
contributed a lot.”  
5. “Sometimes I only help people if I hope to get something in return.” 
 
1. Disagree strongly 
2.  Disagree                      
3.  Rather disagree         
4.  Rather agree      
5.  Agree 
6.  Agree strongly 
7.  Not applicable 
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Table A4.6. Main Results Intended and Actual SCC Use with Wild Bootstrapped SE 
 
Intended SCC Use: 
Would try to use 
SCC even if copies 
are not provided  
(1 "disagree strongly" - 6 
"agree strongly") 
Actual SCC Use: Was 
Checklist actively used or 
looked at during delivery 
process? 
Indonesia Pakistan Indonesia 
(2a) (3a) (4a) 
Attitudes: Using the SCC in my 
professional role is:     1 "completely 
useless" - 6 "completely useful" 
0.4535*** 0.655*** -0.364 
WB p-value (0.00400) (0.00000) (0.50450) 
Subjective Norms: SCC is supported by 
superiors: 1 "not at all" - 6 "completely" 
0.5356* 0.207 0.642 
WB p-value (0.0721) (0.32032) (0.50250) 
Perceived Behavioral Control: Ease to use 
SCC in work environment: 1 "very 
difficult" - 6 "very easy" 
0,2614 0.306*** 0.0381 
WB p-value (0.10210) (0.00000) (0.43243) 
N 163 212 218 
Control variables no no no 
Mean of dep. var. 4.847 0.344 0.389 
Median of dep. var. 5 - - 
Standard Deviation of dep. var. 0.634 0.476 0.489 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are based upon the 
treated providers and standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level and wild cluster bootstrapped due to 
the small number of clusters (15), following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). No bootstrapping is provided for 
intended SCC use in Pakistan as a sufficient number of clusters (70) was sampled. 
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Table A4.7. Binary definition of outcome variable 
 
Would try to use SCC even if copies are not 
provided (Dummy variable=1 if “fully agree”) 
Pakistan Indonesia 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Attitudes: Using the SCC in my 
professional role is:     1 "completely 
useless" - 6 "completely useful" 
0.930*** 0.704** 0.4509*** 
 
0.3173** 
 
p-value (0.00717) (0.02494) (0.00564) (0.01273) 
Subjective Norms: SCC is supported by 
superiors:  
1 "not at all" - 6 "completely" 
0.508 0.244 0.6996*** 
 
0.4444*** 
 
p-value (0.11763) (0.47477) (0.00864) (0.00257) 
Perceived Behavioral Control: Ease to use 
SCC in work environment: 1 "very 
difficult" - 6 "very easy" 
0.763** 0.675** 0.3027 
 
-0.0573 
 
p-value (0.01099) (0.04077) (0.16626) (0.74646) 
N 78 78 163 163 
Control variables no yes No yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4.628 4.628 4.847 4.847 
Median of dep. var. 5 5 5 5 
Standard Deviation of dep. var. 1.452 1.452 0.634 0.634 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are 
based upon the treated providers and standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. Adjusted 
regressions (b) additionally control for a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable 
indicating rural/urban location, a variable indicating the district and for the Pakistan data a binary 
variable indicating whether the facility is open 24/7.  
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Table A4.8. Main Results – Alternative Outcome Measures 
 
Would recommend 
the SCC to fellow 
colleagues  
(1 "disagree strongly" –  
6 "agree strongly") 
Willingness to invest 
additional time for 
SCC project  
(in 5 min categories) 
Estimated average 
contribution by fellow 
health staff 
 (in IDR) 
PCA index 
(all outcome variables) 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Framing 
(=1 if 
'international') 
0.0491 0.1259* -0.1505 0.0949 605.9285 769.9561 0.1082 0.3167** 
p-value (0.53505) 
 
(0.05828) 
 
(0.40361) 
 
(0.62377) 
 
(0.44686) 
 
(0.30365) 
 
(0.52512) 
 
(0.01225) 
 
RI p-value (0.6000) (0.1220) (0.6680) (0.7460) (0.3420) (0.2390) (0.5840) (0.0530) 
WB p-value (0.53053) (0.07608) (0.37037) (0.57057) (0.45245) (0.28228) (0.52452) (0.01001) 
N 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
Control variables No yes no Yes no yes No Yes 
Mean of dep. var. 5.108 5.108 5.084 5.084 7365.269 7365.269 -0.117 -0.117 
Std. dev. of dep. 
var. 
0.581 0.581 2.237 2.237 3950.536 3950.536 1.289 1.289 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based upon the sample limited 
to those respondents without prior SCC contact. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. We present results based 
on clustered SE indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped due to limited cluster number (13) for the specifications indicated 
as “WB p-values”, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). RI p-values are computed with a permutation test based on 
Hess (2017). Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the respondent had 
financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the 
amount of paperwork. 
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Table A4.9. Ordered probit results 
 
Would recommend the 
SCC to fellow colleagues  
(1 "disagree strongly" –  
6 "agree strongly") 
Willingness to invest 
additional time for SCC 
project  
(in 5 min categories) 
Financial Contribution in 
support of SCC project  
(in IDR) 
Estimated average 
contribution by fellow 
health staff 
 (in IDR) 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Framing  
(=1 if 
'international') 
0.1911 0.1259* -0.0871 0.0949 0.0813 1,283.7717** 0.1291 769.9561 
p-value (0.31609) (0.05828) (0.23911) (0.62377) (0.59964) (0.02119) (0.53468) (0.30365) 
N 167 167 167 167 165 165 167 167 
Control 
variables 
no  yes no  yes no  yes no  yes 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Reported coefficients are not transformed and represent ordered 
probit coefficients. All specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC contact. Standard errors (SE) 
are clustered at the facility level. Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the respondent 
had financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of 
paperwork. 
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Table A4.10. Covariates across outcome variables 
 
Would 
recommend the 
SCC to fellow 
colleagues  
(1 "disagree 
strongly"  
6 "agree strongly") 
Willingness to 
invest additional 
time for SCC 
project  
(in 5 min categories) 
Financial 
Contribution in 
support of SCC 
project  
(in IDR) 
Estimated 
average 
contribution by 
fellow health 
staff 
 (in IDR) 
PCA index  
(all outcome 
variables) 
Facility Type (Base: Com. Health Clinics)   
Public Hospital -0.0629 -1.0438 -3,444.5249*** 415.6412 -0.7102* 
p-value (0.59493) 
 
(0.07348) 
 
(0.00001) 
 
(0.81588) 
 
(0.06426) 
 WB p-value (0.65065) (0.13413) (0.00200) (0.69469) (0.20020) 
Private Hospital -0.2171 0.8256 -1,093.5731 1,162.3579 0.0420 
p-value (0.29571) 
 
(0.26514) 
 
(0.66748) 
 
(0.33678) 
 
(0.92297) 
 WB p-value (0.30230) (0.34434) (0.54054) (0.45445) (0.87287) 
Social Acceptability Index  
(5 components: 1’low’ - 6 ‘high’) 
0.1318* 0.9340*** 825.2196* -81.4618 0.4459*** 
p-value (0.07054) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.09055) 
 
(0.70392) 
 
(0.00185) 
 WB p-value (0.08208) (0.00000) (0.11411) (0.63664) (0.00000) 
Paperwork takes too much time  
(1 "disagree strongly" - 6 "agree 
strongly") 
-0.1485*** -0.6369*** -978.2253*** -599.9692** -0.4430*** 
p-value (0.00266) 
 
(0.00010) 
 
(0.00203) 
 
(0.01911) 
 
(0.00008) 
 WB p-value (0.00400) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.01201) (0.00400) 
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Financial problems -0.0078 0.2482 1,266.2008 1,169.0571* 0.2960 
p-value (0.96621) 
 
(0.55271) 
 
(0.19761) 
 
(0.06300) 
 
(0.16188) 
 WB p-value (0.98098) (0.54254) (0.24224) (0.06206) (0.13213) 
N 167 167 165 167 167 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based upon the sample limited to those 
respondents without prior SCC contact (refer to Table A4.3.). Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. We present results based on 
clustered SE indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped due to limited cluster number (13) for the specifications indicated as “WB p-values”, 
following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).   
 
Table A4.11. Framing – Full sample with prior contact control 
 
Would recommend 
the SCC to fellow 
colleagues  
(1 "disagree strongly" –  
6 "agree strongly") 
Willingness to invest 
additional time for 
SCC project  
(in 5 min categories) 
Financial Contribution 
in support of SCC 
project  
(in IDR) 
Estimated average 
contribution by 
fellow health staff 
 (in IDR) 
PCA index  
(all outcome variables) 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Framing  
(=1 if 
'international') 
0.0582 0.1275** -0.0478 0.1774 537.5565 1,206.2985* 458.1032 789.4081 0.1151 0.3230*** 
p-value (0.29056) 
 
(0.03919) 
 
(0.79610) 
 
(0.25000) 
 
(0.44476) 
 
(0.06153) 
 
(0.59195
) 
 
(0.24813) 
 
(0.50173) 
 
(0.00812) 
 WB p-value (0.28629) (0.04004) (0.78478) (0.24024) (0.45045) (0.05005) (0.61862
) 
(0.26026) (0.46046) (0.00801) 
N 230 230 230 230 226 226 230 230 226 226 
Control 
variables 
no  yes no  yes no  yes no  Yes no  yes 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based upon the full sample. Standard errors (SE) are 
clustered at the facility level. We present results based on clustered SE indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped due to limited cluster number (13) 
for the specifications indicated as “WB p-values”, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). Specifications (b) include a binary variable indicating 
whether respondent was in prior contact with the checklist, a variable capturing the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the respondent had 
financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of paperwork. 
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Table A4.12. Main Results – Full sample using interaction with prior contact 
 
Financial Contribution 
in support of SCC project 
(in IDR) 
(a) (b) 
No Prior Contact X  
International Framing  
557.6236 1,164.8298** 
p-value (0.39538) (0.03264) 
Prior Contact X Local 
Framing 225.9725 627.9609 
p-value (0.83548) (0.54703) 
Prior Contact X 
International Framing 706.5217 1,955.2291 
p-value (0.54728) (0.10483) 
N 226 226 
Control variables no yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4757.576 4757.576 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 4711.366 4711.366 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values based on standard errors clustered at the 
facility level according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based 
upon the sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC contact. 
Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. Specifications (b) include 
a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the 
respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social desirability 
variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of 
paperwork. The base category is No Prior Contact and Local Framing. 
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Table A4.13. Main Results: Wild Bootstrapped SE 
 
Financial Contribution  
in support of SCC project  
(in IDR) 
(a) (b) 
Framing  
(=1 if 'international') 
557.6236 1,283.7717** 
WB p-value (0.40440) (0.03203) 
N 165 165 
Control variables no yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4757.576 4757.576 
Std. dev. of dep. var. 4711.366 4711.366 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All 
specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without 
prior SCC contact. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level and wild 
boostrapped due to limited cluster number (13) for the specifications indicated 
as “WB p-values”, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).). 
Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable 
indicating if the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social 
desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the 
amount of paperwork. 
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Table A4.14. Main Results – Controlling for elicitation 
 
Financial Contribution  
in support of SCC project  
(in IDR) 
Framing  
(=1 if 'international') 
852.6100* 
p-value (0.06413) 
 Elicited Contribution of 
Others as control 
0.5000*** 
p-value (0.00163) 
 
N 165 
Control variables yes 
Mean of dep. var. 4757.576 
Std. dev. of dep. 
var. 
4711.366 
Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All 
specifications are based upon the sample limited to those respondents without 
prior SCC contact. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. The 
specification include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable 
indicating if the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social 
desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the 
amount of paperwork. Moreover, the elicited contribution of health practitioners 
from other facilities is added as a control variable. 
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Table A4.15. Association between previous project participation and trust 
 
Trust in local actors 
(1"not at all" - 4"great 
deal") 
Trust in 
international actors 
(1"not at all" –  
4 "great deal") 
Trust in foreign 
countries (average 
trust level) 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Participation 
international 
project 
0.6039*** 0.4738*** 0.2857 0.3676** 0.2522* 0.3782*** 
p-value (0.00731) (0.00775) (0.11531) (0.01980) (0.08280) (0.00202) 
WB p-value (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.09610) (0.00000) (0.11211) (0.01201) 
Participation 
local project 
0.0647 0.1395 0.3017 0.3115* 0.3985*** 0.3699*** 
p-value (0.81084) (0.56675) (0.13285) (0.06467) (0.00251) (0.00021) 
WB p-value (0.79079) (0.54454) (0.10210) (0.04004) (0.00200) (0.00000) 
N 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Control 
variables 
No yes No Yes no Yes 
Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are 
based upon the sample limited to those respondents without prior SCC contact. Standard 
errors (SE) are clustered at the facility level. . We present results based on clustered SE 
indicated as “p-values” and wild bootstrapped due to limited cluster number (13) for the 
specifications indicated as “WB p-values”, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). 
Specifications (b) include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if 
the respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and 
a variable indicating the subjective perception of the amount of paperwork. 
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Table A4.16. Association between framing and potential channel variables 
 
Control 
Capabilities 
Implementation 
Skills 
Funding 
Capabilities 
Accountability 
Trust 
Foreign 
Countries 
Participation 
International 
Project 
Participation 
Local Project 
Framing  
(=1 if 
'international') 
0.8015*** 0.7738*** 0.6040*** 0.4445* 0.0447 0.0225 -0.0652 
SE (0.214) (0.210) (0.188) (0.243) (0.051) (0.047) (0.055) 
p-value (0.00247) (0.00275) (0.00670) (0.08993) (0.39321) (0.63772) 
 
(0.25714) 
 WB p-value (0.00400) 
 
(0.00801) 
 
(0.00801) 
 
(0.11812) 
 
(0.37437) 
 
(0.71872) 
 
(0.22422) 
 N 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Notes: Asterisks indicate p-values according to: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications are based upon the full sample. Standard errors 
(SE) are clustered at the facility level. All specifications include a variable indicating the facility type, a binary variable indicating if the 
respondent had financial problems, a composite index of social desirability variables and a variable indicating the subjective perception of the 
amount of paperwork. 
 221 
 
 222 
 
CHAPTER 5 
The Impact of Impact Evaluations:  
Cross-Country and Sub-National Evidence 
Single-authored 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
“Success depends on knowing what works.” 
– Bill Gates, Co-Chair 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation   
 
he likewise simple and wise statement of Bill Gates illustrates exactly the idea behind 
impact evaluations (IEs) in development economics. With impact evaluations, we try 
to find out, what in interventions enhances development and what not. At the same 
time, evidence is scarce on whether this strategy of employing impact evaluations actually 
works successfully in leading to improved outcomes – their final purpose and meaning of 
existence. This evidence gap remains, in spite of the wealth of experience coming from a 
history of almost 40 years with impact evaluations in development economics, which should 
be enough to draw conclusions. Challenges for evaluations to be effective, are large. Even most 
rigorously conducted evaluations that find significant evidence cannot have an impact by 
themselves, but only through policy practitioners that employ this evidence to design, 
improve, up-scale or discontinue their projects (Shah et al. 2015).210 Similarly important to 
evidence in aid effectiveness is therefore rigorous evidence in impact evaluation effectiveness, 
                                                     
210 Beyond reaching the policy level, Banerjee et al. (2017) describe six further challenges which might 
impede real-world benefits. 
T 
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which allows a judgement of whether the money spent is well invested or whether something 
in their mechanics needs refinement.  
Another argument why impact evaluations’ effectiveness needs evidence is based on 
their opportunity costs. Resources which are increasingly channeled into one area are likely to 
be withdrawn from another in development economics. The rise in impact evaluations of 
international development interventions is particularly well documented by Cameron et al. 
(2016). From the year 2000 onwards, impact evaluations were growing at a rapid pace, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. (Cameron et al. 2016).  
Figure 5.1. Increase in impact evaluations published as journal articles, working papers, 
reports and book chapters per year (1981-2012) 
 
Source: Cameron et al. (2016, 7) 
Overall, 66 percent (1491/2259) of all listed evaluations employ randomized control trials 
(RCTs), which are likely to be conducted by researchers. The increase in research output goes 
hand in hand with increased resources channeled into evaluating impacts. As a proxy for this 
shift in resources to RCT studies, Banerjee, Duflo and Kremer (2016) refer to the composition 
of the association of development economists, Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of 
Development (BREAD). While around 34 percent of the fellows and associates who obtained 
their PhD between 1981 and 1990 conducted at least one RCT, the fraction doubles for the ones 
with PhD years between 2006 and 2015. For current PhDs, the absolute and relative number 
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increases further. Accordingly, the share of RCT-papers presented at the annual conference of 
BREAD increased from 8 percent in 2005 to 63 percent in 2010 and consolidated between 40 to 
50 percent afterwards. With regard to publications in top journals,211 Banerjee et al. (2016) 
document a quite significant number of 10 RCT-studies out of 32 development papers in total 
in the year 2015, while none of the 21 development papers published in top journals were 
RCTs in the year 2000. 
Critics fear a crowding out of other strands in development economics (Ravallion 2012; 
Deaton 2010), while advocates see rather beneficial effects of RCT-studies for the discipline as 
a whole (Banerjee et al. 2016). Banerjee et al. (2016) link the general advancement in clean 
identification strategies in development economics not least to the rise of randomized 
interventions, which could stimulate finding creative ways for causal identification strategies 
beyond random settings. The research question of this chapter, however, is not so much what 
the rise of impact evaluations imply for the scientific side, but whether there are measurable 
real-world impacts. Nonetheless, this chapter is no meta-study, assessing what makes similar 
evaluations work. It rather aims at statistically quantifying a potential direct effect of impact 
evaluations on the outcomes their interventions hint at – via improved international 
development or national projects. 
A growing, mainly qualitative literature, addresses exactly this question of how much 
influence impact evaluations have on real-world policy and social outcomes. They unite in 
finding it generally difficult to judge whether impact evaluations successfully influence policy. 
Shah et al. (2015) measure the effectiveness of IEs in influencing policy by the number of IEs 
that are up-scaled.212 Turning to 626 evaluations conducted through the Abdul Latif Jameel 
Poverty Action Lab (JPAL) for instance, only around 15 were up-scaled. Proportions are 
similar for evaluations from the Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). Accordingly, the 
authors see a rather weak effect of impact evaluations leading to direct action. However, 
looking at mere scale-ups overlooks the potential influence of impact evaluations leading to 
improved designs or termination of poorly functioning programs (Buddlemeyer and Skoufias 
2003). Baanante and Valdivia (2015) draw a slightly more positive picture. They ask 19 impact 
                                                     
211 Banerjee et al. (2016) include the American Economic Review (AER), Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(QJE), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), Review of Economic Studies (Restud) and Econometrica in 
their list of top journals.  
212 With “upscaling” I refer to the extension of projects to further project sites (e.g., to other facilities or 
provinces). 
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evaluation experts to rate the level of policy influence of the most policy relevant impact 
evaluations they had conducted. Out of 37 impact evaluations, 68 percent (25/37) were rated 
to have influenced policy decisions, while 32 percent (12/37) had not. Banerjee et al. (2016) 
choose another approach to measure evaluations’ real-world influence and include 43 
evaluations conducted through USAID’s Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) between 
2010-2012.213 They measure real-world influence by the estimated number of people reached 
through the innovations’ evaluations and their adaptions. They find that 14 percent (6/43) of 
the innovations have reached more than one million people after 3-5 years and 30 percent 
(13/43) have reached more than 100,000 people within 3-5 years. At the same time, this implies 
that a relatively high fraction of 44 percent (19/43) of the evaluations were successfully up-
scaled. The authors identify cost-effectiveness and the involvement of researchers in the 
evaluation design as determinants for success. Legovini et al. (2016) take a quantitative stance 
and evaluate the influence of the World Bank’s impact evaluations on project characteristics 
for 100 evaluations and 1135 World Bank projects between 2005 and 2011. They find that 
projects with IEs are disbursed in a timelier manner and have decreased differences between 
commitments and disbursements. Overall, evidence on the success of impact evaluations to 
directly inform and influence policy decisions is thus limited, so far, and mixed. However, 
none of the authors doubts the important influence of impact evaluations in generating general 
knowledge on development effectiveness. Shah et al. (2015) further differentiate the success 
probability of impact evaluations between being supply and demand driven. Naturally, 
demand driven IEs, i.e., having been asked for by project operators or policy have a much 
greater chance to influence policy levels. However, following Jones et al. (2009), IEs tend to be 
rather supply-driven in all but the health and social development sector. Nevertheless, the 
impact of impact evaluations could still be limited with regard to improving outcomes, if they 
are primarily used by policymakers to legitimize actions (which would have been undertaken 
anyway) and defend budgets, as found by work of Jones et al. (2009) and the World Bank 
(2009).  
The existing literature is accordingly mainly characterized by qualitative evidence 
based on small samples, to which this chapter adds a quantitative analysis of the real-world 
                                                     
213 USAID awards each year innovative solutions to development challenges and provides funding for 
their rigorous evaluation and potential up-scaling (https://www.usaid.gov/div). Accordingly, these 
evaluations can be assumed to be disproportionately successful. 
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effects of impact evaluations, in the sense of analyzing the effect on social outcomes based on 
a comprehensive sample. The current approach is feasible thanks to the newly built database 
of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), which includes all impact 
evaluations with development focus in developing countries from 1981-2012. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first time that this rich database is explored beyond descriptive 
relationships (as in Cameron et al. 2016). I focus the analysis on impact evaluations in the 
health sector only, which accounts for around 50 percent of the interventions being conducted 
so far (Cameron et al. 2016). In an analysis on three different levels, I first explore cross-
country, macroeconomic average effects, second, sub-national district-level panel-analysis for 
Uganda, which allows a more thorough analysis of the mechanisms behind, and third, birth-
level quasi-panel evidence. The cross-country regression analysis with 81 countries in the main 
specification explores the effect of the number and stocks of impact evaluations in health per 
country on changes in Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) two years later. At the sub-
national level, I link the number and stocks of specific impact evaluations on maternal and 
newborn health to projects within this array and examine their interacted effects on district-
level as well as disaggregated birth-level infant mortality rates below the age of 12 months. 
The obvious challenge in identifying causal effects of impact evaluations is that IEs 
themselves are not randomly allocated (Banerjee et al. 2016). The analysis thus needs to 
carefully address endogeneity. Generally, the lag structure that I apply diminishes concerns. 
Following my line of argument outlined in the chapter, evaluators collect endline data in t-3, 
one year later, they inform the policy about their results (t-2). Policymakers or practitioners 
would then be able to improve, up-scale or down-scale their projects in t-1, which would lead 
to improved outcomes in t if there is a measurable direct effect of IEs. The decision to conduct 
an impact evaluation could therefore not be taken later than four years before I measure 
potential effects on outcomes, rather earlier. The actual timing of impact evaluations depends 
on many exogenous factors (i.e., research permit, researchers’ availability, shifts in the 
implementation schedule due to unforeseen barriers in the field, etc.). Therefore, concerns 
about factors that are systematically linked to the announcement of evaluation results, are 
reduced. Nevertheless, I discuss several potential biases through, for instance, more 
governmental effort leading to more health IEs or more research interest after the cessation of 
a conflict, which could both coincide with generally improving health outcomes. 
Consequently, the correlation with the outcome measures applied in this paper (DALYs or 
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infant mortality) would be negative, such that the omission of these variables would 
downward bias my results. 
The three levels of analyses offer different opportunities to tackle the biases. On the 
cross-country-level, I control for the obvious, measurable confounders by a large set of control 
variables, as well as country-specific linear time trends to capture the general improvement of 
health outcomes through increasing living standards and technological or medical 
advancements. Year-fixed effects additionally control for non-linear events like global climate 
shocks or crises affecting health. 
The analysis of the sub-national level for Uganda and its large advantage to work with 
more precisely measured data further reduces endogeneity concerns. I code district-level 
development projects from international development cooperation and country-level health 
IEs into eight narrow health categories, such as maternal and newborn health or HIV/Aids. I 
then focus the analysis on impact evaluations and development projects in maternal and 
newborn health and their interacted effect on infant mortality. Only if there is a project in 
maternal and newborn health in t, and a corresponding evaluation from the same health 
category disseminates evaluation results in t-1, the interaction is larger than zero. I call these 
incidences a “match”. The identification strategy mainly builds on accurately identifying the 
matches and comparing them to incidences when development action through projects take 
place, but cannot rely on information provided through IEs.  
My final estimation at the birth-level employs fixed effects for mothers and, thus, 
exploits variation among siblings, depending on whether their mother could benefit from an 
impact evaluation-project match or not. Many confounders are automatically controlled for 
through the application of mother-fixed effects like time-invariant characteristics of mothers’ 
surroundings (including district characteristics or vegetation) and mothers’ socio-economic 
status. Year-fixed effects control additionally for events out of mothers’ control, like epidemics 
or nation-wide changes in governmental regulations.  
Cross-country level results show a significant correlation between impact evaluations 
in health and improved health outcomes. One additional impact evaluation in health reduces 
the average number of DALYs by 0.1 percent. Sub-national evidence supports the findings 
found at an aggregated level. Different specifications show robustly a reduced infant mortality 
rate after matching impact evaluations and projects in maternal and newborn health. Mean 
health aid disbursements of 38,601 US$ lead to a decreasing IMR by 0.5 in 1,000 live births if 
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an impact evaluation takes place, compared to disbursements without an impact evaluation. 
The robustness of the findings in different specifications and levels of analyses raises 
confidence that health impact evaluations conditional on corresponding international 
development projects lead indeed to reduced infant mortality. 
“Nearly five trillion dollars seems a high price to pay for uncertainty and misunderstanding[.]” 
(Tierney et al. 2011, 1891). The statement of Tierney et al. (2011) underlines the objective of this 
chapter in adding to the literature that tackles aid effectiveness, which is still characterized by 
“uncertainty and misunderstanding” about what makes aid effective. First, the chapter 
contributes to filling the knowledge gap in aid effectiveness on sub-national levels (Kotsadam 
et al. 2018; Dreher and Lohmann 2015) in utilizing newly available fine-grained data from 
AidData (Tierney et al. 2011). Second, the presented evidence adds to understandings about 
the importance of project implementation processes, where evidence is generally scarce (e.g., 
Marchesi and Masi 2018; Kaplan et al. 2018/Chapter 4). Third, the chapter contributes to 
scholarly work on the role of differing donor quality (e.g., Minasyan et al. 2017/Chapter 1; 
Roodman 2012; Bermeo 2011; Minoiu and Reddy 2010) and ineffectiveness of politically 
motivated aid (e.g., Dreher et al. 2018; Kilby and Dreher 2010), where the ineffectiveness of 
poor-quality donors or politically motivated aid could be partly explained by their unlikeliness 
to take insights from impact evaluations into account. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2. explains the mechanisms through 
which impact evaluations are assumed to lead to improved outcomes and builds the 
Hypothesis. Section 5.3. describes the datasets and gives some descriptive information. Section 
5.4. establishes the empirical analysis and Section 5.5. presents the quantitative results. The 
chapter concludes with Section 5.6. 
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5.2. THE MECHANISM 
The question on the impact of impact evaluations is directly linked to the question on 
how policymakers update information. Policymakers can be persons belonging to national 
governments or international development cooperation that conduct development 
interventions. Vivalt and Coville (2017) look at the mechanisms behind policy effectiveness of 
impact evaluations and state three necessary conditions for policymakers to update: 1. 
Evidence, 2. The accurate update of the beliefs, based on the evidence, 3. Policymakers’ 
capability and willingness to change their decisions according to the evidence.214  
Under the assumption that policymakers are willing and able to learn from impact 
evaluations, scholarly work identifies three major channels through which IEs can affect policy 
(Baanante and Valdivia 2015). First, the use can be classified as instrumental or direct, i.e., 
employing IEs to improve, scale-up or scale-down projects (e.g., Buddlemeyer and Skoufias 
2003), second, indirect through general knowledge building on development (e.g., Banerjee et 
al., 2016) and third, legitimizing, to justify continuation of desired policies or budgets (e.g., 
Jones et al. 2009; Baanante and Valdivia 2015). The theory of change for impact evaluations in 
Figure 5.2. is built on Shah et al. (2015) – with modifications relevant to this chapter – and 
illustrates the mechanism: 
Figure 5.2. Theory of change for impact evaluations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
214 One of the major obstacles in making impact evaluations effective lies probably in bridging step one 
and step two, i.e., reaching policymakers with IE evidence. Initiatives like Eva Vivalt’s AidGrade 
(www.aidgrad.org) try to tackle this important challenge.  
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Source: Own design based on IDinsight (Shah et al. 2015, p. 4, 21) 
The yellow (horizontal) arrows in Figure 5.2. illustrate direct ways to influence policy 
for impact evaluations and the orange (vertical) arrows indirect ones. The third channel, via 
the legitimization of policy is not included as this way of using impact evaluations does not 
add actual value.215 The theory of change for the direct channel 1 starts with an academic 
researcher or project implementer, who identify an evidence gap and conduct an impact 
evaluation accordingly. In year t, they collect outcomes, then conduct the analysis and are 1 
year later able to inform project operators (subsumed under policy) about the results in t+1. 
Policy then needs another year to implement the evidence in their projects by improving 
certain aspects, up-scaling or down-scaling them for negative or insignificant results (t+2). The 
modified projects can have an immediate effect (at least on health outcomes) and should lead 
to measurable improved social outcomes in the following year (t+3). Importantly, the theory 
of change highlights that impact evaluations cannot have an effect by themselves, but only 
through development projects. 
The second, indirect channel starts after impact evaluations have produced evidence. 
This evidence is then available via reports and studies and adds to the pool of global 
knowledge about the specific policy area.216 Policy can always learn from this pool of global 
knowledge, which is produced any time before t+2. Hence, also the global knowledge, if used 
by policymakers, can contribute to improved social outcomes in t+3. 
Three mechanisms follow from the theory of change about potential measurable effects 
of impact evaluations. First, impact evaluations can and are frequently used as pilot studies, 
the Progresa success story builds a prominent example (e.g., Baanante and Valdivia 2015). If 
IEs show the intervention to be effective, it should be up-scaled.217 Accordingly, the number of 
project sites could increase after the incidence of an IE in a certain year, if the intervention was 
positively evaluated.  
                                                     
215 However, Buddlemeyer and Skoufias (2003) argue convincingly that also the third, legitimizing 
channel of impact evaluation has an important function as proof of effectiveness helps projects to 
survive changes in government. 
216 The pool of general knowledge consists of evidence created through national and internationally 
done impact evaluations. To the extent in which work by Vivalt (2015) or Duflo et al. (2012), for instance, 
cautions against generalizability of impact evaluations, IE evidence certainly increases the general 
global understanding of human behavior (Banerjee et al. 2016). 
217 Banerjee et al. (2016) indicate that up-scaling also depend on intervention costs per capita, rigorous 
design and likewise simplicity of the intervention. 
 231 
 
Second, if IE results are disseminated while a project is being implemented, project 
implementers might still be able to learn from the presented evidence and adjust their ongoing 
project designs. A change in design should lead to increasing differences between the planned 
(committed) and actual (disbursed) project costs.  
Third, the up-scaled projects following a pilot impact evaluation and the projects 
benefitting from the dissemination of IE results during ongoing project cycles should be 
disproportionately effective and therefore lead to improved social outcomes. Also, projects 
can be implemented from scratch, without a pilot testing the interventions’ effectiveness. In 
this case, project implementers can learn from the global knowledge pool created by all impact 
evaluations conducted in the relevant policy area before. The relevant unit of analysis would 
be the stocks of impact evaluations done before, accordingly. Arguably, evidence from the 
most recent impact evaluation done could have the strongest influence, even if it was not the 
corresponding pilot – results might be particularly present and easy to access for 
policymakers. Following the outlined mechanisms, I hypothesize that IE stocks and the 
incidence of an IE conducted directly before project implementation should lead to improved 
outcomes, in combination with projects. Vivalt and Coville (2017) show that policymakers are 
more likely to learn from positive results. Accordingly, also the overall influence of impact 
evaluations should depend on the direction of evaluation results. 
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5.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES 
This section describes the different datasets on a macro- and microeconomic level, which is 
created for the subsequent analysis of the research question and gives some descriptive 
statistics.  
 
Macroeconomic data 
Conducting the current study is only feasible thanks to a newly built comprehensive database 
of impact evaluations with a development focus by the non-governmental organization 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) (2018).218 In a large data collection effort, the 
3ie included all impact evaluation studies and reports in their repository that meet the criteria 
of building a counterfactual-based evaluation, evaluating development interventions in 
developing countries and being published as journal articles, book chapters, reports or 
working papers. The repository spans the time from 1981-2016. However, as the 3ie considers 
data collection completed only until 2012, I will use their data accordingly. The dataset 
includes 2259 studies, of which 77 percent are journal articles, 18.9 percent working papers, 
3.9 percent reports and 0.3 percent books or book chapters (see Cameron et al. 2016 for a 
comprehensive description of the database).  
Due to two pragmatic reasons, I focus my analysis on impact evaluations in the health 
sector only. First, the large majority of impact evaluations is being conducted in the health 
sector. Within the 3ie sample studies, 54.2 percent belong to interventions in health and offer 
thus the largest data variation. Second, health interventions can have immediate effects on 
health outcomes (De and Becker 2015), which makes the linkage between interventions and 
outcomes comparably easy. My final dataset covers the 1995-2012 period and entails in total 
703 health impact evaluations. Unsurprisingly, the maximum of impact evaluations per year 
is found in India with 36 evaluations in the year 2006 alone. 
I follow USAID’s Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) in measuring the social 
return of evaluations with Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) (Banerjee et al. 2016). 
DALYs present a comprehensive measure of the health status of societies because they 
                                                     
218 I am grateful to the 3ie for providing me with the data in a ready-to-use format, including information 
on the evaluation method, publication type and source.  
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calculate the number of years, which are lost to every person due to any kind of experienced 
disability per life year. That means, if a person is blind, for instance, his or her year of living 
experienced in blindness is discounted by 0.187, a moderate measles infection would be 
discounted by 0.051 (Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network 2017). Weight factors 
range from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (dead).219 The full sum of DALYs for a society are the Years 
of Life Lost (YLLs) (i.e., number of deaths*remaining life expectancy) + Years Lived with 
Disability (YLD) (i.e., number of cases*disability weights) (WHO 2018). A reduction in DALYs 
thus corresponds to a healthier society. The measure is commonly applied in public health and 
builds for instance, a major indicator in the WHO country health profiles (WHO 2015). DALYs 
are constantly decreasing in line with increasing global living standards. See Figure 5.3. for the 
development of DALYs aggregated over all sample countries from 1995-2014: 
Figure 5.3. Development of DALYs from 1995-2014 
 
  
                                                     
219 Accordingly, also premature deaths are assigned 1 full DALY per every life year between the 
experienced deaths and the maximal healthy life expectancy. The same maximal life expectancy is 
applied to every person in every country (WHO 2018).   
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Sub-national data 
The country of choice for the sub-national analysis is Uganda. This choice is pragmatically 
data driven. For my analysis, I need disbursement data on aid projects in health on the district 
level. Such georeferenced data are available from AidData for 13 countries. Of these countries, 
Uganda has received most impact evaluations in health (106) and offers, thus, the largest 
variation in data.220 Moreover, as being part of one of the first coding waves, the Ugandan 
dataset221 belongs to the most reliable AidData-coded project databases (Civelli et al. 2017). I 
aggregate the project level data to 56 Ugandan districts as of the year 2000. This is a reasonably 
large number with regard to data variation for regression analyses and the level on which the 
GADM Global Administrative Areas allocation of latitudinal and longitudinal data to districts 
(ADM2 level units) is available (http://www.gadm.org/).222  
The AidData database contains 1709 projects for the period between 1978 and 2014 of 
which 565 were geocoded. According to AidData geocodes were attributed to all projects for 
which sufficient information was available.223 Out of all coded projects, 214 are classified into 
the health sector and 69 of them geocoded and hence adequate for my approach. This number 
further reduces, as I only keep projects with precision codes from 1 to 3 (larger than 3 relates 
to too broad administrative levels of regions and above) for which the transaction year is 
available.224 I am left with 50 projects disbursed through 421 individual transactions (one 
project is disbursed in different years to different project sites) over the time period 1995-2013. 
Disbursements per project site and the number of project sites are aggregated per district per 
year. All of the 56 districts receive a health project site over the time period studied (see 
Appendix A5.1., column 1). 
                                                     
220 The 12 countries besides Uganda are Afghanistan with 5 impact evaluations, Burundi with 4, 
Colombia with 25, Honduras with 8, Iraq with 2, Nigeria with 29, Nepal with 39, Philippines with 27, 
Senegal with 14, Sierra Leone with 5, Somalia with 0 and Timor-Leste with 2 
(https://www.aiddata.org/datasets accessed June 3rd, 2018). 
221 Released in April 2016 as version “Release Level 1 v 1.4.1” (https://www.aiddata.org/data/uganda-
aims-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-1). 
222 The Ugandan government further divided districts and reaches a number of 111 as of July 2018 
(http://www.statoids.com/uug.html) (see Green, 2008 for potential explanations). All data points after 
2000 were accordingly allocated to the 56 districts. 
223 Personal e-mail contact from April 2018. 
224 I lose 125 transaction year-site observations due to missing transaction years, which I could not 
identify via online research. 
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In order to be able to link projects to impact evaluations as precisely as possible, I 
categorized them further according to their project title available in the dataset (and if 
ambiguous further online research on the project) into more narrow categories. The categories 
I built were General health (115 transactions), HIV/Aids (161), Access to medicine (54), 
Maternal and newborn health (49), Health infrastructure (29), Malaria (11), and Garbage 
management (2) (see Appendix Table A5.1.). 
Subsequently, I conducted the same coding process for all Ugandan impact evaluations 
in health with a view to subsume them into the same categories, allowing a (potential) direct 
link between projects and impact evaluations. Additionally, I coded the district where the 
impact evaluation was conducted, the outcomes intended to affect (like “reduction in neonatal 
mortality” for maternal and newborn health interventions or “increased condom use” for 
HIV/Aids interventions), success of affecting the outcome with the intervention and time until 
measurement of outcomes. The coding was based on the information available in the 
corresponding articles or reports. I coded the success of affecting the intended outcome with 
the evaluation on a scale from 1 to 5. The value 1 referred to a negative impact of the 
intervention, 2 to insignificant results, 3 to moderate positive results, 4 to positive and 5 to 
very positive results.   
There are in total 96 health impact evaluations for the sample period of 1995-2012 in 
Uganda.225 The year refers to the estimated year that policy was informed about the evaluation 
results (under the assumption that results are disseminated one year after the endline data 
collection as outlined in Section 5.2.).226 The majority of impact evaluations was done in 
HIV/Aids with 43 in total. Second comes general health with 13 interventions in topics like 
community-based monitoring of health providers, for instance (Björkman and Svensson 2007). 
Twelve interventions were done in mental health, mainly addressing mental support for war-
                                                     
225 Out of the 106 impact evaluations originally included in the 3ie repository for the whole available 
period from 1995 to 2014, I dropped six because they were either duplicates (five times) or cross-country 
studies (one time). Four more studies were dropped for the final sample, as they were from beyond the 
sample period 1995-2012. 
226 From the repository database, the publication date of studies or reports is available. However, I need 
more precise timing data on the year policy information, i.e. the year when policymakers were informed 
about evaluation results and hence able to include new insights in their project design. I make use of 
the estimated time until publication created by Cameron et al. (2016). Based on a random subset of all 
repository studies, they estimate the time between the endline data collection and the publication in 
academic health journals to take 3.75 years, for book chapters 4.8 years, for working papers 3.63 years 
and for policy reports 1 year. I use these estimates to calculate the estimated year of policy information. 
 236 
 
affected youth (e.g., Ertl et al. 2011) or HIV/Aids-affected families (e.g., Nabunya et al. 2014). 
Malaria interventions (11) come next, then maternal and newborn health interventions (9), six 
interventions in nutrition, one intervention in health infrastructure and one in sanitation. The 
large majority of interventions (90.6 percent) is published in academic journals, while the 
remaining are working papers or policy reports. A similarly high fraction with 86.5 percent of 
the interventions was conducted as RCT. The evaluation results referring to the success of the 
intervention in positively influencing the respective outcome is on average “positive,” the 
second highest category. Results for HIV/Aids, Malaria and nutrition evaluations are below 
average.  
From the available categories and outcome measures, I chose evaluations in maternal 
and newborn health for deeper investigation due to two reasons. First, these interventions can 
have a relatively proximate effect on the outcome measure infant mortality according to 
Kotsadam et al. (2018), for instance. Second, the outcome measure infant mortality is arguably 
objective and reliable data for its construction are available in a georeferenced format through 
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) for Uganda.  
Five DHS surveys for Uganda from 1995-2016 build the base for the sub-national 
dataset. The DHS data are collected in a nationally representative way and include surveys 
with women aged 15-49 (DHS 2018). For my sample period from 1995-2014, the dataset 
consists of 88,348 children and 25,780 mothers. I construct infant deaths below 12 months as a 
binary outcome variable for the birth-level dataset. Each child born alive is coded 1 if the infant 
died before 12 months of age. Within the aggregated dataset on district levels, I build the infant 
mortality rate (IMR) based on the calculation method used for the World Development 
Indicators (UN 2018). For every year, I divide the number of infants dying below the age of 12 
months by the number of children born alive and multiply with 1,000:227 
𝐼𝑀𝑅 = ( 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 < 12 𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒 − 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
) ∗ 1,000 
Figure 5.4. displays Uganda’s average IMR over the sample period 1995-2014. 
Uganda’s decrease in the IMR is in line with a steadily decreasing infant mortality rate 
worldwide. While the global IMR was at 61 children in 1,000 live births in the year 1995, it 
                                                     
227 For robustness, I construct the below-5 mortality ratio equivalently.  
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dropped to 32 in 2014 (UN 2018). Numbers for Uganda are expectedly above the global 
average with an IMR of 115 in the year 1995 and 51 in 2014 (own dataset based on DHS data). 
Figure 5.4. Infant Mortality Rate for Uganda over the sample period (1995-2014) 
 
 Uganda belongs to the low-income country group classified by the World Bank with a 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 1370 US$ (int PPP) and a life expectancy at birth of 
57 years. Uganda’s national health expenditure per capita is below the average expenditures 
among its African WHO region. Among the highest causes of deaths for children under five, 
are acute respiratory infections (15 percent), Malaria (13 percent), Prematurity (12 percent), 
Birth asphyxia (11 percent), Diarrhea (8 percent) and HIV/Aids (7 percent).228 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The first and second mechanism described in Section 5.2. with regard to the influence of impact 
evaluations can only be addressed descriptively with the data at hand. For testing the first 
mechanism, I assess whether project characteristics change, if evaluation results are 
disseminated during corresponding projects in the same category (i.e., I code a binary variable 
to 1, if during the duration of an HIV/Aids project, an evaluation in HIV/Aids informed 
policymakers about its results). More than half of all projects (51 percent) had a corresponding 
impact evaluation during their project duration. Based on the information available in the 
project dataset from AidData, I construct the share of disbursements over commitments and 
the number of project sites per project. The expectation is that disbursements are larger than 
commitments and the number of project sites increases if evaluation results are published 
                                                     
228 Data are based on the latest available WHO statistical profile for Uganda from 2015 and mainly refers 
to the year 2013 (http://www.who.int/gho/countries/uga.pdf?ua=1). 
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during project cycles. Running simple correlations, I do not find support for either indicator. 
The correlation between disbursements as share of commitments and the existence of an 
evaluation is insignificant and negative (-0.183, p-value 0.309) and between the number of 
project sites and simultaneous evaluation incidence is positive and insignificant (+0.048, p-
value 0.762). The relationship does also not change if I drop all 11 evaluations with negative 
results (negative or insignificant) from the sample, as hypothesized following Vivalt and 
Coville (2017). Accordingly, there is no descriptive support for the first potential mechanism, 
through which policymakers might improve or abandon their projects if they have the 
possibility to learn from simultaneously disseminated evaluation results. 
Following the second mechanism, impact evaluations’ influence in corresponding 
health projects could also materialize through project up-scaling. I test this by checking 
whether projects have more project sites if a corresponding impact evaluation was done 
directly, i.e., one year before project start. This was the case for 39.5 percent of the projects in 
the sample. Indeed, there is a significantly positive correlation between the number of project 
sites and an impact evaluation immediately before project start (+0.369 p-value 0.015). 
According to these descriptive statistics, a potential mechanism through which impact 
evaluations could affect projects is hence through up-scaling of a priori conducted pilot 
studies.  
5.4. EMPIRICAL METHOD 
A rigorous empirical analysis needs to identify whether impact evaluations were indeed able 
to materialize in improved outcomes – the main research question of this chapter formulated 
in the Hypothesis in Section 5.2. On the cross-country level, I will employ Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with fixed effects. In a second approach, I will turn to sub-national, district-
level and birth-level analyses for Uganda. This allows me to include high-dimensional fixed 
effects and a more precise linkage of the interventions and outcomes, which both reduces 
endogeneity concerns (Civelli et al. 2017). The analyses on all three levels have to deal with the 
obvious causality problem of unambiguously linking the number of IEs, which is not random, 
to changes in outcomes (Banerjee et al. 2016). There are several potential biases, which I will 
discuss in the following along with their potential direction. When outlining the empirical 
strategy below, I will show how the analysis addresses the biases.  
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The first concern which comes to mind is a simultaneity bias in the sense that a larger 
number of impact evaluations could well coincide with governments who generally increase 
efforts in national health and their demand for impact evaluations at the same time. This 
would downward bias my results. This means that the coefficient of the number of impact 
evaluations in health captures parts of the health improving effect actually originating from 
increased government effort. Health improvement translates to reductions in my outcome 
variables DALYs and the IMR. Accordingly, if I cannot control for governmental effort in my 
analysis, my estimate for impact evaluations is likely to be downward biased, i.e., the effect of 
impact evaluations with regard to improving outcomes appears to be stronger (more negative) 
than it is. The cessation of conflicts or wars could have a similar effect. Health outcomes can 
be expected to improve after conflicts and likewise the interest of researchers increases, who 
could be specifically interested in the effectiveness of interventions improving the health of 
the war-affected population, or, have always had a research interest in the specific country or 
region but were not able to enter before, due to the conflict. In line with explanations for 
increasing government effort, also this potential confounder will be downward biasing the 
effect of impact evaluations. A third bias can be associated to the fact that foreign evaluators 
of development interventions who want to study their effectiveness in improving health 
outcomes will typically go to places which have problems with these health outcomes, or, they 
will go to places they like. More accurate is probably to assume a combination of both. For 
instance, the evaluation of interventions addressing infant mortality is more likely to take 
place in areas with high infant mortality rates, which could be stagnant, increasing or also 
decreasing, but at a comparably low pace. This reverse causality, would then associate 
increasing numbers of health evaluations to also increasing infant mortality rates and therefore 
upward biasing the results. Whether researchers like to do research in a place will depend on 
research regulations like the ease to obtain research permits and the obligations linked to them. 
These are unlikely to be correlated with health outcomes. However, researchers will also prefer 
to go to places where living standards are acceptable and not harmful to their own health, like 
through easily communicable diseases. These aspects are obviously related to the health 
outcomes, researchers might study, and might again downward bias the estimated effect of 
impact evaluations. Overall, are the discussed biases likely to downward bias the results, and 
need to be tackled in the analysis in order to produce meaningful findings.  
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Macroeconomic level 
On the macroeconomic level, I will look at a potential average effect of impact evaluations in 
health on improved health outcomes applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with fixed 
effects. The dependent variable will employ the logged number of DALYs. Alternative 
specifications use the DALYs rate in 100,000 inhabitants as robustness. In my baseline 
specification, I regress the logged number of DALYs on the number of health evaluations 
conducted per country per year, including a set of controls. I focus the analysis on this direct 
effect of the incidence of impact evaluations, as this is most controversially discussed in the 
literature. A contribution of impact evaluations on general knowledge building is generally 
acknowledged (see Figure 5.2. for direct versus indirect influences of policy). However, I will 
still address the effect of a general knowledge increase from nationally conducted IEs by 
including stocks of IEs per country, in an alternative specification. 
(1) log(DALYsit) = β1 #HIEit-2 + β2 (log)Health disb.it-1 + β3 Health gov. exp.it-1  
+ Σm β4 Controlsimt-1 + β5 linttit + ηi + μt + uit 
On a cross-country, aggregated level, more impact evaluations in health – measured 
directly as incidence (#HIEit-2) or indirectly as stock (Stock HIEit-2) – should increase the 
effectiveness of every dollar spent in health, via international development disbursements 
((log)Health disb.it-1) or national government expenditures (Health gov. exp.it-1), if the 
policymakers designing the projects learn from the evaluations (see Section 5.2.). Accordingly, 
I will include aid disbursements and government expenditure on health as controls, to observe 
the ceteris paribus effect of impact evaluations. Controlling for government expenditure in 
health also diminishes the first source of endogeneity bias identified above. However, the 
effect of health IEs can also materialize through up-scaling as described in Section 5.2., which 
would lead to increased health aid disbursements or government expenditures.229 The two 
types of health expenditures would represent bad controls in this case. Therefore, I will 
accordingly show regressions which exclude them.  
Following suggestions from the literature, I include the following control variables 
(Controlsimt-1) in my model: Logged GDP in constant 2011 US$ controls for the positive 
relationship between living standards and health and reduces endogeneity bias from 
researchers’ potential preference to conduct impact evaluations rather in countries with higher 
                                                     
229 If the money is not cut elsewhere, which would again lead to greater effectiveness per dollar spent. 
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living standards. Logged population is an important control, as health outcomes might be 
easier or more difficult to handle conditional on the size of the population. Also, Cameron et 
al. (2016) show a positive link between higher population numbers and increased incidence of 
impact evaluations. In addition, when using the total number of DALYs as an outcome, 
controlling for population size is essential. A dummy for regime change is included as 
priorities change when politicians change, which might affect the use of IEs and affect 
outcomes (Buddlemeyer and Skofias 2003). This also captures parts of the endogeneity 
originating from potentially changing governmental preferences for health, which could at the 
same time increase demand in impact evaluations. A conflict dummy, indicating an internal 
armed conflict in a given year, eliminates health effects stemming from conflict violence. 
Additionally, the control captures endogeneity from conflict cessation leading to increased 
impact evaluations and improved health outcomes at the same time. A political corruption 
index is included as corruption should slow down learning from IEs. Presumably, more 
corrupt governments would focus less on effective policies but rather on policies beneficial to 
government elites or bureaucracy and therefore disregard IE results with a higher likelihood. 
Following a similar line of argument, I include a measure for government effectiveness, the 
polity IV score to categorize democratic vs. autocratic regimes, freedom of academic 
expression and a dummy for the existence of a local government230, which might influence 
whether the results reach policy. With more government fractionalization, i.e., the existence of 
local governments it might be more difficult to spread knowledge gained through IEs (see 
Appendix 5.3. for a detailed description of the variables as well as summary statistics). All 
time-varying control variables enter the regression with a lag of one year. The inclusion of 
control variables hence addresses three of the four endogeneity concerns, government effort, 
conflicts, and living standards in the destination country. The potential upward bias through 
worse outcomes attracting researchers’ scientific interest remains, but is less worrisome as it 
would render my effects weaker than they actually are. 
Considering the steadily decreasing shape of the outcome DALYs over time as 
illustrated in Figure 5.3., the inclusion of country-specific linear time trends linttit is important 
(Herzer and Nagel 2015). They account for general advancements in health due to 
                                                     
230 It might first come at a surprise, that the dummy for existence of local governments is time-varying, 
but the degree of decentralization can change over time within countries. For instance the dummy 
switches from non-existence to existence of local government for Azerbaijan in 1999. 
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technological or medical improvements and increasing living standards. These general factors 
are likely to be overall responsible for the observed linear improvements in health or life 
expectancy. However, as we still see large differences in technological change and health 
status improvements in different countries, the change is likely to come at a different pace for 
every country, however linear, which is why country-specific linear trends are included. 
Additionally, there may be non-linear shocks affecting all countries at the same time like the 
global financial crisis or certain seminal health inventions. I include year-fixed effects μt, which 
capture these non-linear health shocks equal to all countries. Finally, I include country-fixed 
effects ηi, which capture time-invariant factors like countries’ geography and the error term uit. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-level. The choice of control variables and 
fixed effects should capture a large fraction of endogeneity in my model. Note that linear time 
trends also account for the global knowledge increase through impact evaluations in health. 
My analysis thus aims at isolating the direct and indirect country-specific effects of locally 
conducted impact evaluations – as described in the Hypothesis. Any effect found will, 
therefore, be a lower bound of impact evaluations’ impact, which could additionally 
materialize through general global knowledge building (see Section 5.2.). 
The timing of the specification is built on insights about the mechanism outlined in 
Section 5.2. of how impact evaluations work. Accordingly, I include health interventions with 
a two-year lag and all other control variables with a one-year lag, including health aid and 
national health expenditures. The lag-structure I apply reduces further endogeneity concerns. 
Impact evaluations, which are mostly conducted as a cooperation between foreign researchers 
and local specialists, need time to be set up. Research permits need to be applied for, field 
work abroad planned, and the like. As described in the Introduction and Mechanisms Sections, 
evaluations will need to be planned at least four years before their outcomes are measured in 
my analysis. All biases outlined above could confound the decision to conduct an impact 
evaluation (government demand, conflict cession, country attractiveness with regard to 
research and living standards, or health challenges). The actual timing of results’ 
dissemination, however, depends on many exogenous factors. Such factors are the availability 
of researchers, length of the administrative process until research permits are forwarded, 
unforeseen barriers in the field or delays in the data analyses. The list could be further 
extended. It is therefore hard to imagine that confounding factors systematically coincide with 
the dissemination of impact evaluation results and would therefore be the actual drivers of 
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effects, while they are likely to confound decisions to undertake impact evaluations, which is, 
however less of a threat to my identification. Moreover, the careful selection of adequate DVs, 
control variables and lag structures reduces the measurement error, omitted variable and 
simultaneity bias and can therefore lead to meaningful correlations. However, the results do 
not claim causality.231 
 
Sub-national level 
Similar to studies on the aggregate effect of aid on growth (e.g., Dreher and Langlotz 2017), 
also the aggregate effect of health evaluations on overall health is informative from a general 
perspective using the full variation of all possible country contexts. Nevertheless, the analysis 
might suffer from an “over-aggregation” problem as outlined in Civelli et al. (2017). They 
consequently turned to the sub-national level of – coincidentally – Uganda as well to evaluate 
the effect of aid on growth. I will make use of Uganda’s district level data (and below) to assess 
my research question.  
Due to the fact that impact evaluations can arguably only show an effect through aid 
projects or national government programs and the sub-nationally coded data provide high 
precision to reasonably link specific evaluations to such projects, the sub-national analysis will 
focus on the effects of impact evaluations conditional on aid disbursements. Only the 
                                                     
231 One way of addressing causality could go through an instrumental variable approach with an 
exogenous instrument for the endogenous number of impact evaluations. One possibility for such an 
instrument would be the ease of doing research in a country, which is arguably exogenous, as it depends 
on governmental regulations, requirements and administrative barriers for research permits and 
research visa, but should not be linked to health outcomes in any way. As there is no time varying 
indicator for the ease of doing research in different countries available, I chose an approach building on 
Google hits. I was inspired by Rose (2007), who used the “desirability of residing in a particular country 
as Foreign Service Officer” as an instrument for the number of Foreign Missions. He measured this 
desirability by the number of Google hits for the search ‘+”Travel Destination” + “city” + “x”’ with x 
being the capital city. Similarly, I construct a year and country varying measure for the ease of doing 
research in a specific country in a specific year. To this end, I count the Google hits for the phrase 
“[country] difficult foreign research permit [year]”, where the [country] varied over all sample countries 
and the [year] for all years from 1997, when Google was founded, to 2012. Anecdotal evidence among 
researchers or websites suggests that research permit requirements can be an underestimated hurdle 
that may well lead to a change in the destination country if the barrier becomes too high (e.g., 
https://clinregs.niaid.nih.gov/country/india#_top). However, the first stage shows a positive correlation 
between the number of Google hits and the number of impact evaluations, rather than the expected 
negative. The Google hits therefore are more likely to capture general interest in doing research than 
difficulty to do research and are accordingly not a valid instrument. Potentially, future research can 
however build on the idea in order to address causal findings.   
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disaggregated, narrow categorization of impact evaluations and development projects into the 
eight categories described in Section 5.3. allows the linkage between IEs and projects. Again, I 
argue that there should only be a direct effect measurable if the policy recommendations from 
an impact evaluation are announced one year before a development project is disbursed. I call 
these incidences, when HIEs inform policy one year before projects in the same category take 
place, a match. In the sub-national analysis, I interact the number of impact evaluations 
informing policy in t-2 with project disbursements in the same health category in t-1 and 
investigate the effect of these matches on the specific outcome in time t. The interaction effect 
thus compares observations with matches to observations in which development projects take 
place without being directly informed by impact evaluations. Additionally, I evaluate an 
indirect effect of HIEs contributing to an increased pool of knowledge by examining the stocks 
of HIEs. 
Specifically, I link evaluations and aid projects addressing maternal and newborn 
health and observe their conditional influence on the infant mortality rate below the age of 12 
months in 1,000 live births.232 The ability to precisely link IEs to disbursements and specific 
outcomes reduces endogeneity concerns based on omitted variable bias and measurement 
error. An additional advantage over aggregated cross-country data is that I have information 
on specific monetary transactions in the eight health categories per districts and years (Civelli 
et al. 2017). 
As data on governmental health expenditure are unfortunately not available, I will 
only be able to assess the link between impact evaluations and international development 
projects or disbursements on the IMR. On the one hand, every effect I may find will 
consequently represent a lower bound of the impact evaluations’ influence as their impact may 
also materialize through national health expenditures. On the other hand, the disability to 
control for governmental efforts could increase the simultaneity bias described above and 
downward bias my results. 
                                                     
232 The timing assumptions for these specific interventions in Maternal and newborn health are based 
on corresponding impact evaluations conducted in Uganda. I follow the studies from Fuentes et al. 
(2006) and Björkman and Svensson (2007), which form part of the impact evaluation repository for 
Uganda. Their interventions lasted 11 (Fuentes et al. 2006) and 12 months (Björkman and Svensson 2007) 
before they measured infant mortality and under-five mortality, respectively. Accordingly, I lag aid 
projects or disbursements by one year. 
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In the first set of regressions, I exploit district-level variation and the conditional effect 
of impact evaluations concerning mother and newborn health on the IMR aggregated per 
district (IMRjt). 
(2) IMRjt = β1 #Mat&NeoIEt-2*(log)Mat&Neo disb.jt-1 + β2 (log)Mat&Neo disb.jt-1  
+ Σm β3 Controlsjmt-1 + ηj + μt + ejt 
As explained above, the number of maternal and newborn health evaluations 
(#Mat&NeoIEt-2) enters with a two-year lag and is interacted with one-year lagged maternal 
and newborn health disbursements ((log)Mat&Neo disb.jt-1). Even though I coded information 
on the exact location where the impact evaluations were conducted, I assume their results can 
influence policy nationwide based on Jones et al. (2009).233 The same set of health evaluations 
is therefore attributed to every district j. The interaction’s constitutive term of Maternal and 
newborn health evaluations (#Mat&NeoIEt-2) is hence captured in the year-fixed effects 
included in the model (μt). This theoretically justified strategy comes with the advantage of 
reducing many endogeneity concerns. Since it does not matter in which district exactly the 
evaluation was conducted, but results are assumed to be able to inform policy in all districts 
likewise, it is also irrelevant whether evaluators picked specific evaluation locations due to 
better or worse infant mortality outcomes, better living standards, or after cessation of 
conflicts. What matters is only the match of information spread all over Uganda and specific 
projects in maternal and infant health per district. Moreover, a national increase in 
governmental health efforts is captured by the year-fixed effects μt. The year-fixed effects 
account again for all health shocks equal to all districts at the same time, like epidemics. Lastly, 
district-fixed effects ηj control for time-invariant district characteristics like being landlocked. 
The error term is represented by ejt and robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
In a robustness specification, I will additionally employ district-specific linear time trends to 
capture linear advancements at a different pace in different districts. 
I largely follow Cruzatti et al. (2018) in specifying my set of control variables. As time-
varying geographic controls, I include mean precipitation (“Rainfall”), mean temperature 
(“Temperature”) and the mean Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) (“Vegetation”). 
As population controls, I include the population density and urban land coverage (Goodman 
                                                     
233 Jones et al. (2009) find that the communication of evaluation results at the national level is relatively 
robust for the health sector. 
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et al. 2016). In addition to controls used by Cruzatti et al. (2018), I employ logged population 
numbers due to their relevance for impact evaluation incidences, the number of deaths due to 
conflicts (“Conflict deaths”), which can increase infant mortality as well as the average age of 
mothers at their children’s births (see Appendix A5.3. for detailed sources and descriptions).234 
All control variables are included without a time lag as they simultaneously affect children’s 
survival during their first year of life. The estimation period ranges from 1995-2014. 
In alternative specifications, I use stocks of maternal and newborn health evaluations 
(Stock Mat&NeoIEt-2) instead of incidences and project numbers (#Mat&Neo pr.jt-1) instead of 
disbursements. In robustness specifications, I will employ IMR growth rates as dependent 
variable or effects on the under-5 mortality rate. 
Specific interest is put in gaining more insights on mechanisms. I will investigate 
differential effects for different project operators. Over the sample period maternal and 
neonatal health projects are realized by the following donors: The World Bank in 18 project-
years with 206,986 US$ mean disbursements, Japan in 16 district-years with an average 
disbursement of 40,474 US$, Sweden in 8 project-years with 231,310 US$ mean disbursements 
and the European Union (EU) in 5 district-years with an average disbursement of 715,018 US$.  
An even higher degree of data precision is reached with the third level of analysis using 
birth-level data and the application of mother-fixed effects following Kotsadam et al. (2018). 
The dataset is structured as quasi-panel, comparing birth cohorts, but not individuals over 
time (Guillerm 2017). The regression line reads as follows: 
(3) Infant deathkt = β1 Active Mat&Neo Matcht +  β2 Orderkt + β3 Twinkt + mm + μt + ekjt 
The dependent variable “Infant deathkt“ is defined as a binary indicator, which equals 
one, if the child k died below the age of 12 months. The major advantage of the analysis based 
on the quasi-panel is the possibility to apply mother-fixed effects (mm). With mother-fixed 
effects, all potential confounders which do not change for the same mother over time are 
controlled for. This strategy should capture most heterogeneity, when it comes to survival 
probabilities of infants (like mother’s education and socio-economic factors and all time-
invariant-characteristics of the village, town or district, she lives in). However, necessary 
                                                     
234 I do not include the index of aridity and travel to next larger settlement of 50,000 people like Cruzatti 
et al. (2018) do. I expect aridity to be captured by the combination of “Rainfall” and “Vegetation”. 
Distance to next larger settlement is not applicable to me as I have district-level data. 
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controls, which are correlated with infant mortality are the birth order of the child (Orderk) and 
a binary variable indicating whether the child is part of a multiple birth (Twink). The strategy 
thus looks at the within-sibling variation. In a robustness specification, I will include a district-
specific linear time trend as well, which controls for technological advancements (however, 
less important for differences in births of the same mother) and experience gains for the 
mother. 
I build on the approach of Kotsadam et al. (2018) in defining a binary variable “Active 
Mat&Neo Matcht“ which is one as soon as an impact evaluation matches a corresponding 
project per mother. For instance, if there is an impact evaluation in maternal and newborn 
health in the year 2000 and a development project in maternal and newborn health takes place 
in a specific district in 2001, this is a match for this district. Assume a mother living in this 
district has three children, the first born in 1999, the second in 2002 and the third in 2004. The 
“Active Mat&Neo Matcht“ will turn one for the mother (and her children) in 2002 and 2004, but 
zero in 1999. The assumption is that the mother’s delivery for the third child can still benefit 
from the intervention she experienced with her second child, while there was no intervention 
match during the birth of her first child.  
In an additional specification, I add birth order-fixed effects, like Kotsadam et al. (2018) 
do. Birth order-fixed effects in regressions across mothers follow a similar logic as year-fixed 
effects in cross-country estimations. We observe variation within siblings per mother, while 
controlling for all factors, which are equal to children of the same birth order. Controlling 
additionally for year-fixed effects takes out all confounders, which are equal to children born 
in a specific year all over Uganda. This could be country-wide climatic phenomena, epidemics 
or government regulations. It is difficult to come up with an additional source of endogeneity, 
which would systematically relate a project-IE match to a confounder actually driving the 
effect, other than the project-IE match. The fact that IEs can be conducted in any district and 
not necessarily near the mother works additionally in our favor as explained above. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the district level j and sample weights are included. 
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5.5. RESULTS 
In the results section, I will first address the cross-country evidence on the influence of impact 
evaluations and subsequently turn to more narrow sub-national country evidence for Uganda. 
Table 5.1. shows OLS evidence for the link between the number of impact evaluations 
in health and the logged number of DALYs per country. The results show a strongly negative 
and statistically significant correlation, which is robust to the in- or exclusion of all control 
variables, importantly excluding the potential bad controls health disbursements, government 
expenditure and GDP in column 4.235 Table A5.3. in the Appendix shows the full set of controls 
including different model specifications. Control variables show the expected correlations. My 
preferred specification with regard to model fit measured by adjusted R-squared and the 
number of observations is displayed in column 2 and will serve as the baseline. The effect size 
can be interpreted as one additional health intervention reducing the Disability Adjusted Life 
Years by 0.1 percent. With an average of 23.6 million life years lost due to disabilities per 
country per year, 0.1 percent would translate into 23,600 life years less lost to disabilities, if 
one more impact evaluation in health is conducted.236 
Table 5.1. OLS Regressions with Fixed-Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LOGGED NUMBER OF DALYS 
 w/o 
controls 
preferred 
all 
controls 
w/o bad 
controls 
Number of Health IEs (t-2(=tpolicy)) -0.003*** -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035) 
Logged int. health disbursements,   -0.000 0.001  
const (t-1)  (0.851) (0.483)  
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) (t-1)  -0.001 -0.001  
    (0.543) (0.497)   
Country- and year FE √ √ √ √ 
Country-specific linear time trends √ √ √ √ 
Number of observations 2,880 1,314 1,005 1,174 
Number of countries 160 81 81 93 
R-squared (within) 0.618 0.585 0.520 0.515 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.593 0.548 0.464 0.464 
                                                     
235 Only the exclusion of the country-specific linear time trend reduces the significance level and leaves 
us with insignificant, but negative estimates for the number of health IEs. The theoretically chosen 
timing seems to be empirically adequate, as the effect is only significant with a one- and two-year lag 
and loses significance before and after (see Appendix Table A5.4.). 
236 Overall, we have 483 observations with a positive number of health evaluations in the sample, which 
is 36.8 percent of all country-years. 
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Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
The Appendix entails robustness checks for an alternative dependent variable (DALY rate in 
1,000 inhabitants), stocks of evaluations and periodic data (six times three year periods from 
1995-2014). It is reassuring that the effects of impact evaluations show robustly in the same 
negative direction at similar coefficient sizes for all robustness checks. However, significance 
cannot be established (see Appendices A6, A7 and A8).  
Overall, the findings presented by OLS estimates with fixed effects hint at a positive 
correlation between impact evaluations in health and improved health outcomes, meaning 
that more impact evaluations correlate with fewer life years of the population whose quality 
is discounted due to any kind of disability experienced. Significance, however, is not robust.  
Arguably, impact evaluations cannot have direct impacts by themselves, but function 
through improved health interventions. As the data are not specific enough on a cross-country 
level to meaningfully link impact evaluations to health projects in the same specific health 
category through interacting the variables. I turn to the sub-national level for a more fine-grain 
analysis, where this is possible. 
 
Uganda sub-national analysis 
As discussed before, an analysis on the sub-national level solves many of the estimation 
challenges encountered on the cross-country level. I will first present district level OLS results 
for the effects of IEs in maternal and newborn health conditional on corresponding 
international health disbursements. Second, I will turn to the more rigorous birth-level 
estimations counting on mother-fixed effects. 
District-level evidence is displayed in Table 5.2. for the interaction term presenting the 
variable of interest only. Column 1 shows the specification without any control variable, 
column 2 includes geographic controls only, column 3 includes population controls only and 
column 4 includes both sets of controls and mothers’ age at birth additionally. As model 4 
produces the highest adjusted R-Squared, explaining 29 percent of the variation in the infant 
mortality rate, this specification is preferred and serves as the baseline model for the remaining 
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tables presented in the following. Table A5.9. in the Appendix presents full specifications and 
displays that the control variables for infant mortality show the expected effects. 237  
Table 5.2. District-Level Conditional Effect of Impact Evaluations on IMR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (IN 1,000 LIVE 
BIRTHS) 
 
w/o 
controls 
with geo. 
controls 
with pop. 
controls 
preferred 
(full) 
      
Logged disb (t-1) * IEs (t-2) in mat & neo health -1.091* -1.106* -1.222* -1.234** 
 (0.072) (0.061) (0.053) (0.044) 
Logged mat & neo health disb (t-1) 1.062 1.012 1.183 1.182 
  (0.202) (0.203) (0.157) (0.161) 
Constant 196.507*** 24.055 47.175 -339.302 
 (0.000) (0.848) (0.877) (0.259) 
     
District- and year-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Observations 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 
R-squared (within) 0.291 0.293 0.297 0.304 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.277 0.277 0.280 0.285 
Number of districts 56 56 56 56 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note that the levels of IEs in mat & neo 
health (t-2) are kept in the year fixed effects as they apply on the country level. 
 
Findings in Table 5.2. show a robust, significant, and negative effect of increasing 
health interventions in maternal and neonatal health, conditional on increasing corresponding 
disbursements for different models. Coefficients are negative and significant at the 10 percent-
level in all but the preferred specification in column 4, where significance levels reach 5 
percent. The margins plot in Figure 5.5. allows a more meaningful interpretation of the 
marginal effect of impact evaluations presented in the preferred model.238 
                                                     
237 All control variables enter the regression without time lag. However, the size and significance levels 
of the coefficients of our variables of interest are robust to the inclusion of all control variables with a 
one-year lag, if readers are concerned about potential bad control problems. Results are available upon 
request.  
238 Estimates are robust to the inclusion of district-specific time trends, which further reduce endogeneity 
concerns. Appendix Table A5.10. presents full results. The interaction in column 4 materializes 30 times 
in the sample, which is 3 percent of the observation-years. As this constitutes a relatively small fraction 
driving the effect, I conduct robustness regressions including interactions with all health impact 
evaluations. Results show that apart from interactions between maternal and neonatal health impact 
evaluations and disbursements, also interactions for HIV/Aids interventions have a robustly significant 
negative effect on neonatal mortality rates and under-five mortality rates. Considering that Uganda 
belongs to one of the most HIV/Aids-affected countries, this finding seems plausible. HIV/Aids 
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Figure 5.5. Marginal effect of impact evaluations 
 
Figure 5.5. shows that as the number of impact evaluations increases, the IMR reduces 
if logged disbursements in maternal and neonatal health projects increase. Precisely, the 
interaction term indicates that the marginal effect of impact evaluations on IMR varies 
between -1.23 and -22.21 depending on the level of health disbursements. With mean 
disbursements of 38,601 US$ (in logs 0.41), the IMR decreases by 0.5 in 1,000 live births if there 
is one additional impact evaluation from which projects were able to learn (the average infant 
mortality rate is 80 infants in 1,000 live births).239 
The effect is robust and significant when growth rates of the IMR are applied as the 
DV, but loses significance for the number of projects instead of disbursements. Similar to 
regressions on a cross-country level, the effect turns insignificant when stocks are applied, 
                                                     
disbursements and impact evaluations match more frequently in 60 observation-years, which is in 6 
percent of all observations. Interactions for general health or malaria interventions do not correlate with 
either measure. Also, a joint significance of all intervention interactions cannot be established. Results 
are available upon request. 
239 Please note that the estimations presented do not give insights about the individual effect of impact 
evaluations. As outlined above, however, impact evaluations should not have measurable individual 
effects other than through health projects.  
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even though the negative direction is robust – like throughout all robustness checks 
employed.240  
The finding on insignificant effects of impact evaluation stocks is unintuitive. The 
picture on learning mechanisms through impact evaluations gets more nuanced when looking 
at individual donors. Results are shown in Table 5.3. for different interactions of impact 
evaluation numbers with disbursements (column 1) or project numbers (column 2) and 
interactions of impact evaluation stocks and disbursements (column 3) or project numbers 
(column 4). 
Table 5.3. Influence by donor country 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
HIE 
numbers 
and 
disburse- 
ments 
HIE 
numbers 
and project 
numbers 
Stocks and 
disburse-
ments 
Stocks and 
project 
number 
          
EU disbursements / projects (t-1) -1.282 3.466 -0.299 85.255*** 
 (0.156) (0.735) (0.873) (0.000) 
EU effort (t-1) * HIEs (t-2) 0.490 1.884 -0.127 -14.797*** 
 (0.288) (0.757) (0.677) (0.000) 
Japan disbursements / projects (t-1) 0.535 4.317 0.835 30.169 
 (0.514) (0.734) (0.700) (0.276) 
Japan effort (t-1) * HIEs (t-2) -0.826 -9.809 -0.145 -4.336 
 (0.219) (0.253) (0.588) (0.216) 
Sweden disbursements / projects (t-1) -0.494 -4.751 26.122** 466.181*** 
 (0.583) (0.523) (0.021) (0.000) 
Sweden effort (t-1) * HIEs (t-2)   -3.005** -52.493*** 
   (0.025) (0.000) 
WB disbursements / projects (t-1) 4.040*** 53.459*** 20.300*** 57.968* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.074) 
WB effort (t-1) * HIEs (t-2) -3.624*** -53.951*** -2.260*** -6.429* 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.071) 
          
District- and year-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 
R-squared (within) 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 
Number of districts 56 56 56 56 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note that the levels of IEs in mat & neo 
health (t-2) are kept in the year fixed effects as they apply on the country level. 
                                                     
240 Results for these robustness checks are available upon request.  
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Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.3. show that only the World Bank projects seem to receive 
enough direct input from corresponding impact evaluations to lead to significantly more 
efficient disbursements and overall projects. The significantly negative effects of impact 
evaluations conditional on projects from the EU (column 4) and projects and disbursements 
from Sweden and the World Bank (columns 3 and 4) indicate that these donors benefit from 
the general past knowledge creation in maternal and newborn health. Japan’s aid, however, 
never seems to benefit from impact evaluation insights. These findings are well in line with 
general rankings of donor quality. The World Bank has a long history of using impact 
evaluations, Sweden and the EU are generally ranked as good quality donors and Japan is 
lacking behind regarding quality (Roodman 2012). 
The final setting is built on birth-level data and employs the strict identification 
strategy using mother- and year-fixed effects. Table 5.4. shows the results for the effects of an 
active match between impact evaluations in maternal and newborn health and corresponding 
projects on infant deaths. Column 1 includes mother-fixed effects and year-fixed effects.  
Table 5.4. Regressions with Mother Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 INFANT DEATHS 
          
Active Mat&NeoIE Match (t) -0.025** -0.023** -0.019* -0.018* 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.062) (0.074) 
Birth order (t) -0.030***  -0.031***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Twin status (t) 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Mother-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Year-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Birth order-fixed effects  √  √ 
District-specific linear time 
trend 
  √ √ 
Observations 74,484 74,483 74,484 74,483 
Number of districts 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.305 0.307 0.307 0.308 
R-squared (within) 0.0154 0.0130 0.0156 0.0130 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.0154 0.0130 0.0155 0.0129 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions include 
sample weights. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district-level.  
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The dummy indicating an active Health IE – project match shows a negative effect 
significant at the 5 percent-level. The effect shows that the probability for infants dying is 
reduced by 2.5 percent compared to their siblings who were born before the existence of such 
a match. Importantly, the birth order is controlled for, as first born children would generally 
have a higher mortality risk. The effects are also robust and significant at the 5 percent-level, 
to the inclusion of birth order-fixed effects in column 2, in addition to mother-fixed effects and 
year-fixed effects. This specification captures all factors equal to all first born, second born, etc. 
– comparable to the logic of year-fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 show that results are also 
robust to the inclusion of district-specific linear time trends, which capture general linear 
improvements over the time period each mother gives birth to all her children. As expected, 
coefficients decrease if another source of endogeneity bias with downwards direction is 
eliminated. The robustly significant impact of impact evaluations on outcomes established 
with this conservative estimation strategy establishes confidence in the results obtained 
throughout the analysis, which indicate the existence of a measurable positive impact of 
impact evaluations on improved outcomes, which works through corresponding development 
projects.  
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5.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents several models and estimation strategies at three levels of analyses 
including the cross-country, district-level and birth-level to test a potential impact of impact 
evaluations. In particular, the chapter focuses on impact evaluations in the health sector, as 
these can arguably have relative immediate effects on health-related outcome measures and 
therefore simplify timing assumptions. The challenge of the analysis is to establish a 
meaningful link between impact evaluations and outcomes, because it cannot be direct but 
only work via development projects (from the government, international donors or NGOs). 
Importantly and the more remarkable, all presented models tell the same story – that there is 
a positive effect of impact evaluations on final outcomes. Endogeneity concerns are largely 
reduced by the lag-structure employed as well as a large set of control variables and different 
fixed effects. 
Cross-country evidence leads to the conclusion that the number of impact evaluations 
done per country significantly correlates with improved health outcomes measured through 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). One additional evaluation of health interventions 
reduces the average DALYs per country by 0.1 percent. On average, this corresponds to 23,600 
less life years lost due to disabilities. For testing the existence of an effect of impact evaluations 
conditional on corresponding health projects on a global scale, more fine-grain data would be 
needed that allow a precise linkage between evaluations and development projects. For the 
example of one country – Uganda – this chapter provides such data and a more rigorous 
analysis. Results show that increasing impact evaluations in maternal and newborn health 
lead to significantly reduced infant mortality rates, if aid disbursements in the same category 
increase. Interestingly, there are heterogenous effects for different donors. With the limitation 
of the small sample of four different donors, suggestive evidence for the influence of impact 
evaluations reproduce general donor rankings: the World Bank with a long and deep history 
of using impact evaluations seems to make the best use of them, leading to more efficient 
projects. Positive effects are also shown for Sweden and the EU, generally classified as very 
good (Sweden) and well enough (EU) donors. Japan, however, which is generally low ranked 
with regard to its aid quality, does not seem to be influenced at all by impact evaluations. 
These findings, however, need deeper analyses to be conclusive. 
 256 
 
The effects found for the impact of impact evaluations and their robustness is 
surprisingly strong in light of the available qualitative evidence, which judges the direct policy 
influence of impact evaluations rather moderate. One reason for the discrepancy could be that 
effects can be expected to be larger for demand-driven evaluations, which are particularly 
prominent in health and social development sectors (Jones et al. 2009). Effects are therefore 
likely to be smaller in other policy areas. However, the provided evidence can only hint at 
lower bounds of the impact of impact evaluations in Uganda, as sub-national data on health 
expenditures from the national government, through which impact evaluations are similarly 
likely to work, is not available. 
This chapter is the first to give a quantitative response to the policy debate on whether 
the rise in impact evaluations and increased resources channeled into it, is reasonable. 
Naturally, this question is linked to aid effectiveness, in general. As we still know generally 
very little about what makes development assistance effective, Tierney et al. (2011, 1891) state 
right to the point that “[n]early five trillion dollars seems a high price to pay for uncertainty and 
misunderstanding[.]” in their article “More dollars than sense?”. In light of the huge amounts of 
money potentially spent without much “sense” through ineffective aid disbursements, every 
dollar invested in rigorous impact evaluations that have the potential to find out what works 
and what does not, seems sensibly invested – based on the findings of this chapter. 
The deep analysis of mechanisms in how evaluations work conditional on ODA, as 
presented in this chapter is restricted to a small sample of sub-national data for only one 
country. Pooling sub-national IEs and ODA project data for more countries would allow 
deeper analyses of the mechanisms and is open to future research along with identifying 
channels to bridge academic impact evaluations and policy. 
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Table A5.1. Number of health transactions per district and category 
 Number of transactions in: 
District 
All 
health 
projects 
General 
health 
Maternal 
and 
newborn 
health 
HIV/Aids Health 
infrastruc-
ture 
Malaria Access 
to 
medicine 
Garbage 
manage-
ment 
Adjumani 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Apac 23 2 8 8 0 3 2 0 
Arua 6 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 
Bugiri 15 0 0 14 0 0 1 0 
Bundibugyo 4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Bushenyi 12 2 8 2 0 0 0 0 
Busia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gulu 8 3 1 1 0 3 0 0 
Hoima 6 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 
Iganga 36 7 0 26 2 0 1 0 
Jinja 13 0 0 3 9 0 1 0 
Kabale 14 4 1 5 3 0 1 0 
Kabarole 7 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 
Kaberamaido 5 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 
Kalangala 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Kampala 26 5 3 16 1 1 0 0 
Kamuli 19 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 
Kamwenge 4 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Kanungu 6 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 
Kapchorwa 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Kasese 7 1 4 1 0 0 1 0 
Katakwi 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Kayunga 4 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 
Kibale 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Kiboga 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kisoro 20 18 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Kitgum 4 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 
Kotido 5 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Kumi 5 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Kyenjojo 5 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 
Lira 12 2 3 5 2 0 0 0 
Luwero 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Masaka 9 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 
Masindi 5 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Mayuge 7 0 1 5 0 0 1 0 
Mbale 9 2 0 4 0 0 3 0 
Mbarara 8 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 
Moroto 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
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Moyo 4 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 
Mpigi 5 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 
Mubende 5 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Mukono 6 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 
Nakapiripirit 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Nakasongola 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Nebbi 8 1 0 0 6 0 1 0 
Ntungamo 17 14 1 0 2 0 0 0 
Pader 5 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 
Pallisa 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Rakai 7 1 0 1 3 0 2 0 
Rukungiri 4 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Sembabule 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Sironko 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Soroti 14 9 1 2 0 0 2 0 
Tororo 6 3 0 1 0 0 2 0 
Wakiso 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 
Yumbe 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 421 115 49 161 29 11 54 2 
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Table A5.2. Number and characteristics of impact evaluations in health per category 
 
 
 
All health 
sectors
General 
health
Maternal 
and 
newborn 
health
HIV/Aids Health 
infrastruc-
ture
Malaria Nutrition Mental 
health
Sanitation
Total number 96 13 9 43 1 11 6 12 1
of which
Journal articles 87 11 7 42 1 10 4 12 0
RCTS 83 10 4 41 0 11 5 12 0
3.79 4 4 3.3 4 3.21 3.7 4.5 4Mean result
 (scale 1-5)
Number of impact evaluations in:
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Appendix A5.3. Definitions of variables and summary statistics 
Variables for Tables 5.1., A5.4., A5.5., 
A5.6., A5.7. 
Description of Variable Source 
Logged DALYs number Logged disability adjusted life years (DALYs). DALYs 
calculation: Years of Life Lost (number of deaths*remaining 
life expectancy) + Years Lived with Disability (number of 
cases*disability weights). 
Global Burden of Disease Collaborative 
Network (2017) 
DALYs number Total number of DALYs. DALYs calculation: Years of Life 
Lost (number of deaths*remaining life expectancy) + Years 
Lived with Disability (number of cases*disability weights). 
Global Burden of Disease Collaborative 
Network (2017) 
DALYs rate Number of DALYs in 100,000 inhabitants. DALYs 
calculation: Years of Life Lost (number of deaths*remaining 
life expectancy) + Years Lived with Disability (number of 
cases*disability weights). 
Global Burden of Disease Collaborative 
Network (2017) 
Stock of health IEs Stock of impact evaluations in health per country (adding 
the ones, of which the results are communicated to the 
policy in that year). 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(2018) 
Number of health IEs Number of impact evaluations in health per country, of 
which the results are communicated to the policy in that 
year. 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(2018) 
Logged int. health disbursements, const 
US$ 
Logged health sector ODA gross disbursements in constant 
2011 US$. 1 US$ was added to all monetary values before 
logging. 
OECD (2018) 
Int. health disbursements, const US$ Total health sector ODA gross disbursements in constant 
2011 US$. 
OECD (2018) 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) Health expenditure, public as percentage of total 
government expenditure. 
WDI (World Bank 2018) 
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Logged population Logged population numbers. WDI (World Bank 2018) and Coppedge et al. 
(2017) (V-Dem) 
Logged GDP, const US$ Logged Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant 2011 
US$. 1 US$ was added to all monetary values before 
logging.  
WDI (World Bank 2018) 
Polity IV Democraty measure from fully autocratic (-10) to fully 
democratic (+10). 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) 
Political corruption Political corruption index combining the executive 
corruption index and public sector corruption index 
referring to public sector employees. Ranges between zero 
and one from less corrupt to more corrupt systems. 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) 
Election dummy Binary variable equal to one if executive election takes place 
that year. 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) 
Internal conflict Binary variable equal to one if country suffered internal 
armed conflict in given year. 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) based on 
Brecke (2001) 
Local government Binary variable equal to one if local government exists. Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) 
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness measures the quality of public 
service provision, bureacracy, competence of civil servants, 
independence of civil service and credibility of the 
government's commitment to policies. 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) based on 
Kaufmann et al. (2016) 
Free acad. Expression Measure based on survey question: "Is there academic 
freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to 
political issues?" Responses: 0 - not respected, 1 - weakly 
respected, 2 - somewhat respected, 3 - mostly respected, 4 - 
fully respected. 
Coppedge et al. (2017) (V-Dem) based on 
Pemstein et al. (2015) 
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Variables for Tables 5.2., 5.3., A5.9. Description of Variable Source 
IMR Infant mortality rate in 1,000 live births per district in 
Uganda, constructed as follows: (Number of deaths among 
infants<12 months of age per year / Number of live-born 
children per year)*1,000. 
Own construction based on DHS (2018) Birth 
Recode (UGBR) 
Under-five-mortality rate Below-five mortality rate in 1,000 live births per district in 
Uganda, constructed as follows: (Number of deaths among 
infants<59 months of age per year / Number of live-born 
children per year)*1,000. 
Own construction based on DHS (2018) Birth 
Recode (UGBR) 
Stocks of IEs in mat & neo health Stock of impact evaluations in maternal and newborn health 
(adding the ones, of which the results are communicated to 
the policy in that year). 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(2018) data coded into own categories 
Number of IEs in mat & neo health Number of impact evaluations in maternal and newborn 
health, of which the results are communicated to the policy 
in that year. 
International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(2018) data coded into own categories 
Logged mat & neo health disb Logged total aggregated disbursements in maternal and 
newborn health projects in constant 2011 US$. 1 US$ was 
added to all monetary values before logging. 
AidData (2018) data coded into own categories 
Mat & neo health disb Total aggregated disbursements in maternal and newborn 
health projects in constant 2011 US$. 
AidData (2018) data coded into own categories 
Conflict deaths Number of total fatalities resulting from conflict event per 
Ugandan districts. 
Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
created using UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset (GED) global version 17.1. 
Logged population Logged total population count per Ugandan districts, 
linearly interpolated. 
Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
World v4.GPWv4, UN Adjusted 
Population density Population density per Ugandan districts, persons per 
square km, linearly interpolated. 
Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
World v4.GPWv4, UN Adjusted 
Urban landcover Land coverage with urban regions of districts per year. Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
Global Land Cover Facility (MCD12Q1) 
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Rainfall Mean precipitation per district per year. Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
created using UDel Precipitation dataset 
(v4.01) 
Temperature Average air temperature per district per year. Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
created using UDel Air Temperature dataset 
(v4.01) 
Vegetation index Yearly value for Normalized Difference Vegetation Index 
(NDVI), mean per Ugandan districts. 
Goodman et al. (2016), GeoQuery AidData, 
created using the NASA Long Term Data 
Recode (v4) AVHRR data. 
Mother's age at birth Mother's age at birth. DHS (2018) Birth Recode (UGBR)    
Variables Table 5.4. Description of Variable Source 
Infant deaths Binary variable equal to one, if infant died below 12 months 
of age, zero otherwise (excluding stillbirths). 
Own construction based on DHS (2018) Birth 
Recode (UGBR) 
Active Mat&NeoIE Match Binary variable equal to one, as soon as there was a health 
impact evaluation in t-2 in maternal and newborn health 
and a project in maternal and newborn health in t-1, 
calculated within the period, the mother is giving birth to all 
her children. The variable is zero, as long as there is no such 
match. 
Own construction based on DHS (2018) Birth 
Recode (UGBR) 
Twin status Binary variable equal to one, if infant is part of a multiple 
birth, zero if single birth. 
Own construction based on DHS (2018) Birth 
Recode (UGBR) 
Birth order Birth order of child. DHS (2018) Birth Recode (UGBR) 
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Summary Statistics 
Variables Tables 5.1., A5.4., A5.5., 
A5.6., A5.7. 
Mean Sd Min Max 
Logged DALYs number 15.59 1.52 12.11 20.08 
DALYs number 23,600,000 71,400,00 183362.7 529,000,000 
DALYs rate 46825.63 25030.57 18068.65 188268.1 
Stock of health IEs 6.36 18.16 0.00 206.00 
Number of health IEs 1.33 3.20 0 36 
Logged int. health disbursements, 
 const US$ 
15.58 3.79 0 20.32 
Int. health disbursements, const US$ 38,300,000 68,500,000 0.00 670,000,000 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) 10.01 4.62 0.76 30.60 
Logged population 16.49 1.52 13.07 21.01 
Logged GDP, const US$ 24.13 1.87 19.72 29.53 
Polity IV 2.60 5.87 -10 10 
Political corruption 0.63 0.21 0.03 0.96 
Election dummy 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Internal conflict 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Local government 0.97 0.16 0 1 
Government effectiveness -0.46 0.64 -1.98 1.31 
Free acad. Expression 2.48 0.93 0.16 4 
 
    
Summary Statistics 
Variables Tables 5.2., 5.3., A5.9. 
Mean Sd Min Max 
IMR 79.94 48.93 0 287.12 
Under-five-mortality rate 105.25 59.19 0 352.94 
Stocks of IEs in mat & neo health 4.11 3.57 0 9 
Number of IEs in mat & neo health 0.50 0.68 0 2 
Logged mat & neo health disb 0.41 2.13 0 17.15 
Mat & neo health disb 38,601.67 922,524.3 0 28,300,000 
Conflict deaths 11.51 54.28 0 662 
Logged population 12.96 0.65 9.63 14.41 
Population density 322.28 998.92 15.77 10023.75 
Urban landcover 74.80 259.80 0 1853 
Rainfall 97.97 19.28 48.74 235.68 
Temperature 22.97 1.78 17.15 27.58 
Vegetation index 5951.48 517.69 3957.63 7379.76 
Mother's age at birth 25.75 1.31 21.15 33.23 
 
    
Summary Statistics 
Variables Table 5.4. 
Mean Sd Min Max 
Infant deaths 0.07 0.25 0.00 1 
Active Mat&NeoIE Match 0.03 0.17 0.00 1 
Twin status 0.03 0.17 0.00 1 
Birth order 3.92 2.45 1.00 18 
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Appendix Table A5.4. Timing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LOGGED NUMBER OF DALYS 
                
Number of health IEs (t) -0.000       
 (0.966)       
Number of health IEs (t-1)  -0.002**      
  (0.021)      
Number of health IEs (t-2(=tpolicy))   -0.001**     
   (0.035)     
Number of health IEs (t-3(=tendline))    -0.001    
    (0.329)    
Number of health IEs (t-4)     -0.002   
     (0.410)   
Number of health IEs (t-5)      -0.000  
      (0.976)  
Number of health IEs (t-6)       -0.000 
       (0.914) 
        
Number of observations 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,314 1,314 
R-squared (within) 0.584 0.586 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.584 0.584 
Number of countries 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls from the preferred specification as well as country- and year-
fixed effects and country-specific linear time trends are included. Full results are available upon request. 
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Table A5.5. Influence of the number of health IEs on logged DALYs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LOGGED NUMBER OF DALYS 
        
                
Number of health IEs (t-2(=tpolicy)) -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.042) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035) (0.029) 
Logged int. health disbursements,   -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001  0.001 
const (t-1)  (0.135) (0.116) (0.851) (0.483)  (0.495) 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) (t-1)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.878) (0.733) (0.543) (0.497)  (0.376) 
Logged population (t-1)   0.818*** 0.990*** 0.922*** 0.652 0.696* 
   (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (0.135) (0.085) 
Logged GDP, const (t-1)   -0.001 -0.065* -0.040   
   (0.991) (0.062) (0.314)   
Polity IV (t-1)   0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 
   (0.556) (0.367) (0.103) (0.073) (0.099) 
Political corruption (t-1)    -0.005 -0.057 -0.043 -0.070 
    (0.910) (0.266) (0.412) (0.208) 
Election dummy (t-1)    -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.568) (0.247) (0.193) (0.256) 
Internal conflict (t-1)    0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 
    (0.741) (0.610) (0.610) (0.447) 
Local government (t-1)    0.042*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Government effectiveness (t-1)     -0.002 -0.001 0.009 
     (0.883) (0.947) (0.645) 
Free acad. expression (t-1)     -0.012 -0.022* -0.014 
     (0.296) (0.073) (0.203) 
Constant 14.814*** 14.112*** 1.695 0.348 0.876 5.004 3.652 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.688) (0.943) (0.872) (0.482) (0.579) 
        
Country- and year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Country-specific linear time trends √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Number of observations 2,880 2,332 1,942 1,314 1,005 1,174 1,018 
Number of countries 160 142 120 81 81 93 82 
R-squared (within) 0.618 0.558 0.552 0.585 0.520 0.515 0.505 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.593 0.526 0.517 0.548 0.464 0.464 0.449 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A5.6. Influence of the number of health IEs on the DALY rate (in 100,000 inhabitants) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 DALY RATE (IN 100,000 INHABITANTS) 
        
                
Number of health IEs (t-2(=tpolicy)) -100.781* -54.379 -37.844 -49.186 -55.964 -44.705 -56.337 
 (0.082) (0.203) (0.363) (0.230) (0.186) (0.279) (0.187) 
Logged int. health disbursements,   -40.028 -77.637 8.949 120.267  118.512 
const (t-1)  (0.326) (0.280) (0.930) (0.436)  (0.443) 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) (t-1)  -38.335 -48.906 -70.109 -103.244  -109.263 
  (0.552) (0.517) (0.384) (0.267)  (0.247) 
Logged population (t-1)   2,529.198 8,228.272 4,416.795 -15,258.691 -4,973.650 
   (0.873) (0.645) (0.823) (0.435) (0.804) 
Logged GDP, const US$ (t-1)   -2,575.653 -6,944.330* -4,223.171   
   (0.555) (0.085) (0.324)   
Polity IV (t-1)   107.105 130.626 239.987 252.618 242.651 
   (0.309) (0.344) (0.153) (0.136) (0.151) 
Political corruption (t-1)    -1,663.464 -4,820.974 -3,450.053 -5,187.435 
    (0.597) (0.245) (0.386) (0.226) 
Election dummy (t-1)    -376.712 -640.287 -552.585 -620.008 
    (0.382) (0.246) (0.220) (0.267) 
Internal conflict (t-1)    432.983 -118.164 -166.491 -213.882 
    (0.306) (0.886) (0.823) (0.794) 
Local government (t-1)    1,927.303*** 1,306.822 1,538.963** 838.414 
    (0.006) (0.228) (0.032) (0.443) 
Government effectiveness (t-1)     174.756 -522.317 306.962 
     (0.857) (0.629) (0.762) 
Free acad. expression (t-1)     -445.697 -1,075.037 -454.027 
     (0.539) (0.157) (0.517) 
Constant 66,967.503*** 4,943.817*** 26,490.229 31,011.859 28,237.132 307,248.598 83,948.022 
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 (0.000) (0.001) (0.909) (0.912) (0.929) (0.337) (0.798) 
        
Country- and year FE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Country-specific linear time trends √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Number of observations 2,880 2,332 1,942 1,314 1,005 1,174 1,018 
Number of countries 160 142 120 81 81 93 82 
R-squared (within) 0.778 0.765 0.755 0.746 0.682 0.672 0.678 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.764 0.747 0.736 0.724 0.645 0.638 0.641 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table A5.7. The influence of stocks of impact evaluations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LOGGED NUMBER OF DALYS 
 
       
                
Stock of health IEs (t-2(=tpolicy)) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.190) (0.288) (0.535) (0.450) (0.390) (0.222) (0.299) 
Logged int. health disbursements,   -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002  0.002 
const (t-1)  (0.168) (0.122) (0.891) (0.410)  (0.408) 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) (t-1)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
 
 (0.938) (0.783) (0.605) (0.556)  (0.437) 
Logged population (t-1)   0.792*** 0.946*** 0.873** 0.594 0.644 
   (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.180) (0.125) 
Logged GDP, const US$ (t-1)   0.002 -0.062* -0.035   
   (0.974) (0.080) (0.386)   
Polity IV (t-1)   0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
   (0.538) (0.332) (0.084) (0.052) (0.077) 
Political corruption (t-1)    0.004 -0.047 -0.032 -0.057 
    (0.926) (0.335) (0.519) (0.265) 
Election dummy (t-1)    -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.585) (0.252) (0.186) (0.261) 
Internal conflict (t-1)    0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 
    (0.689) (0.737) (0.809) (0.589) 
Local government (t-1)    0.040*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) 
Government effectiveness (t-1)     -0.004 -0.003 0.007 
     (0.758) (0.864) (0.727) 
Free acad. expression (1-1)     -0.013 -0.024* -0.016 
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     (0.265) (0.057) (0.175) 
Constant 16.514*** 15.502*** 2.903 2.097 2.792 7.691 5.998 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.550) (0.717) (0.654) (0.318) (0.420) 
        
Observations 2,880 2,332 1,942 1,314 1,005 1,174 1,018 
R-squared (within) 0.621 0.561 0.553 0.587 0.523 0.522 0.510 
Number of countries 160 142 120 81 81 93 82 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.596 0.529 0.518 0.551 0.468 0.471 0.455 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table A5.8. The influence of the number of health evaluations on logged DALYs in periodic data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 LOGGED NUMBER OF DALYS 
 
       
                
Number of health IEs (t-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.544) (0.546) (0.463) (0.453) (0.463) (0.581) (0.503) 
Logged int. health disbursements,   0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.004 
const (t-1)  (0.623) (0.336) (0.329) (0.350)  (0.393) 
Gov. health exp. (% gov exp.) (t-1)  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
 
 (0.799) (0.365) (0.338) (0.345)  (0.293) 
Logged population (t-1)   0.909** 0.889** 0.903** 0.674 0.754 
   (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.185) (0.115) 
Logged GDP, const US$ (t-1)   0.108 0.108 0.108   
   (0.229) (0.232) (0.225)   
Polity IV (t-1)   0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 
   (0.452) (0.442) (0.425) (0.561) (0.452) 
Political corruption (t-1)    0.032 0.037 0.031 0.033 
    (0.438) (0.439) (0.492) (0.457) 
Election dummy (t-1)    -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.751) (0.757) (0.751) (0.715) 
Local government (t-1)    -0.017 -0.018 0.003 -0.013 
    (0.358) (0.363) (0.591) (0.442) 
Government effectiveness (t-1)     0.018 0.016 0.024 
     (0.596) (0.616) (0.476) 
Free acad. expression (t-1)     0.008 -0.002 0.000 
     (0.686) (0.912) (0.989) 
Constant 14.275*** 14.107*** -2.561 -2.234 -2.449 3.991 2.480 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.749) (0.779) (0.761) (0.623) (0.746) 
        
Number of observations 640 616 523 523 523 540 531 
Number of countries 160 155 133 133 133 137 135 
R-squared (within) 0.787 0.782 0.765 0.766 0.766 0.775 0.784 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.714 0.706 0.679 0.677 0.676 0.692 0.701 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A5.9. Full specification of Table 5.2. from the main results part 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (IN 1,000 LIVE 
BIRTHS) 
 
w/o 
controls 
with geo. 
controls 
with pop. 
controls 
preferred 
(full) 
      
Logged disb (t-1) * IEs (t-2) in mat & neo health -1.091* -1.106* -1.222* -1.234** 
 (0.072) (0.061) (0.053) (0.044) 
Logged mat & neo health disb (t-1) 1.062 1.012 1.183 1.182 
 (0.202) (0.203) (0.157) (0.161) 
Conflict deaths (t)   0.018 0.016 
   (0.424) (0.491) 
Logged population (t)   12.410 12.332 
   (0.624) (0.629) 
Population density (t)   0.011*** 0.010*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban landcover (t)   0.028*** 0.026*** 
   (0.001) (0.008) 
Rainfall (t)  -0.142  -0.081 
  (0.306)  (0.605) 
Temperature (t)  7.735  8.169 
  (0.143)  (0.131) 
Vegetation index (t)  0.002  0.005 
  (0.791)  (0.589) 
Mother's age at birth (t)    4.021** 
    (0.025) 
Constant 196.507*** 24.055 47.175 -339.302 
 (0.000) (0.848) (0.877) (0.259) 
     
District- and year-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Observations 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 
R-squared (within) 0.291 0.293 0.297 0.304 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.277 0.277 0.280 0.285 
Number of districts 56 56 56 56 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note that the levels of IEs in mat & neo 
health (t-2) are kept in the year fixed effects as they apply on the country-level. 
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Table A5.10. Main district-level results of interacted effects including district-specific linear time 
trends 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (IN 1,000 LIVE 
BIRTHS) 
 
w/o 
controls 
with geo. 
controls 
with pop. 
controls 
preferred 
(full) 
      
Logged disb (t-1) * IEs (t-2) in mat & neo health -1.439** -1.391** -1.457** -1.388** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) 
Logged mat & neo health disb (t-1) 1.889* 1.873* 1.886* 1.879* 
 (0.056) (0.051) (0.057) (0.054) 
Conflict deaths (t)   0.003 0.002 
   (0.915) (0.933) 
Logged population (t)   7.796 8.512 
   (0.955) (0.955) 
Population density (t)   -0.029 -0.012 
   (0.541) (0.804) 
Urban landcover (t)   -0.012 0.005 
   (0.830) (0.930) 
Rainfall (t)  0.057  0.064 
  (0.712)  (0.700) 
Temperature (t)  6.652  7.115 
  (0.211)  (0.217) 
Vegetation index (t)  0.007  0.006 
  (0.503)  (0.602) 
Mother's age at birth (t)    4.354*** 
    (0.010) 
Constant 3.517 -193.359 -94.221 -412.974 
 (0.535) (0.144) (0.959) (0.835) 
     
District- and year-fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
District-specific linear time trends √ √ √ √ 
Observations 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 
R-squared (within) 0.384 0.385 0.384 0.391 
Adjusted R-squared (within) 0.335 0.335 0.332 0.337 
Number of districts 56 56 56 56 
Notes: Robust p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note that the levels of IEs in mat & neo 
health (t-2) are kept in the year-fixed effects as they apply on the country-level. 
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